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Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
Position Of Homosexual Persons In
The United States*
By RHONDA R. RIVERA*****
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this Article is to provide a comprehensive picture
of the legal position of homosexual persons in the United States today.
It is hoped that this survey approach will provide, for the legal scholar,
the practicing attorney, and the interested layperson, an understanding
of the multiplicity of situations in which a person's sexual orientation
interfaces with the law. Secondly, it is hoped that this Article will pro-
vide a solid basis from which to begin an in-depth analysis of any legal
problem faced by homosexual persons. This survey will examine the
judicial response to homosexual issues, primarily focusing on civil mat-
ters rather than criminal ones. Where particularly significant, recent
legislative actions will be called to the reader's attention. Every civil
case dealing with homosexuality that was available to this researcher is
described in this Article. By close attention to the text and particularly
the footnotes, the reader can also locate most currently available and
pertinent law review articles.
This Article will make no attempt to examine the various theories,
either psychological,' sociological 2 or religious,3 seeking to explain the
* The research for this Article was made possible by a grant from the Small Grant
Program of Ohio State University.
** B.A., 1959, Douglass College; M.P.A., 1960, Syracuse University; J.D., 1967, Wayne
State University. Member, Bars of Ohio and Michigan. Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio
State University.
*** I would like to thank Jane E. Lesley, J.D., for so competently implementing most of
the research for this Article; Elizabeth L. Heimbach, B.A., for her valuable research assist-
ance; Dorothy Flynn, Lois Brecht, and Michaele Frost for their dedicated secretarial assist-
ance; Pamela S. Hyde, J.D., for her incomparable editorial assistance, and lastly, Lynn
Loacker, of The Hastings Law Journal for a superb editing job.
1. See UNDERSTANDING HOMOSEXUALITY: ITS BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
BASES (J.A. Loraine ed. 1974); D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED (1977).
2. See J.H. GAGNON & W. SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF
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presence of homosexual individuals in society. It is assumed that there
are approximately twenty million4 homosexual Americans today, and
that they come from all walks of life, all racial groups, all ethnic
groups, and all religious groups.5 Moreover, homosexual persons are
found among both sexes. It is the basic premise of this Article that the
legal problems of such a large group of people, whose very economic
and social diversity causes them to intersect with our institutions at all
levels, are an important and worthwhile area of concern for the legal
scholar, the legal practitioner, and the layperson. While it is the firm
belief of the author that homosexual persons are entitled to equal treat-
ment before the law, it will be the deviation from this ideal that is,
unfortunately, the focus of this survey Article.
Definitions
Because the focus of this Article is the judicial treatment of homo-
sexual individuals, it is important to define precisely the characteristics
of a homosexual person. The simplest definition may be that a homo-
sexual person is one who engages in a sexual act with a person of the
same sex.6 This definition causes immediate problems. Do we label a
person "a homosexual" if he or she behaves in. this manner once?
Twice? How often does same-sex behavior have to occur for the actor
to earn the label? Does it matter when one engages in this type of
conduct? During puberty? While heterosexually married? What kind
HUMAN SEXUALITY (1973); M. SCHOFIELD, SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HOMOSEXUALITY
(1965); C.A. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX (1975).
3. See J. McNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL (1976); N. PITTENGER,
TIME FOR CONSENT: A CHRISTIAN'S APPROACH TO HOMOSEXUALITY (rev. ed. 1970); L.
SCANZONI & V.R. MOLLENKOTT, IS THE HOMOSEXUAL MY NEIGHBOR? (1978); Barrett, Le-
gal Homophobia and the Christian Church, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1019 (1979).
4. According to the Kinsey Institute for Sex Research, Inc., 9.13% of the total popula-
tion have had either extensive or more than incidental homosexual experience. Given the
United States population of approximately 210 million people, approximately 19,170,000
persons must fall within that group. Letter from Paul H. Gebhard, Institute for Sex Re-
search (March 18, 1977). See generally A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 650-51 (1948); A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P.
GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 473-74 (1953).
5. Hooker, Homosexuality, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK
FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY 11 (1972).
6. "[Hlomosexual: One, especially a male, whose desire for sexual relations is di-
rected to a person of the same sex." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (1969).
"[H]omosexuality: sexual desire or behavior directed toward a person or persons of one's
own sex." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1966).
"[Hlomosexuality 1: atypical sexuality characterized by manifestation of sexual desire to-
ward a member of one's own sex; 2: erotic activity with a member of one's own sex.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966).
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of behavior are we talking about? Strong emotional attachment to a
person of the same sex? Holding hands and hugging? Kissing? Fanta-
sies? Mutual masturbation? Fellatio? Cunnilingus? Sodomy? Is a
person who announces his or her status but never engages in any same-
sex sexual behavior considered "homosexual"? Is a celibate homosex-
ual person really "a homosexual"?
Kinsey recognized some of these problems and, consequently, ex-
amined sexual behavior on a continuum.7 At one end of the contin-
uum is the exclusively heterosexual person ("0" on the Kinsey scale)
who fantasizes about and acts sexually only with persons of the oppo-
site sex. A "6" on the Kinsey scale is the exclusively homosexual per-
son who fantasizes about and acts sexually only with persons of the
same sex. Varying degrees of heterosexuality and homosexuality char-
acterize persons in between. At the middle of the continuum (rated
"3") are those persons whose erotic arousal or overt experiences are
equally heterosexual and homosexual. Kinsey's rating scheme can be
used to describe an entire life span or can be used in reference only to
particular periods in a person's life.8 Even this superficial discussion
should illustrate that labeling a person "a homosexual" is a complex
matter, medically or psychologically. 9
Courts have generally been uninterested in these distinctions. This
Article will reveal that courts have treated a wide variety of persons as
"homosexual" individuals. For example, the following persons have
been labeled as "homosexual" and treated as such:
-a married father who engaged in same-sex behavior in his late
teens,' 0
-a man with a single conviction for a same-sex sex crime,"
-a woman whose friends were bisexuals,
12
-a man who said he was a homosexual but never admitted any
overt same-sex behavior,'
3
-women in mannish attire, 14
-persons who exhibited characteristics and mannerisms which evi-
7. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
638-41 (1948).
8. Id. at 639.
9. "The attempt to categorize all humanity into two mutually exclusive and contrast-
ing groups of homosexuals and heterosexuals, a form of 'them' and 'us', besides being ethi-
cally and politically dubious, produces misleading over-simplifications." D.J. WEST,
HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 1 (1977).
10. Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
11. United States v. Flores-Rodriquez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956).
12. Bennett v. Clemens, 230 Ga. 317, 196 S.E.2d 842 (1973).
13. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 348, 535 P.2d 804 (1975).




The important point is that courts and judges have treated a vari-
ety of people as "homosexuals." Where, in fact, these persons fall on
the Kinsey sexual behavior scale is unimportant for the purposes of this
Article. If the courts treat a person as a "homosexual," then for the
purposes of this Article, that person is a homosexual individual. For
the remainder of this Article, the definition of a homosexual person is a
person so labeled by the courts.
Homosexual individuals include both men and women. The term
"homosexual person" as used in this article applies equally to persons
of both sexes. The term "lesbian"'16 refers specifically to homosexual
women. There is no similar nonpejorative term exclusively for the
male homosexual. 17 The term "gay"' 18 is synonymous with the term
"homosexual" and these two words will be used interchangeably
throughout this Article.
This Article will not discuss the legal position of transsexual indi-
viduals.' 9 There is a popular, but incorrect, belief that transsexualism
15. Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 27 App. Div. 2d 918, 278 N.Y.S.2d
951 (1967).
16. D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 12 (1955); see Reese, The Forgotten Sex: Lesbians,
Liberation, and the Law, It WILLAMETTE L.J. 354 (1975). The term lesbian is allegedly
derived from the island of Lesbos, home of the famous Greek poetess Sappho. It is widely
believed that Sappho was a homosexual woman.
17. Male homosexuals are usually called "faggots" by persons wishing to give offense.
The term allegedly arose from the bundles of sticks used to burn homosexual persons alive
during the middle ages. "Dyke" is the term of opprobrium for female homosexuals. Like
the word "nigger," which is offensive only when used by nonblack persons, the words "fag-
got" and "dyke" are offensive when used by nonhomosexual persons but permitted and even
used affectionately among some homosexual individuals. The homosexual argot for a
nonhomosexual person is a "straight" person.
18. There are varying theories as to how the word "gay" came to be synonymous with
the word "homosexual." Some persons believe that it came from a story by Gertrude Stein
entitled Miss Furr and Miss Skeene.
"She did not find it gay living in the same place where she had alvays been living. She
went to a place where some were cultivating something . . . . She met Georgine Skeene
there who was cultivating her voice which some thought was quite a pleasant one. Helen
Furr and Georgine Skeene lived together then. Georgine Skeene liked travelling. Helen
Furr did not care about travelling, she liked to stay in one place and be gay there. They
were together then and travelled to another place and stayed there and were gay there.
"They stayed there and were gay there, not very gay there, just gay there. They were
both gay there, they were regularly working there both of them cultivating their voices there,
they were both gay there. Georgine Skeene was gay there and she was regular, regular in
being gay, regular in not being gay, regular in being a gay one who was not being gay longer
than was needed to be one being quite a gay one. They were both gay then there and both
working there then." SELECTED WRITINGS OF GERTRUDE STEIN 563 (Van Vechten ed.
1962).
19. See Wein & Remmers, Employment Discrimination and Gender Dysphoria." Legal
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and homosexuality are the same thing. A transsexual person is one
whose psychosexual identity differs from his physiological sex.20 A
male transsexual psychologically believes himself to be female, but his
genitalia are male. A homosexual person is congruent in his or her
psychosexual identity and physiological appearance. For example, a
lesbian believes she is a woman and has female genitalia. She desires
no change in her physiognomy because it already conforms to her
psychosexual identity.21 The transsexual person deeply desires sexual
reassignment surgery to conform body to mind. The erotic preference
of a transsexual person is generally for a person of the opposite sex,22
although this may superficially appear to be a same-sex orientation.
For example, since a male transsexual believes himself female, his
erotic preference is for a male. Once sexual reassignment surgery con-
forms external body form to mental gender identity, the preference of
most transsexuals is seen clearly as heterosexual. On the other hand,
the homosexual woman, for example, knows mentally that she is a wo-
man and wants to remain physically a woman, but her erotic prefer-
ence is for another woman.
Homosexuality must also be distinguished from transvestism. A
transvestite is a person who has a fetish of dressing in the clothing of
Defnitions of Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex and Disability, 30 HASTING L.J. 1075
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Wein & Remners]. Holloway, Transsexuals-Their Legal Sex,
40 U. COLO. L. REV. 281 (1968); Note, City of Chicago v. Wilson and ConstitutionalProtection
for Personal Appearance. Cross Dressing as an Element of Sexual Identity, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1151 (1979); Note, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Conceptual
Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288 (1975); Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Sur-
gery and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 96 (1971); Note, Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search
for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REv. 236 (1971); Comment, Transsexuals in Search
of LegalAcceptance: The Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
331 (1978).
20. A transsexual is an individual anatomically of one sex who firmly believes he or she
belongs to the other sex. This belief is so strong that the transsexual is obsessed with the
desire to have his or her body, appearance, and social status altered to conform to that of his
or her "rightful" gender. Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the
Law, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 963, 963 n.1 (1977) (citing TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REAS-
SIGNMENT 487 (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969)). The popular method of describing this
situation is that the male transsexual feels like a woman trapped in a man's body. See Wein
& Remmers, Employment Protection and Gender Dysphoria: Legal Defnitions of Unequal
Treatment on the Basis of Sex and Disability, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1075 (1979).
21. In her current research on matched samples of female transsexuals and lesbians,
Dr. Anke Ehrhardt found that the transsexuals had fantasies that they were males while
having sex relations with other women. This was not true of the lesbians. L. SCANZONI &
V.R. MOLLENKOTr, IS THE HOMOSEXUAL My NEIGHBOR? 14, 144 (1978) (citing report by
Dr. Ehrhardt at the Institute for Sex Research Summer Program, Bloomington, Indiana,
July 28, 1977).
22. See Holloway, Transsexuals-Their Legal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 281, 282 n.6
(1968).
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the opposite sex. 23 The great majority of transvestites are heterosexual
in their sexual preference.
24
Throughout this Article, the author has tried never to refer to any-
one as "a homosexual". Rather, phrases such as homosexual individ-
ual, homosexual person, homosexual teacher, homosexual doctor, or
homosexual sailor have been used. A person's sexual preference is but
one part of his or her character, and acting upon it occupies a small
part of his or her actual existence. Hence, the author has used the word
"homosexual" only as an adjective which describes the sexual orienta-
tion of the individual rather than using "homosexual" as a noun which
implies a being whose sole dimension is an erotic one.
2 5
Methodological Problems
There are a number of methodological problems involved in re-
searching legal decisions dealing with homosexuality. The first and
most obvious problem is the variety of legal subdisciplines which are
involved. To examine comprehensively the legal position of the homo-
sexual person, the legal researcher must examine labor law cases, do-
mestic relations cases, administrative law cases, criminal cases, and
constitutional law cases. Aside from the challenge to the abilities of the
researcher, such a search requires familiarity with a large variety of
indexes and digests. Dealing with so many areas is even more difficult
since many indexes did not in the past, and some still do not, list cases
on homosexuality under a separate topical heading. In fact, for years
most indexes never had a single topic listing for homosexuality. Thus,
the ferreting out of relevant decisions is often difficult.
23. TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 963 n.3 (R. Green & J. Money eds.
1969).
24. C.A. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 26 (1975).
25. A new study commissioned from the Kinsey Institute by the National Institute of
Mental Health was to be published in late August, 1978. This study by Alan P. Bell and
Martin S. Weinberg is entitled Homosexualities: A Study of Human Diversity Among Men
and Women. Researchers for this new report discovered a wide diversity among gay persons
and concluded that gay persons "are best understood when they are seen as whole human
beings, not just in terms of what they do sexually." The Advocate, Aug. 23, 1978, at 8.
According to Alan P. Bell, the report shows "that homosexuality is not... pathological and
that all homosexuals cannot be lumped together." The report also indicates that homosex-
ual individuals, like heterosexual individuals, differ widely in their living arrangements, oc-
cupations, social activities, and personal relationships. Moreover, the study indicates "that
most homosexual persons have come to terms with their sexual orientation and are no more
psychologically at odds with the world than heterosexuals." The Citizen Journal (Colum-
bus, Ohio), Aug. 9, 1978, at 1. See Richards, SexualAutonomy and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
957, 727n. 117 (1979). [hereinafter cited as Richards].
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Second, the person who is attempting to locate decisions and infor-
mation on a controversial and emotion-laden subject is often not pro-
vided the whole-hearted cooperation that researchers in less
controversial fields enjoy. Researching and writing on a subject which
many find personally objectionable often causes the researcher and/or
writer to be socially stigmatized in a manner which is not conducive to
open and free research.
26
Third, judges in their opinions for a variety of reasons may choose
never to use the word homosexuality.27
Lastly, there is some evidence that cases involving homosexual is-
sues are unpublished more often than are cases involving other issues.
28
Because of the various difficulties involved in the use of regular
legal sources, the author has relied at times on information derived
from nonlegal periodicals. 29 Wherever possible, however, traditional
legal sources have been utilized.
It is hoped that, in addition to gaining factual information, the
reader of this Article will gain an understanding of current judicial atti-
tudes toward homosexuality and an appreciation of the tenuous legal
position of the homosexual person in the United States.
Employment and Related Occupational Discrimination
I. Private Employment
Although it is generally acknowledged that discrimination against
homosexual persons is quite common in the private employment sec-
26. "Too often, even those who write about homosexuality are fearful that to express
an interest in the subject, by implication, may be to include oneself within that category.
Surely this is the reason why 'a well established scholar on issues relating to homosexuality'
uses a pseudonym in his published article." Reese, The Forgotten Sex: Lesbians, Liberation,
and the Law, 11 WILLAMETrE L.J. 354, 355 n.4 (1975).
27. In State v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 118, 313 N.E.2d 847, 851 (1974), Justice
Stern noted in his dissent: "In fact, nowhere in the recorded decisions of the Ohio Supreme
Court has any justice ever used the term 'homosexual' or 'homosexuality' .... " His opin-
ion indicates that Justice Stem did computerized research using LEXIS. Id. at 118 n.3, 313
N.E.2d at 851.
28. See To Publish or Not to Publish-That Is The Question, 2 SEX L. RPrR. 18 (1976).
See section on Custody at notes 513-631 & accompanying text infra.
29. Among the nonlegal sources utilized by the author are various periodicals pub-
lished by gay groups. These periodicals often contain current information about legal events
involving the gay community. The three periodicals of this type most often utilized are The
Advocate, a national gay newspaper published bi-weekly; It's Time, the newsletter of the
National Gay Task Force (NGTF), see note 70 infra, and Lesbian Connection, a nationally
distributed newsletter published monthly in East Lansing, Michigan.
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tor,30 the exact extent of such discrimination is difficult to ascertain.
Because homosexual individuals3' are not readily identifiable, data col-
lection is difficult. Since presumably only the "known" or "recogniza-
ble" homosexual individual is fired, or not hired, it follows that other
homosexual persons would do their best to remain unknown.
Despite the difficulties inherent in measuring the extent of employ-
ment discrimination against homosexual persons, gay people clearly
perceive themselves as being the subjects of discrimination.
32
The common law, reflecting the Anglo-American belief in the free-
dom to contract, has supported the principle that private persons have a
right to hire and fire whomever they wish, and American courts have
been firm in the belief that "[a]n employer's right to employ and dis-
charge whom he pleases, in the absence of any statutory or contractual
provision is unquestioned. ' 33 Thus, under the common law the
homophobic private employer apparently can fire or refuse to hire any
homosexual person in the absence of governmental prohibitions.
34
The only federal legislation that prohibits discrimination by pri-
vate employers is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,35 which
proscribes discriminatory employment practices based on certain enu-
merated characteristics. While neither homosexuality, sexual prefer-
ence nor sexual orientation are among the enumerations, sex is one of
the proscribed characteristics.
36
On at least two occasions, disgruntled employees have unsuccess-
fully sought to include sexual orientation or transsexualism within the
sex discrimination prohibition. In a case of first impression, Smith v.
30. See Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REv. 687, 702-03
(1973); Note, Homosexuality and The Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273, 278 (1971).
31. See Cyr v. Walls, 439 F. Supp. 697, 703 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
32. See National Gay Task Force Action Report, Documenting Discrimination 2
(June-July 1978); Gay Activists Alliance, Employment Discrimination Against Homosexu-
als (1970 & Supp. No. 1 1971).
33. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 127 F. Supp. 934, 937
(D.D.C. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956) (emphasis added).
34. If a statute does not forbid discrimination for a specific reason, e.g., sex or race,
private persons can exercise their prejudices. See Kramarsky v. Stahl Management, 46
U.S.L.W. 2241 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Nov. 9, 1977) (upholding landlord's right to refuse to rent
to a black, divorced female lawyer on the grounds that he did not want to rent to lawyers).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
36. Section 2000e-2(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condictions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
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Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,37 the court held that Title VII did not
forbid employment discrimination based on "affectional or sexual pref-
erence" of the applicant, despite the fact that the plaintiff was not char-
acterized as a homosexual person but as "effeminate." The defendant-
employer candidly admitted that the plaintiff was not employed in the
employer's mailroom because he appeared "effeminate. '38 The plain-
tiff, however, argued that by hiring a black female instead, the defend-
ant-employer had hired an employee displaying effeminate
characteristics and thus had discriminated between two "effeminate"
employees on the basis of sex. The court rejected this analysis on the
grounds "that the plaintiff, a male, displayed characteristics inappropri-
ate to his sex."'39 This assumption that certain behavior is only appro-
priate to people of one gender raises a much broader Title VII issue
which was not dealt with at all, namely, that one of the purposes of
Title VII was to eliminate all stereotyped conceptions about men and
women in the hiring process.40
The court in Smith went beyond the issue of discriminatory hiring
on the basis of appearance and evoked the broader principle of an em-
ployer's right to hire and fire by saying that "[i]f the law-making proc-
ess has yet reserved freedom of action (by not forbidding it) to an
employer, it is the duty of the courts to protect it."' 41 The court con-
cluded that Congress had not protected the employment rights of
homosexuals by forbidding discrimination based on "affectional or sex-
ual preference" 42 and that the freedom traditionally afforded the em-
ployer was not circumscribed.
Four months after Smith, another district court reached a similar
conclusion. In Voyles v. Ralph K Davies Medical Center43 the court
held that Title VII does not protect the employment rights of transsexu-
als,44 and, in dicta, broadened that lack of protection to cover homosex-
37. 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
38. Id. at 1099.
39. Id. at 1099 n.2.
40. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
41. 395 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
42. Id. at I101. The court indicated that there was a bill before Congress to amend
Title VII and add "sexual preference" to the enumerated characteristics. However, the court
noted that such a bill was not yet enacted and "[would] not be enacted here in these cham-
bers." Id. at 1101 n.6.
43. 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
44. Id at 457. See Wein & Remmers, supra note 19, at 1095. See notes 19-20 &
accompanying text supra for the definition of transsexualism.
uals and bisexuals as well.45 The plaintiff in this case was discharged
prior to undergoing a sexual-reassignment operation. The defendant-
employer discharged her for the admitted reason that such a change
might have a potentially adverse effect on both the patients receiving
treatment at the medical center and on the plaintifi's co-workers.
46
The Voyles court took cognizance of legislation pending in Con-
gress that would have amended Title VII to afford protection to homo-
sexuals. The court said that the failure of these amendments made it
"clear that in enacting Title VII, Congress had no intention of proscrib-
ing discrimination based on an individual's transsexualism. ' 47 This
approach seems to indicate either sloppy jurisprudence or total igno-
rance of the difference between a homosexual individual and a
transsexual individual.
48
Thus, two federal courts have rather clearly ruled out Title VII as
a protection for homosexual employees in the private sector. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)4 9 has been
equally unhelpful. 50 In 1975 the EEOC rendered two decisions dealing
with homosexual employees. In both decisions, the Commission found
that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with either complaint, on the grounds
that Congress did not intend to include a person's sexual practices
within the meaning of the term "sex." 5'
Given the intransigent attitudes of the courts and the EEOC, it
would be fair to conclude that at the present time federal law provides
no protection for the privately employed homosexual individual.
State laws are no better. Although nearly all states now have
prohibitions against employment discrimination based on characteris-
45. Id.
46. Id. at 456. Legitimate customer preference, related to the manner in which the
work will be performed and the manner in which such performance will be received by
customers, can provide a basis for an employer to select employees on the basis of their sex.
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (empha-
sis added).
47. 403 F. Supp. at 457.
48. See notes 19-20 & accompanying text supra. If the judge had known that by far the
majority of transsexuals are heterosexually oriented, he might have reached a different
result.
49. The EEOC is the agency created by Congress to carry out the goals of Title VII.
While the Commission renders decisions based on complaints, it can also issue opinions
through its General Counsel. However, such opinions can only be relied on by the ad-
dressee(s). 35 Fed. Reg. 18,692 (1970).
50. The General Counsel of the EEOC issued an Opinion holding that an employer did
not commit an unlawful employment practice by failing to hire or by discharging a homo-
sexual individual. OP. GEN. COUNSEL EEOC M108-66 (Feb. 2, 1966).
51. [1976] 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6493, 6495.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
THE LEGAL POSITION OF HOMOSEXUALS
tics such as sex and race, there is no state fair employment practices law
that specifically protects homosexual individuals. In a recent case, Gay
Law Students' Association v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co.
(GLSA v. PT& T),5 2 gay activists unsuccessfully sought to persuade a
California district court to include protection for the homosexual em-
ployee under California's Fair Employment Practices Act. The
plaintiffs first sought to come under the California Fair Employment
Practices Act (FEPA) by claiming that the enumerated characteristics
(race, sex, religious creed, color, etc.) were merely illustrative rather
than restrictive. The court found not only that the legislature had spe-
cifically listed the only characteristics it sought to protect but had re-
fused affirmatively to include sexual orientation by an express refusal
to amend the FEPA.
53
Alternatively, the plaintiffs proferred a rather novel argument de-
rived from the "disparate impact" test of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
54
They alleged that private employers and PT & T in particular, discrim-
inated more heavily against male homosexuals than female homosexu-
als and hence this was discrimination based on "sex," one of the
enumerated characteristics of the California FEPA.55 The court in
GLSA v. PT&T, however, dismissed this argument by saying that no
showing of disproportionate impact upon one sex had been made.
56
Moreover, the court indicated that even if the showing had been made,
the applicability of the Griggs doctrine to men as a class was
questionable.
57
The plaintiffs also argued that discrimination against homosexual
individuals is literally discrimination based on gender, since it disquali-
fied individuals on the basis of stereotyped characteristics of the sexes.
Rather than confronting the issue of stereotypes, the court disposed of
this argument by citing Smith58 and Voyles 59 to show that federal
52. 135 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1977), petitionfor hearing granted, No. SF 32625 (Cal. Sup. Ct.,
May 3, 1977).
53. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70.
54. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
55. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 470. This argument apparently was first developed in G. COOPER,
H. RABB & H. RUBIN, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, 275 (1975). The argument has also
been discussed in great detail in Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimination in Employment, 16
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495, 506-11 (1976), as well as in Rivera & Galvan, Homosexuals and
Title VII, 3 TEx. S.U.L. REV. 126, 136-38- (1975). The reasoning of this argument hardly
seems helpful to homosexual persons in general, particularly when all an employer need
show is that he discriminated equally against male homosexuals and female homosexuals.
56. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
57. Id.
58. Id (citing Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975)).
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courts do not regard Title VII's "sex" discrimination prohibition as ap-
plying to sexual preference.
Lastly, the Gay Law Students' Association argued that the right to
work was a "fundamental right" and, consequently, that the refusal of
the California State FEP Commission to hear cases of discrimination
against homosexuals constituted a denial of homosexual persons' due
process and equal protection rights. In answering this contention the
court summed up the current situation of the homosexual employee:
"There is simply no constitutional right to work for an unwilling
employer."
60
While neither the federal government nor any state government
prohibits employment discrimination against homosexual individuals
in the private sector, a number of city6 1 and county 62 ordinances have
granted some measure of protection. Many of the ordinances are less
than one year old; virtually none are more than three years old. Conse-
quently, their respective effects are difficult to gauge.
63
59. Id at 471 (citing Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456
(N.D. Cal. 1975)).
60. Id at 471.
61. The following ordinances prohibit private employment discrimination against
homosexuals: Anchorage, Alas., Ordinance A077-75 (Jan. 20, 1976); ANN ARBOR, MICH.,
CODE ch. 112, §§ 9:151-9:155 (1972); DETROIT, MICH., CODE ch. 10, §§ 7-1004-7-1005
(1976); EAST LANSING, MICH., CODE ch. 4, § 1.127 (1973); MADISON, WIS., CODE
§ 323(7)(a) (1976); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 945 (1975); PALO ALTO, CAL., ADMIN.
CODE § 2.22.050 (1969); Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 102,562 (Sept. 18, 1973); Washington,
D.C., Human Rights Law (Nov. 16, 1973).
The following cities and counties were reported by It's Time, the newsletter of the Na-
tional Gay Task Force, in March, 1977, to have laws prohibiting private employment dis-
crimination against homosexuals: Alfred, N.Y.; Austin, Tex.; Berkeley, Cal.; Cleveland
Heights, Ohio; Marshall, Minn.; Portland, Ore.; San Jose, Cal.; Toronto, Ont.; Tucson, Ariz.;
Yellow Springs, Ohio; Hennepin County, Minn.; Howard County, Md.; Santa Cruz County,
Cal.
Since March 1977, other cities have passed ordinances prohibiting private employment
discrimination: San Francisco, Cal., see National Gay Task Force Action Report 3 (May
1978); Aspen, Colo., see The Advocate, Jan. 25, 1977, at 8; Champaign, Ill., see The Advo-
cate, Sept. 9, 1977, at 8; Iowa City, Iowa, see The Advocate, Feb. 8, 1978, at 11; Windsor,
Ont., see The Advocate, Feb. 8, 1978, at 11. However, a number of such ordinances recently
have been repealed by referendum in Dade County, Fla.; Wichita, Kan.; St. Paul, Minn.;
and Eugene, Ore.
See note 153 infra for a list of ordinances and executive orders banning discrimination
in public employment.
62. The following counties are reported to have laws forbidding discrimination against
homosexual persons in private employment: Santa Cruz, Cal.; Latah, Idaho; Howard, Md;
Hennepin, Minn. It's Time, March, 1977.
63. On July 23, 1976, the Municipal Clerk's Office of Anchorage, Ala., reported no
complaints under their six-month-old ordinance. In Ann Arbor, Mich., only four com-
plaints were made during the first year of the ordinance's existence. In Seattle, Wash., the
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Although advocates of gay rights have received little encouragent
from the courts and only questionable relief from statutes enacted by
municipal and county subdivisions, persistent efforts are being made to
rectify the position of the homosexual person in the private sector.
There is a continuing battle by gay rights activists to amend Title VII.
64
However, it is difficult to ascertain the likelihood of success. A strong
argument for such a bill was made over seven years ago by Irving Ko-
varsky in probably the best legal article on employment rights of
homosexuals.65 Kovarsky suggests a novel approach to the question of
why the government should protect the homosexual individual from
private employment discrimination. First, he notes that "there is a
problem of considerable magnitude when anywhere from 4 to 20 per-
cent of our adult male population can anticipate employment difficulty
if homosexual behavior is established or suspected. '66 He then argues
that eliminating employment discrimination against homosexuals is in
the national economic interest and in the self-interest of employers:
Economists, public leaders and others display considerable in-
terest in the gross national product, an indicator of economic well-
being, without considering discrimination faced by the homosexual.
While the employment rights of minorities are protected by state and
federal law as a means of meeting economic objectives, no concern is
shown in the income of the homosexual. Public policy in the United
States calls for full employment, an unreal goal. Therefore, there is a
general consensus of opinion that 4 percent unemployment, or less, is
socially tolerable. The unemployment rate of the homosexual may
or may not vary from the national averages, but he faces discrimina-
tion and reduced income in the more skilled and desirable jobs.
In addition, the failure to provide adequate economic opportu-
nity geared to skill and education has an impact on the male facing
antagonism from the employer. The self-interest of the homosexual
in employment is evident and needs little comment, but the employer
is something else. Given his prejudices and a genuine interest in up-
lifting morale in the plant, the employer is-reluctant to hire the ef-
feminate male or known homosexual. Statistically, however, the
City Clerk could recall two cases since the statute's inception, both won by the complainants.
S. Berlin, Private Employment Discrimination Based Upon Sexual Preference (Sept. 26,
1976) (unpublished seminar paper).
64. E.g., H.R. 12149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 2937 (1978).
65. Kovarsky, Fair Employment for the Homosexual, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 527. It
should be noted that Kovarsky focuses only on males. See also Oldham, Questions of Exclu-
sion and Exception Under Title VII- "Sex-Plus and the BFOQ," 23 HASTINGS L.J. 55, 67-
71(1971).
66. Id., at 530. Recent estimates are that 13.95% of males and 4.25% of females, or a
combined average of 9.13% of the total population, had either extensive or more than inci-
dental homosexual experience. Letter from Paul Gebhard, Director, Institute for Sex Re-
search, Indiana University, to the author (March 18, 1977).
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large employer is bound to hire sexually inverted employees since
most homosexuals are not effeminate and are unidentified. Thus the
homosexual employee who is aware of the employer's policy toward
homosexuals lives in fear knowing that he will lose his job and will
be unable to find other employment if discovered. A reasonable as-
sumption is that the "closet" homosexual performs less efficiently be-
cause of inner torment (however, the homosexual may perform in a
superior fashion so that his employer finds him indispensable). The
employer maximizing profit should be interested in the mental well-
being of the unknown (and known) homosexual employee.
6 7
Theorists have long argued that nondiscriminatory hiring was eco-
nomically sound, but Kovarsky was first to point out that the idea ap-
plies as much to homosexuals as it does to women and blacks.
In this same article, Professor Kovarsky also suggests that the
Taft-Hartley Act could be a useful fair employment tool. He points out
that nothing in the Act protected black workers from racial discrimina-
tion by an employer or union, until the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) interpreted the requirement of fair representation and
the definition of an unfair labor practice to give the black worker some
measure of protection. In 1971, Kovarsky felt that "[i]t [was] within the
realm of possibility that the NLRB, faced with a legitimate question of
fair representation or an unfair labor practice, might extend a helping
hand to the homosexual. '68 However, there has been no indication in
labor literature that such developments have occurred.
69
Nevertheless, gay activists, realistically facing the lack of govern-
ment protection in the employment area, have begun negotiations with
large employers through the National Gay Task Force (NGTF).70 Ba-
sically, these activists have sought and obtained pledges of no discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual preference. To date such employers as
AT&T, IBM, Citibank, and NBC have agreed to such pledges.
7'
Although convincing economic and pragmatic arguments can be
made in support of federal relief for the homosexual individual seeking
employment in the private sector, such relief has not been forthcoming.
67. Kovarsky, Fair Employment for the Homosexual, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 527, 530-31.
68. Id. at 560.
69. See generally Modjeska, The Uncertain Miranda FuelDoctrine, 38 OHIO ST. L.J.
807 (1977). However, in a recent speech to the Annual Conference of the National Public
Employee Labor Relations Association, Robert Kipp, President of the International City
Management Association, alerted public labor negotiators to the needs of gay people, noting
that labor "can expect [homosexuals] to press successfully for entry into, and special consid-
eration in, the labor force." The Advocate, July 12, 1978, at 12.
70. The National Gay Task Force is a national gay civil rights organization founded in
1973. Its address is Room 506, 80 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, 10011.
71. National Gay Task Force Action Report 4 (April 1978).
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Until legislatures and courts squarely recognize the obstacles con-
fronting the homosexual individual, advocates of gay rights must con-
tinue to look to the efforts of such groups as the NGTF for needed
reforms in the area of private employment.
II. Federal Employment
The largest employer in the United States is the federal govern-
ment. In 1976 approximately 2.835 million civilians were directly em-
ployed by the United States government. 72 Moreover, many workers in
private industry under government contract are subject to federal hir-
ing standards. These same federal government standards indirectly af-
fect state and local government employment as well as private
employment. Therefore, the federal government's long standing em-
ployment policy of discriminating against homosexual individuals af-
fects a large number of United States citizens. Since the federal
government is generally regarded as being in the forefront of liberal,
nondiscriminatory employment policies, it is ironic that it has for years
discriminated against homosexuals. This discrimination has particu-
larly far reaching effects, because a person discharged by the govern-
ment as a homosexual individual will encounter severe problems in
subsequently locating employment in the private sector.
73
Federal Civil Service employees are considered part of the execu-
tive branch but their protection from arbitrary dismissal comes from
Congress. Thus, while Congress authorized the President to regulate
the Civil Service,74 it limited the President's authority to remove a civil
service employee except for "such cause as will promote the efficiency
of the service."'75 The President has delegated these regulatory tasks to
the United States Civil Service Commission.
76
In the past, the policies and regulations of the Civil Service Com-
mission have systematically excluded homosexual persons from gov-
ernment employ. Not only were these antihomosexual policies and
72. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 269 (1977).
73. This stigmatization was recognized by Chief Judge Bazelon in Norton v. Macy, 417
F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) when he said: "[The dismissal imposes a 'badge of infamy'
disqualifying the victim from any further Federal employment, damaging his prospects for
private employ, and fixing upon him the stigma of an official defamation of character." Id.
at 1164 (footnotes omitted).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
75. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a), 7512(a) (1976).
76. Exec. Order No. 10,577, 3 C.F.R. 218 (1954-1958 Comp.), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 1302 (1976).
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regulations strongly supported by the Congress for a long time,77 judi-
cial review of the commission's policies was infrequent. Until recently,
the courts upheld the view that government employment was a privi-
lege not a right.78 This idea, coupled with a tradition of judicial nonin-
terference with the executive branch, supplied the courts with a basis
for upholding nearly all the administrative decisions of the federal
government.
79
The Early Cases.- Judicial Deference to Administrative Findings
With the notable exception of Judge Bazelon's opinion for the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Scott v. Macy, 80 fed-
eral courts consistently deferred to the finding of the Civil Service
Commission that a dismissal was "for cause." As a result, federal
courts failed to examine the more substantive issues raised by such
dismissals.
Dew v. Halaby,81 decided by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in 1963, was apparently the first published case of
any significance dealing with the homosexuality of a federal em-
ployee8 2 and clearly illustrates the traditional judicial reluctance to
override an administrative finding. William Dew, a civil service em-
ployee of the Federal Aviation Agency, had been employed as an air
traffic controller. After successfully completing his probationary pe-
riod, he was notified that he was being discharged because of previous
marijuana smoking and four "unnatural sex acts" he had allegedly
committed eight years prior to his dismissal and six years prior to his
government service. Although at the time of his dismissal Dew was
married, a parent and, according to a psychiatric evaluation, "function-
ing within a normal range," the court upheld his dismissal and avoided
any substantive discussion of the issue of Dew's homosexuality.
83
77. See EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERN-
MENT, S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
78. Van Alstyne, The Demise ofthe Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
79. See Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512 (1920); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S.
290 (1900); Levy v. Woods, 171 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Golding v. United States, 78 Ct.
Cl. 682 (1934), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 643 (1933).
80. 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
81. 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed per stulation, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
82. Id. at 586. The court cites two purportedly similar cases: Caplan v. Connally, 299
F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (per curiam), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Shields v. Sharp,
No. 15,666 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 917 (1961). These cases, however,
reveal nothing about the issue of homosexuality.
83. It is interesting to note that even at this early date in the gay rights struggle, peti-
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Rather, the court found the conclusion of the Board of Appeals and
Review of the Civil Service Commission "rational and valid," citing
with approval the finding of the Appeals Examiner that "[to] require
employees to work with persons who have committed acts that are re-
pugnant to the established and accepted standards of decency and mo-
rality can only have a disrupting effect upon the morals and efficiency
of any organization."
84
While the court recognized that by statute Dew could only be re-
moved if his removal would "promote the efficiency of the service,"
85 it
deferred to the agency's judgment and required no proof of such im-
pairment other than the above noted conclusion of the government.
86
Thus, the court paid homage to what was then the dominant view of
the judicial role vis-a-vis the Civil Service Commission, namely, that
the scope of judicial review was severely limited when the removal of a
civil servant was challenged on substantive rather than procedural
grounds.8
7
Although the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Dew,8 8 the writ was subsequently dismissed by stipulation8 9 when the
Federal Aviation Agency reinstated the employee and granted him
back pay.90
Thus, the reinstatement of Dew coupled with the consequent fail-
ure of the Supreme Court to examine the propriety of this type of dis-
missal, left the lower courts with no clear guidelines for future
resolution of similar cases. As a result, the courts continued to reach
unpredictable and disparate results with respect to the issue of homo-
sexuality as grounds for removal from the Civil Service. 91 Among
tioners were seeking to educate the courts and the public. In his defense,'Dew introduced
portions of the Kinsey report in his appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The Commis-
sion, however, was seemingly unimpressed. 317 F.2d at 587 n.10.
84. Id.
85. 5 C.F.R. §§ 9.101(a), 9.102(a)(1), 22.201 (1961).
86. 317 F.2d at 587-89.
87. Id. at 589.
88. 376 U.S. 904 (1964).
89. 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
90. Chief Judge Bazelon commented on this occurrence in Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d
1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969), noting that "[i]f these official actions may not be deemed a
confession of error, the history of the case at least casts considerable doubt on the authority
of what was, in any event, a narrow holding."
91. See generally Note, Government- Created Employment Disabilities of the
Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1738 (1969). This Note provides a fine discussion of the role
of the Civil Service Commission and the application of the "efficiency standard." See note
85 & accompanying text supra.
these decisions is Scott v. Macy, 92 in which the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia revealed a very different attitude toward this type
of dismissal than that represented by its previous decision in Dew.
Bruce Scott, a civil service applicant, was twice disqualified for
employment on the basis of "immoral conduct" 93 and was twice or-
dered qualified by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
94
In Scott I, the court was less diffident than it had been in Dew toward
the government's right to hire and fire, noting that the absence of a
constitutional guarantee to public employment does not license the
government to " 'resort to any scheme for keeping people out of such
employment.' -95
Looking to the substantive grounds for Scott's dismissal, the court
recognized that a dismissal under such terms not only stigmatized Scott
and disqualified him for government employment but also jeopardized
his ability to be employed elsewhere. In light of the grave conse-
quences of dismissal under such circumstances, the court found that the
Commission could not rely on a determination of immoral conduct
based on such impermissibly vague labels as homosexual and homo-
sexual conduct.
96
Less than three years after his victory in Scott I, Bruce Scott was
back before the same court, challenging the charges that the Commis-
sion had refiled against him. The court again decided in Scott's favor.
Although the charges were basically the same as those disposed of in
Scott I, the Commission argued that it was really disqualifying Scott
for his refusal to answer questions on his application. The court not
only was unconvinced by this argument but arguably indicated in some
strong and prescient dicta that even an alleged homosexual possesses a
right of privacy:
97
92. 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Scott I).
93. "Immoral conduct" provided grounds for disqualification of applicants under 5
C.F.R. § 2.106 (1961) and its later counterpart 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (1968).
94. Scott v. Macy (Scott 1), 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Scott v. Macy (Scott II), 402
F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
95. 349 F.2d at 183.
96. Id. at 184-85. The court observed that "these terms have different meanings for
different people" and illustrated this remark with quotations from a Senate Subcommittee
Report, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, S.
Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950) and from Thompson, Changing Concepts of
Homoseruality in Psychoanalysis, in 10 PSYCHIATRY 187 (1947).
97. It is interesting to note that Justice Burger, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
dissented in both Scott I and Scott I1. He felt that disqualification from federal service
based on homosexual conduct was not arbitrary. Scott I, 349 F.2d at 189-90; Scott II, 402
F.2d at 650, 652.
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But it may also be true that federal applicants for employment do not
.. . forfeit all rights of privacy accorded to persons generally by the
First Amendment, and that the reasonableness of requiring answers
to certain questions may be greatly affected by the clarity and ration-
ality of the policies sought to be effectuated by the questions. Where
disclosure is required of circumstances of an intenseiy private andper-
sonal ature, the discloser is arguably entitled to know the standards
by which his revelations will be assessed.98
Other federal courts have been less willing to override the findings
of the Commission and directly confront the substantive issues raised
by dismissals on the grounds of homosexual conduct. As long as the
Commission has substantially complied with all procedural require-
ments and the dismissal is neither arbitrary nor capricious, these courts
will defer to the judgment of the Commission. In 1967, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Taylor v. United States Civil Service Commission99 upheld the
discharge of a civil service employee of the Air Force on the grounds
that his removal would "promote the efficiency of the service and [was]
for the best interest of the Air Force.' ' 0° The court noted that its re-
view powers were limited to insuring procedural correctness and guard-
ing against arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the
government.
In Anonymous v. Macy,'0 decided a year later, the court was simi-
larly succinct in rejecting the appellant post office employee's argument
that homosexual acts by federal employees were private acts of those
employees and did not as such affect the efficiency of the service.
102
Another post office employee, an assistant janitor, was also unsuc-
cessful when the Tenth Circuit decided Vigil v. Post Office
Department03 in January of 1969. The court adhered to the limited
scope of review adopted in Taylor, noting that all statutory and proce-
dural requirements had been complied with and there was "no plausi-
ble basis" for finding that postal officials had acted arbitrarily or
capriciously. The court found substantial evidence to support the dis-
missal on the grounds of "infamous, immoral, or notoriously disgrace-
98. 402 F.2d at 648 (emphasis added).
99. 374 F.2d,466 (9th Cir. 1967).
100. Id. at 467.
101. 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
102. The court dismissed the appellant's argument with one sentence: "That contention
is not accepted by this Court." Id. at 318. The sentence was supported by a citation to
Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 970 (1957), and its
words: "[S]o long as there was substantial compliance with applicable procedures and stat-
utes, the administrative determination was not reviewable as to the wisdom or good judg-
ment of the department head in exercising his discretion."
103. 406 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1969).
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ful conduct,"'°4 thereby ostensibly distinguishing Scott I and Scott II,
which rejected "vague" charges of immorality as grounds for dismis-
sal. 0 5 The court, however, neglected to indicate how the efficiency of
the postal service would be impaired by the retention of a homosexual
assistant janitor.
The Norton "Rational Nexus" Test
The judicial lassitude, evident in many of the earlier cases, did not
persist. Six months after Vigil, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit decided Norton v. Macy, 0 6 which is usually regarded
as the landmark case in protecting the rights of homosexual employees
of the federal government. In this important decision, Chief Judge
Bazelon, 107 who wrote the opinion in Scott I and concurred in Scott II,
imposed on the Civil Service Commission for the first time the burden
of showing a "rational nexus" between an employee's homosexuality
and the lowering of the efficiency of the federal service. 0
8
Underlying the "rational nexus" requirement were constitutional
considerations previously stressed by Chief Judge Bazelon in Scott . 109
While the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in determining what
constitutes "cause" for removal of a federal employee, Chief Judge
Bazelon noted that due process limits such dismissals and forbids ad-
104. Id. at 924 n.5.
105. Police had discovered Vigil and another man in the back seat of a parked car with
their trousers down. Id. at 924. Vigil was consequently convicted under a Denver City
ordinance "forbidding any person to commit any indecent or filthy act or to use abusive
language or make an obscene gesture to any person publicly." Vigil pled guilty and was
fined $50. Id. at 922.
106. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
107. In 1967, a task force to study homosexuality was appointed by the Director of the
National Institute of Mental Health. One of the task force members was Chief Judge
Bazelon, who resigned from the task force on June 3, 1969, less than one month before he
decided Norton.
108. 19 CATH. U.L. REV. 267 (1969). This commentary provides an in-depth discussion
of how Norton affected the role of the judiciary in reviewing actions of the Civil Service
Commission, concluding: "In the past, the Commission has enjoyed great latitude in its
policy determinations, and noting that homosexual conduct is contrary to the laws and mo-
res of our society, the Commission determined that homosexuals are not suitable for federal
employment. After Norton, the Commission may not justify the exclusion of homosexuals
on the ground that such conduct is contrary to the dominant conventional norms. Instead,
there must be a showing that the individual's conduct has an ascertainable deleterious effect
on the efficiency of the service. If Norton stands, the following seems clear: (1) the Commis-
sion may not sustain the removal of a federal employee who confines his homosexual con-
duct to off-duty hours, unless he occupies a particularly sensitive position, and (2) the
Commission may not exclude every homosexual application (sic) from all federal positions."
Id. at 275.
109. See notes 94-96 & accompanying text supra.
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ministrative decisions that are arbitrary or capricious. The due process
limitations may be even greater where the dismissal, as in Norton, stig-
matized the employee and impaired his future employment prospects,
or infringed upon the employee's right of privacy. 10 Because of the
important constitutionally-protected interests at stake, the Commission
must not only comply with statutory procedural requirements but
"must demonstrate some 'rational basis' for its conclusion that a dis-
charge will promote the 'efficiency of the service'.""'
Norton, a budget analyst for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, was discharged for allegedly "immoral conduct" and
for possessing personality traits which allegedly rendered him "unsuita-
ble" for government employment. In applying the "rational basis" test
to Norton's dismissal, Chief Judge Bazelon observed that "immoral
conduct," as grounds for dismissal, was impermissibly broad, encom-
passing a "multitude of sins,"' 12 and that it invited the Commission to
indulge in moral judgments that were inappropriate to the proper func-
tions of a federal agency and "at war with elementary concepts of lib-
erty, privacy and diversity."' 1 3 The court observed that while a finding
of immorality could result in dismissal if those immoral acts had some
"ascertainable deleterious effect on the efficiency of the service," 14 no
such effect had been demonstrated in the instant case. Norton was a
competent employee, who did not meet the public and whose prefer-
ence was unknown to his colleagues. In fact, the government admitted
that it was the "custom" to fire homosexuals and that in Norton's case
they were worried that continued employment of Norton "might turn
out to be embarrassing to the agency." ' 15 The court stated that "the
unparticularized and unsubstantiated conclusion that such possible em-
barrassment"" ,6 threatened the agency lacked the "reasonably foresee-
able, specific connection" 17 required to support Norton's dismissal. 18
110. The court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
111. 417 F.2d at 1164.
112. Id. at 1165.
113. Id.
114. Id. The court admitted that it was possible for an employee's homosexuality to
have an effect on the efficiency of the service. It hypothesized that blackmail might affect
security; that homosexuality might be evidence of an unstable personality unsuitable for
some jobs; or that offensive overtures on the job or notorious conduct might so affect other
employees or the public as to warrant dismissal.
115. Id. at 1167.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Although the Norton opinion is most significant for its discussion of the constitu-
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Subsequent Applications of the Norton "Rational Nexus" Test
The Norton "rational nexus" test met with varying degrees of ap-
proval in other federal courts. Some courts purported to apply the ra-
tional-nexus requirement but nevertheless distinguished Norton on its
facts; only one court clearly applied the test within the meaning and
spirit of Norton.
In Schlegel v. United States," 9 decided only three months after
Norton, the Court of Claims upheld Schlegel's dismissal from a civilian
position with the Department of the Army, on the basis of testimony by
three of Schlegel's superiors that the morale and efficiency of the office
would be affected adversely by his continued presence. The court con-
curred in the conclusion of Schlegel's superiors and noted that the four
homosexual acts allegedly committed by Schlegel distinguished that
case from Norton where "merely a homosexual advance" had been in-
volved.120 In upholding Schlegel's dismissal the court remarked:
Any schoolboy knows that a homosexual act is immoral, indecent,
lewd, and obscene. Adult persons are even more conscious that this
is true. If activities of this kind are allowed to be practiced in a gov-
ernment department, it is inevitable that the efficiency of the service
will in time be adversely affected.121
While similarly purporting to apply the "rational nexus" test, the
court in Richardson v. Hampton 22 upheld the Civil Service Commis-
sion's rejection of an applicant who refused to answer questions rele-
vant to his fitness for public service. 123 Although the court noted that
tionally protected interests of the homosexual civil servant and the articulation of the "ra-
tional nexus" test, it also illustrates growing judicial awareness of the practical impact of
discrimination against homosexual employees. In a footnote, the court cited Kinsey's statis-
tics on male homosexuality, concluding that "a policy of excluding all persons who have
engaged in homosexual conduct from government employ would disqualify for public serv-
ice over one-third of the male population. This result would be both inherently absurd and
devastating to the public service." The court also noted that the Civil Service Commission
of the City of New York had determined that homosexual conduct is not an automatic bar to
employment. Id. at 1167 n.28.
119. 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); see 48 N.C.L. REV.
912 (1970). This Note discusses Schlegel in depth and compares it with Norton.
120. 416 F.2d at 1378.
121. Id. For an interesting discussion and review of the federal employment situation
for homosexual individuals in 1970, see Note, Government Employment and the Homosexual,
45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 303 (1970). This Note discusses Norton, Dew, and Schlegel and their
relationship to Morrison v. State Board of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1969), and McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970). For a discussion
of Morrison, see text accompanying notes 377-84 infra; for a discussion of McConnell, see
text accompanying notes 156-68 infra.
122. 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972).
123. Id. at 609. Richardson was discharged from his prior federal job for emotional
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"[c]ourts have increasingly recognized that an individual's private sex-
ual preferences, activities and associations are among those areas pro-
tected from governmental inquiry by the First Amendment,"' 124 it
nevertheless concluded that because both Scott and Norton recognized
that homosexuality might bear on efficiency, the government has a need
to make inquiries which are "reasonably calculated to elicit informa-
tion concerning an applicant's private sex life which bears directly on
his suitability for Federal employment."'' 25
The first unequivocal application of Norton came in 1973 in Soci-
ety For Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton. 26 In that case, a dis-
charged 27 federal employee was joined by a gay rights group in a class
action suit challenging the Civil Service Commission's policy that ho-
mosexual persons were not suitable for federal employment because
they would bring the government service "into public contempt.' 28 As
a threshold determination, the court found a class to which it was capa-
ble of giving relief, to wit:
those homosexual persons who the Commission would deem unfit
for government employment for the sole reason that the employment
of a homosexual person in the government service might bring that
service into the type of public contempt which might reduce the gov-
ernment's ability to perform the public business with the essential
respect and confidence of the citizens which it serves.'
2 9
The court further determined that it was proper to grant relief to this
class in order "to prohibit the Commission from continuing to ignore
the plain holding of Norton'' 30 and consequently held that the over-
instability and for attempting to make a sexual advance to a boy of 16 in the HEW building
while employed there. Id.
124. Id. at 608.
125. Id. at 609. The court indicated that the applicant could renew his application if he
answered the proper questions and that the burden would then be on the government to
show whether his homosexuality would interfere with the performance of his duties.
126. 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aif'don other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975).
127. Mr. Hickerson, a supply clerk, was discharged from the Agriculture Department
upon disclosure of his prior discharge from the Army because of his homosexuality.
128. This policy was explicitly enunciated in the Federal Personnel Manual Supplement,
which provided as follows: "Homosexuality and Sexual Perversion-Persons about whom
there is evidence that they have engaged in or solicited others to engage in homosexual or
sexually perverted acts with them, without evidence of rehabilitation, are not suitable for
Federal employment. In acting on such cases, the Commission will consider arrest records,
or records of conviction for some form of homosexuality or sexual perversion; or medical
evidence, admissions, or other credible information that the individual has engaged in or
solicited others to engage in such acts with him. Evidence showing that a person has homo-
sexual tendencies, standing alone, is insufficient to support a rating of unsuitability on the
ground of immoral conduct." 63 F.R.D. at 400 n.l.
129. Id. at 401.
130. Id.
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broad rule found in the Federal Personnel Manual could not be
enforced. 131
As a result of this case, the Commission altered its regulations as
of December 21, 1973 to better comport with the requirements of
Norton. The Civil Service Regulations relating to suitability disqualifi-
cations which became effective on July 2, 1975 were also substantially
amended to eliminate "immoral" conduct as a grounds for dismissal
and restrict those permissible grounds to "criminal, dishonest, infa-
mous or notoriously disgraceful conduct."'' 32 The "Suitability Guide-
lines for Federal Employment" was also revised to conform to the new
regulation. The amended guidelines for determining "Infamous or No-
toriously Disgraceful Conduct" provides in part:
Individual sexual conduct will be considered under the guides dis-
cussed above. Court decisions require that persons not be disquali-
fied from Federal employment solely on the basis of homosexual
conduct. The Commission and agencies have been enjoined not to
find a person unsuitable for Federal employment solely because that
person is homosexual or has engaged in homosexual acts. Based
upon these court decisions and outstanding injunction, while a per-
son may not be found unsuitable based on unsubstantiated conclu-
sions concerning possible embarrassment to the Federal service, a
person may be dismissed or found unsuitable for Federal employ-
ment where the evidence establishes that such person's sexual con-
duct affects job fitness.'
33
With this change in federal regulations and policy to reflect the more
enlightened approach of many courts, the ability of a homosexual per-
son to obtain or keep a federal job solely on his or her individual merit
seemed assured.
Although the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Singer v. United States
Civil Service Commission,134 upholding the dismissal on grounds of ho-
mosexuality of a clerk-typist 35 for the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), was vacated by the United States Supreme
131. Id.
132. 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b) (1975).
133. Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 n.15 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
134. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
135. It is interesting to note that the cases reviewed in this section mainly focus on
clerks, typists, and janitors. Somehow one cannot help wondering why managers, lawyers,
and other professionals are not the plaintiffs. Is it because only the relatively powerless are
discharged under these statutes and regulations? Or are higher ranking officials given the
chance to resign rather than face dismissal? Also note the irony of the Singer case: Singer
was fired by the EEOC, the government agency charged with fighting job discrimination
under Title VII.
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Court 136 and ultimately remanded to the Civil Service Commission for
reconsideration in light of the newly promulgated regulations,137 it nev-
ertheless illustrates the intransigent attitude of some courts toward the
homosexual federal employee.
The Singer case can be seen as representative of the new wave of
cases in the federal employment area brought by openly gay persons.
Unlike Messrs. Norton, Scott, or Dew, Singer was openly gay and not
forced to acknowledge his sexual preference by events subsequent to
his hiring. Moreover, Singer was conspicuously engaged in gay politi-
cal activities.
38
As a result of the considerable publicity surrounding Singer's po-
litical activities and attempted marriage, which linked his name with
the EEOC, Singer was discharged for "immoral and notoriously dis-
graceful conduct."'' 39 In its letter to Singer the Commission informed
136. 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
137. On October 13, 1977, the Bureau of Personnel Investigations (BPI) of the Civil
Service Commission reaffirmed its 1972 decision with respect to Singer, evidently disregard-
ing the instructions of the remand. On November 4, 1977, Singer appealed to the Federal
Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA), which held that the October 13, 1977 suitability de-
termination did not "clearly set forth reasons for the disqualification which will stand scru-
tiny" under the 1975 guidelines and remanded the case to the BPI for further investigation.
On April 11, 1978, the BPI refused to reinvestigate claiming the lapse of time made it eco-
nomically impractical and declaring that its October 13, 1977 decision remained "final." On
June 13, 1978, the BPI formally reissued its October 13, 1977, decision and on June 21, 1978,
Singer appealed once again to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority. As of this writing
Mr. Singer is awaiting another decision from the FEAA. Telephone conversation with Law-
rence Baker, Esq., of Seattle, Wash. (June 28, 1978). Opinions mentioned on file with the
author.
138. Singer was the organizer and leader of the Seattle Gay Alliance. Moreover, Singer
attempted to legitimize his private relationship by seeking to marry his lover. Singer v.
Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). See the discussion of homosexual marriages
at text accompanying notes 450-80 infra. As a result of his attempted marriage and his
political activities, Singer was the subject of television, newspaper, and magazine reports,
some of which indicated that he was a clerk-typist for the EEOC. Singer alleged that he
never authorized the use of his place of employment in media reports and that any such
statements were made without his knowledge or consent.
139. The Commission cited specific acts in support of Singer's dismissal, including his
attempted marriage and political activities, the "flaunting" of his homosexuality by kissing a
man near the place of previous employment, the exposition of sexual preference in an article
published in the San Francisco Chronicle, and his dress and demeanor at the EEOC offices
which purportedly indicated an intention to stay gay. Singer denied none of the charges, but
contended that nothing in any of the acts violated regulations affecting federal employees.
530 F.2d at 249.
The Commission's accusation that Singer "flaunted his homosexuality" is evidently sus-
ceptible of several meanings. Webster's Third International Dictionary definesflaunt as: "2a:
to display or obtrude oneself to public notice esp. by reason of excessive or gaudy finery or
impropriety of behavior: seek to attract attention esp. by appearing or acting brash and
brazen... b: to make a showy appearance: stand out brightly or distinctly .... " WEB-
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him that his "activities in these matters are those of an advocate for a
socially repugnant concept."'
140
The Commission alleged that such behavior reflected discredit
upon the federal government and thus impeded the efficiency of the
service by lessening the confidence of the general public. 14 1
In his appeal to the courts, Singer claimed that there was no "ra-
tional nexus" between his homosexual activities and the efficiency of
the Service and hence his dismissal constituted a violation of his due
process rights. 142 Singer also claimed he was being denied his first
amendment right of freedom of expression.
In rejecting Singer's contentions, the Ninth Circuit noted that
while Norton required a "rational nexus," the Norton court had indi-
cated that homosexuality of a federal employee might, under certain
circumstances, affect the efficiency of the service. This case, the court
concluded, constituted such circumstances where the notorious con-
duct, open flaunting, and careless display of unorthodox sexual conduct
in public would potentially cause embarrassment to the federal
government. 1
43
After briefly reviewing Gay Students Organization of University of
New Hampshire v. Bonner'44 and Acanfora v. Board of Education,145
both of which were highly protective of the first amendment rights of
homosexual individuals, the court concluded that these cases were fac-
tually distinguishable from Singer because "[n]either involved the open
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1965). Rev. Malcolm Boyd presents this
view of "flaunting": "When we walked in, the rector announced that John had a guest to
introduce, 'I would like you to meet my friend and lover, Malcolm Boyd,' John said. He
perceived love, affection, integrity, and dignity as the natural right of a gay person. Some
people stand ready to criticize a natural expression of freedom as 'flaunting'. But in an open
and free society there is inevitably too fine a line between a minority's freedom and a major-
ity's attack upon 'flaunting' to let it be erased. Often what is as natural as breathing to a
member of the majority-a public sign of affection, a symbol of relationship-is labeled as
'flaunting' when practiced by people who belong to a minority." M. BOYD, TAKE OFF THE
MASKS 147 (1978).
140. 530 F.2d at 250 n.3.
141. Id. at 251.
142. In an evaluation report Singer was rated by his supervisor as "superior" or "very
good." Moreover, a letter from his co-workers said he was competent and that their experi-
ence with him was "educational" and "positive." Id. at 250 n.4.
143. Id. at 255. The court flatly refused to consider the new regulations adopted since
Hampton because they were not in effect when Singer's case arose. Id.
144. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974). See notes 789-99 & accompanying text infra for a
discussion of this case.
145. 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). See notes 418-25 & ac-
companying text infra for a discussion of this case.
[Vol. 30
THE LEGAL POSITION OF HOMOSEXUALS
and public flaunting or advocacy of homosexual conduct." 146 Even as-
suming that this interpretation of Bonner and Acanfora was correct, the
court's decision seems highly repressive, particularly in light of the
court's conclusion that the interest of the government as an employer in
promoting the efficiency of the public service outweighed the interest of
its employee in exercising his first amendment rights by publicly flaunt-
ing and broadcasting his homosexual activities.
147
The court's balancing of governmental and first amendment inter-
ests inevitably restricts a federal civil servant's right to espouse uncon-
ventional social ideas.
148
On balance, the position of the homosexual individual as an em-
ployee of the federal government has significantly improved. Not only
are most courts recognizing the important constitutional rights of such
employees by requiring a rational nexus between the alleged grounds
for dismissal and the purported effect on the efficiency of the employer,
but the Civil Service Commission has also incorporated some of these
constitutional considerations into its recently promulgated regulations.
Other significant protections remain to be achieved, however. In par-
ticular, more attention should be given to the first amendment interests
of homosexual employees and a more careful balancing of those inter-
ests against the interests of the government is warranted.
III. State and Local Government Employment
An examination of state and local government employment poli-
cies dealing with homosexual employees is relatively simple compared
with a similar examination of federal government employment policies.
With the exception of cases involving teachers, discussed separately in
a following section, there are few reported state cases.
Such an examination is further complicated by the numerous state
and municipal statutes and ordinances which variously promote or pro-
tect against discrimination. Some state codes provide that applicants
can be excluded from state civil service positions because of their infa-
mous or notoriously disgraceful conduct. 49 Other state statutes pro-
146. 530 F.2d at 256.
147. Id
148. See 20 UTAH L. REV. 172 (1976). This comment, which explores in depth the first
amendment questions raised by Singer, concludes that "[tihe Singer opinion marks a major
reversal in the current trend of cases allowing greater freedom of speech for government
employees in general and homosexual employees in particular." Id. at 185.
149. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b108b.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 43.14 (West 1970). Mississippi still includes the term "immoral." Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-
31-21 (1972).
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vide that permanent employees may be disciplined or removed for
immoral conduct. 15
0
On the other hand, many recent state and local enactments indi-
cate a growing concern with the dilemma of the homosexual employee.
Discrimination on the basis of sexual preference was prohibited in 1975
in Pennsylvania by an Executive Order issued by then Governor
Milton Shapp applying to all state offices and positions.' 5 ' With the
notable exception of New York City, where the refusal of the city coun-
cil to pass a gay rights bill prompted Mayor Koch to issue an Executive
Order banning discrimination on the basis of sexual preference in city
agencies, 152 a number of municipalities have ordinances prohibiting
discrimination in employment based on sexual preference.'
53
In addition to the protection increasingly afforded by statutes and
ordinances, the procedural rights which have been found to protect fed-
eral employees also presumably protect state and municipal employees
through the application of the fourteenth amendment due process limi-
tations to the states.' 54 Homosexual employees of state governments or
instrumentalities have consequently sought the protection, with varying
150. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19572(1) (West Supp. 1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 124.34
(Page 1978).
151. 3 SEX. L. REP. 43 (1977).
152. The Advocate, March 22, 1978, at 37. The Executive Order, issued on January 23,
1978, applies to employment, housing, credit, contracting and the provision of services by all
agencies under the control of the mayor.
The New York Civil Service Commission has also been relatively progressive in recog-
nizing the rights of homosexual employees. As early as 1966, the Commission announced
that known homosexual persons were eligible for employment but not in jobs requiring
contact with young people or with people easily influenced. In May 1969, the city decided
that homosexual applicants could not absolutely be barred from any job. Kovarsky, Fair
Employmentfor the Homosexual, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 527, 535-36 535-36. This later deci-
sion seems to have been in response to Brass v. Hoberman, 295 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), in which two men who were denied jobs as social workers on the basis of suspected
homosexuality sued in federal district court claiming an abridgement of their due process
rights. Prior to a decision on the merits, the New York Civil Service Commission settled
with the plaintiffs and issued a statement that "[t]he City of New York does not have a
policy of absolute disqualification for homosexuality." N.Y. Times, May 9, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
The Commission nevertheless retained the right to exclude homosexual individuals from
positions requiring contact with young people or other persons who might easily be
influenced.
153. The following cities have ordinances or executive orders banning discrimination
against homosexual persons in municipal employment only: Amherst, Mass.; Atlanta, Ga.;
Boston, Mass.; Chapel Hill, N.C.; Cupertino, Cal.; Ithaca, N.Y.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Moun-
tain View, Cal.; New York, N.Y.; Ottawa, Can.; Pullman, Wash.; Santa Barbara, Cal.; Sun-
nyvale, Cal. It's Time, March, 1977, at 3. See notes 61 & 62 supra for cities and counties
which offer additional protection to homosexuals in the area of private employment.
154. See Illinois State Employees Union Council v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 572 (7th Cir.
1972) ("[Blasic rights of citizenship survive acceptance of public employment.").
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degrees of success, of the "rational nexus" standard articulated in Nor-
ton v. Macy. 1
55
The first application of the rational-nexus standard to dismissals of
homosexuals by state agencies was McConnell v. Anderson.156 While
James McConnell was awaiting confirmation by the Board of Regents
of the state university of his appointment as a university librarian, an
action that was usually a rubber stamp of a lower managerial decision,
he and another man attempted to marry. 57 This action drew a great
deal of media interest and prompted the Board of Regents to reject
McConnell on the grounds that his personal conduct was not consistent
with the best interests of the university. Relying upon Norton v.
Macy158 and Morrison v. State Board of Education,159 both of which
required a finding of a rational nexus between the homosexuality of the
employee and any alleged diminution of efficiency, the court concluded
that the university had not shown an observable and reasonable rela-
tionship between McConnell's efficiency on the job and his
homosexuality.
160
In emphasizing the constitutional significance of the rational-
nexus requirement, Judge Neville made the strongest statement in
favor of gay civil rights of any federal judge to date:
An homosexual is after all a human being, and a citizen of the
United States despite the fact that he finds his sex gratification in
what most consider to be an unconventional manner. He is as much
entitled to the protection and benefits of the laws, and due process
fair treatment as are others, at least as to public employment in the
absence of proof and not mere surmise that he has committed or will
commit criminal acts or that his employment efficiency is impaired
by his homosexuality.'
6 1
Despite Judge Neville's logical interpretation and application of
the Norton standard, McConnell v. Anderson was reversed on appeal by
the Eighth Circuit.' 62 Harking back to the days of excessive judicial
deference to the executive branch, the court observed that the discre-
tion of the Board of Regents was broad and could not be overturned
155. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 106-48 & accompanying text supra.
156. 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rei'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
157. The case generated by the attempted marriage is Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310,
191 N.W.2d 185 (1971). See notes 452-60 & accompanying text infra.
158. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 106-118 & accompanying text supra.
159. 1 Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). See notes 377-84 & accompa-
nying text infra.
160. 316 F. Supp. at 814.
161. Id.
162. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
unless arbitrary or capricious. 163 Construing McConnell's conduct as
demanding the "right to pursue an activist role m implementing his un-
conventional ideas concerning the societal status to be accorded homo-
sexuals and, thereby, to foist tacit approval of the socially repugnant
concept upon his employer,"' 64 the court concluded that the Board's
decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. 65 The court
characterized McConnell as a person making "extravagant de-
mands"' 66 and indicated a greater tolerance for either latent or closet
homosexuals. 
67
In addition to denying McConnell the due process rights protected
in Norton and emphasized by Judge Neville in the lower court opinion,
the Court of Appeals summarily dismissed McConnell's first amend-
ment objections.
68
Safransky v. State Personnel Board, decided by the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in 1974,169 similarly upheld the dismissal of an avowed
homosexual but nevertheless reflects a less cavalier attitude toward the
constitutional interests protected in Norton. Safransky was a
houseparent in a state institution for retarded teenage boys who was
dismissed after discussing his sexual preference with colleagues in front
of patients, wearing make-up to work, accusing another employee of
being a lesbian and threatening to dress up one of the patients as a
"drag queen." The State Personnel Board dismissed him on the basis
of these acts and found that (1) "homosexual activity is contrary to the
generally recognized standards of morality" and that (2) Safransky's
activity had a substantial adverse effect on his job performance.'7 0
While the state supreme court upheld the dismissal, it noted that
whether homosexuality is immoral or not was irrelevant to a determi-
nation of "just cause."'' Citing to Norton v. Macy, 172 Richardson v.
163. Id. at 196.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Judge Stephenson's obvious dislike of homosexual individuals was revelaed
throughout the opinion. In one footnote he referred to McConnell's attempted marriage as
an "antic" and implied it was a publicity stunt. Id. at 195 n.4. He said the Board of Regents
had an "unenviable task and duty" of dealing with McConnell and referred gratuituously to
homosexuality as "socially repugnant." Id. at 196.
166. Id.
167. The court observed that "this is not a case involving mere homosexual propensities
.... Neither is it a case [involving]. . .a desire clandestinely to pursue homosexual con-
duct." Id.
168. Id. at 196 n.7.
169. 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974).
170. Id. at 470, 215 N.W.2d at 382.
171. Id. at 473-74, 215 N.W.2d at 383.
172. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 106-18 & accompanying text supra.
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Hampton17 3 and Morrison v. State Board of Education,174 the court ob-
served that the basis for removal must be a "rational nexus" between
conduct complained of and deleterious effects on job performance and
concluded that Safransky's failure "to represent and project to the pa-
tients an appropriate male image consistent with that experienced by
the remainder of society" 75 bore a rational nexus to the efficient per-
formance of his duties as houseparent.
While state and local law with respect to employment of homosex-
ual persons is neither as clear nor as consistent as federal law, it is
reasonable to conclude that, in general, homosexual state and munici-
pal employees are better protected from discrimination than their
counterparts in private employment. Due process protections coupled
with a growing movement to protection by ordinance 7 6 seems to pro-
vide a modicum of relief to homosexual individuals seeking to obtain
or retain employment in state or local governments.
IV. Security Clearances
The need to obtain a security clearance spans both the private and
public employment sectors. Certain federal government employees in
both the civil service and the military need security clearances, as do
certain persons privately employed by a federal government contractor.
The denial of a security clearance can deprive a person of his ability to
earn a living in his chosen profession for the rest of his life.' 77 More-
over, refusal of a government clearance is clearly stigmatizing. 7 8 Ho-
173. 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972). See notes 122-25 & accompanying text supra.
174. 1 Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). See notes 377-84 & accompa-
nying text infra.
175. 62 Wis. 2d at 475, 215 N.W.2d at 384. It is certainly arguable that Safransky's
conduct was professionally inappropriate to the houseparent position. However, it is ques-
tionable whether even a homosexual houseparent who comported with professional stand-
ards of behavior could meet the court's standard. This kind of standard seemingly
reinforces sex-role stereotypes that may be outdated and inappropriate.
176. At least three cities passed ordinances subsequent to the defeat of the Dade County,
Fla., ordinance in June 1977. These are Aspen, Colo., The Advocate, Jan. 25, 1978, at 8;
Champaign, Ill., The Advocate, Sept. 7, 1977, at 8; and Iowa City, Iowa, The Advocate, Feb.
8, 1978, at 11-12. One county (Ingham County, Mich.) also now prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual preference in county employment and county services. The Advocate,
July 26, 1978, at 11.
177. For example, George W. Grimm was a specialist in a highly complex field of space-
flight techniques, privately employed by a federal government contractor. He had held a
security clearance for some 13 years when his security clearance was revoked. He was sub-
sequently unable to find work despite over 100 job attempts and was ultimately forced to go
on welfare. Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. Rlv. 403, 408 n.38
(1973).
178. Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J., dissenting).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
mosexuality has been a ground for refusal or revocation of security
clearances since the inception of the program in the 1940's.' 7 9 Al-
though there are some indications to the contrary,8 0 it appears highly
unlikely that a known or professed homosexual could obtain a security
clearance even today.'8 ' One commentator has suggested three basic
assumptions about homosexual individuals that make them potential
security risks in the eyes of the government: homosexual individuals
are open to blackmail, they engage in criminal conduct and, by their
very nature, they are unstable, unreliable, and untrustworthy.8 2 To
varying degrees, the courts, in reviewing government denials of security
clearances, have accepted the validity of these assumptions.
The Industrial Security Clearance Review Office (ISCRO) is the
agency currently entrusted with processing security clearances. 8 3 The
general charge to the ISCRO is to give a security clearance to an indi-
vidual only when "to do so is clearly consistent with the national inter-
est.1'8 4 The following criteria for determining eligibility for clearance
generally have been used to deny security clearances to homosexual
applicants or employees: 
85
(h) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, or notoriously disgrace-
ful conduct, habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess, drug
addiction, drug abuse, or sexual perversion.
(i) Facts, circumstances or conduct reflecting activity of a reck-
less, irresponsible or wanton nature which indicates such poor judg-
ment, unreliability or untrustworthiness as to suggest that the
applicant might fail to safeguard classified information entrusted to
his care and use or might disclose classified information to unautho-
rized persons or otherwise assist such persons, whether deliberately
or inadvertently, in activities inimical to the national interest.
179. C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY 26-27 (1971).
180. According to 35 FACTS ON FILE 107 (1975), on Feb. 1, 1975, the Department of
Defense granted the first security clearance to a homosexual. The field examiner granted a
secret-level industrial security clearance to Otis F. Tabler, Jr., an admitted homosexual, stat-
ing that Tabler "successfully has rebutted any inference that his variant sexual practices tend
to show that he is not reliable or trustworthy."
181. On June 9, 1977, the Department of Defense Appeal Board reversed a hearing
examiner's decision that granted a security clearance to Roy Fulton, a computer engineer
employed by a private company. 3 SEX. L. REP. 45. Fulton has since initiated suit. The
Advocate, Sept. 7, 1977, at 10.
182. Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403, 410 (1973).
183. ISCRO was created by the Department of Defense in 1960 pursuant to Executive
Order No. 10,865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, 3 C.F.R. 398 (1960),
as amended by 3 C.F.R. 691 (1968). For a clear review of the structure and functioning of
ISCRO, see Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403, 403-08
(1973).
184. 32 C.F.R. § 155.4(a) (1978).
185. 32 C.F.R. § 155.5(h)-(k) (1978).
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(j) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature
which, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause sig-
nificant defect in the judgment or reliability of the applicant with due
regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the
medical findings in such cases.
(k) Any facts or circumstances which furnish reason to believe
that the applicant may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pres-
sure which may be likely to cause action contrary to the national
interest.
186
(m) Refusal by the applicant, without satisfactory subsequent
explanation, to answer questions before a Congressional Committee,
Federal or State court, or Federal administrative body, regarding
charges of his alleged disloyalty or other conduct relevant to his se-
curity eligibility.'
8 7
The process of denying or granting security clearance to an em-
ployee, in general, or to a homosexual employee, in particular, does not
totally lack procedural safeguards. Even prior to the creation of the
ISCRO, the Supreme Court, in Greene v. McElroy, 88 recognized that
the due process clause of the fifth amendment encompasses the "right
to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession
free from unreasonable governmental interference."'
' 8 9
Despite the unequivocal mandate of the Court in Greene v.
McElroy, the federal courts have been somewhat less protective of the
procedural due process rights of homosexual employees denied security
clearance. The earlier decisions, in particular, reveal an extremely su-
perficial treatment of the due process issue.
Adams v. Laird,90 decided in 1969, was the first significant chal-
lenge by a homosexual employee to the security-clearance process. Ad-
ams, employed in private industry as an electronics technician, was
given a Secret clearance in 1957 and sought a higher level of clearance
in 1962, at his employer's request. When Adams was subsequently in-
terviewed by investigators of the Office of Naval Intelligence, he admit-
ted homosexual acts. As a consequence of this admission, his Secret
authorizaton was suspended and his application for Top Secret clear-
ance denied. Adams was cited for (1) immoral conduct and acts of
sexual perversion, (2) behavior which tended to show he was not relia-
ble or trustworthy, (3) acts which indicated poor judgment, suggesting
186. Id. These criteria have had different letter designations at earlier times.
187. 32 C.F.R. § 155.5(m) (1978). Criterion (m) has been used when the other criteria
have proven inapplicable.
188. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
189. Id. at 492.
190. 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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he might disclose classified information and (4) being in a situation
where he might be subject to coercion or pressure to act contrary to the
national interest.
Adams challenged the denial of his security clearance as a viola-
tion of due process on the grounds that the standard for denial of a
security clearance lacked the requisite degree of specificity and that the
government had failed to show that the denial was "required in the
national interest."' 191 The court quickly disposed of the latter chal-
lenge, noting that "the grant or denial of security clearances is an inex-
act science at best. Those who have that responsibility have to do the
best they can with what they have .... ,,192
Similarly, the court found that the criteria used by the Department
of Defense were sufficiently specific, that they included "ample indica-
tions that a practicing homosexual may pose serious problems," and
that "[t]hey refer[red] expressly to the factors of emotional instability
and possible subjection to sinister pressures and influences which have
traditionally been the lot of homosexuals living in what is, for better or
worse, a society still strongly oriented toward heterosexuality."' 193
Judge Skelly Wright wrote a strong dissent, demanding that the
government show "whether his status as a homosexual related to his
[appellant's] abilities to protect classified information."', 94 His position
that the government must establish such a "rational connection"
closely parallels the "rational nexus" requirement of Norton v. Macy. 195
Judge Wright pointed out that "generalized assumptions that all homo-
sexuals are security risks cannot outweigh almost eight years of faithful
service." 196
Three years later in Finley v. Hampton, 197 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia again avoided the due process implications of
a security-clearance denial, by holding that the aggrieved employee
had suffered no cognizable legal injury. While undergoing a security
clearance examination Finley was confronted by his supervisor with
191. Id. at 235.
192. Id. at 239. The court seemed surprised at Adams' objection to this "common
sense" standard and said that, after all, "appellant is not being sent to jail." Id. at 239 & n.7.
193. Id. at 239.
194. Id. at 242.
195. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court here required a showing that the effi-
ciency of the federal government was impaired by an employee's homosexual status before
the employee could be dismissed. See notes 106-18 & accompanying text supra for a discus-
sion of Norton.
196. 420 F.2d at 241.
197. 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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reports that two of his friends had "homosexual mannerisms." Thus it
was not merely the employee's own sexuality that came into play, but
the sexual preference of his or her friends and acquaintances. Shortly
after this conversation with his supervisor, Finley's position was re-
moved from the sensitive category and he was declared acceptable for
the now-nonsensitive position. Finley then began a long and frustrat-
ing battle with the Civil Service Commission to discover the source and
nature of the information. When efforts in the bureaucracy proved to
no avail, Finley petitioned the court to expunge the information. The
court of appeals upheld the lower court's summary judgment for the
government on the ground that Finley had not demonstrated any cog-
nizable legal injury, and observed that while "Finley may be unhappy
about the presence in his file of adverse and perhaps untrue com-
ments,"198 the material could not be expunged unless there was a real
threat of injury caused by government action. According to the court,
the potential for future use of the material was too speculative to justify
the issuance of an order removing the material from the government's
files.
Once again Judge Skelly Wright dissented. In the first place, he
questioned the government's reluctance to expunge information that
had unanimously been deemed irrelevant' 99 unless it intended to use
that information in the future. Secondly, he concluded that if this was
the government's intention then "the harm to appellant is obvious and
continuing." 200
The courts' apparently superficial approach to the due process in-
terests of homosexual employees did not persist. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia as well as other federal courts adopted, at
least in principle, Judge Wright's position in Adams v. Laird that the
rational-nexus standard should apply to the denial of security
clearances. 201
A diluted version of the rational-nexus standard was applied by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Gayer v.
Schlesinger,202 which represented the consolidation of three security
clearance cases.203 In two of the three cases, the court affirmed respec-
198. Id. at 185.
199. The district court judge called the material "silly," id. at 184 n.7, and the majority
for the court of appeals recognized that such information derived by the government from
informants "has never been given a hallmark of significance," id. at 188.
200. Id. at 190.
201. See text accompanying notes 194-96 supra.
202. 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
203. In Gayer v. Laird, 332 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1971), the lower court in a short opin-
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tive findings that security clearances had been improperly refused or
revoked. The distinction drawn by the court involved the degree to
which the government could permissibly question the security-clear-
ance applicant about his private sex life, rather than upon the substan-
tive connection between the employee's alleged homosexuality and his
ability to protect classified information.
The contention that the government had failed to establish a ra-
tional connection between the applicant's homosexuality and ability to
protect sensitive information was effectively disposed of with respect to
Wentworth, one of the three aggrieved employees.
First, the court disagreed diametrically with the district court and
found that Wentworth was not denied his security clearance on a find-
ing of homosexuality per se.2°4 However, the court did conclude that
the criteria 20 5 used were intended to consider sexual perversion as rele-
vant to a determination of eligibility and that homosexuality was
clearly sexual perversion. Relying on the rational-nexus analysis of
Norton v. Macy,206 the court pointed out that homosexuality "might"
affect national security just as it "might" affect the efficiency of the
service.
Moreover, the court concluded that "[w]ith respect to the suffi-
ciency of proof of a nexus between the conduct involved and security
clearance, Adams does not require, as we construe it, objective or direct
evidence. ' 20 7 According to the court, each case must be considered on
its particular facts and involves basically a judgmental decision based
ion found that the government had failed to show a nexus between Gayer's homosexuality
and his ability to effectively protect classified information. Moreover, the court held that
questions asked by the government during the investigation of Gayer violated Gayer's right
to privacy. In Wentworth v. Laird, 348 F. Supp. 1153 (D.D.C. 1972), the same court and the
same judge again held that no nexus was shown and that Wentworth's right to privacy also
had been violated. Moreover, since Wentworth had clearly "come out" (acknowledged his
sexual preference to himself and/or divulged that preference to others), the judge was not
persuaded that he was likely to be blackmailed. Lastly, in Ulrich v. Laird, No. 203-71
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1971), the lower court held that Ulrich's security clearance was improperly
revoked because the nature of the questions asked by the government also violated Ulrich's
right to privacy.
204. 490 F.2d at 747.
205. See the criteria listed at text accompanying note 186 supra.
206. See note 195 and accompanying text supra.
207. 490 F.2d at 750 (emphasis added). A similar conclusion was reached by the district
court in Rock v. Secretary, Department of Defense, No. C-74-1128 (N.D. Cal., March 21,
1975), in upholding the revocation of a Top Secret industrial security clearance, held by a
deputy manager of a large defense corporation for eighteen years. The district court agreed
with the conclusion of the appeals board that, since Rock chose to participate in acts of
sexual perversion, in the face of strong social condemnation and criminal penalties, he was a
potentially untrustworthy person.
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on "over-all common sense." 20 8
Despite the court's conclusion that a rational nexus had been es-
tablished, the court affirmed the district court's holding with respect to
Wentworth on the specific grounds that the questions asked the em-
ployee went too far. Although the government had a right to ask ho-
mosexual applicants and employees about their sex life "to develop the
kind of deviant sexual life the applicant lives so to fully consider the
application in terms of national security," 209 the court held that the ho-
mosexual applicant "is not required to suffer such a severe invasion of
personality." 210 The court, however, failed to make explicit the fine
line between the two types of questions.
The court similarly affirmed the district court's holding with re-
spect to Mr. Ulrich2lt on the grounds that the questions asked "went
beyond the boundaries permissible." 212 However, the denial of a clear-
ance with respect to the third employee, Gayer, was found to be proper
because the questions he refused to answer were, in the court's opinion,
permissible. The court nevertheless ordered that Gayer be given a
chance to answer those questions. However, if he failed to do so, the
court would consequently conclude that the denial of his security clear-
ance should be permitted to stand.
213
Another example of a superficial application of the rational-nexus
standard is found in the Ninth Circuit's brief opinion in McKeand v.
Laird214 upholding the denial of McKeand's security clearance. After
McKeand had held a security clearance for seven years, an investiga-
tion to raise the level of the clearance from Secret to Top Secret re-
vealed that he was a homosexual individual. The court said that
because the hearing examiner below had found that McKeand feared
disclosure of his homosexuality, such fear made him a potential target
for blackmail. This, according to the court, constituted a sufficient "ra-
tional nexus" between McKeand's conduct and the government's de-
nial of his security clearance.
In a dissenting opinion, district court Judge Peckham pointed out
208. 490 F.2d at 750.
209. Id. at 752.
210. Id.
211. Messrs. Wentworth's and Ulrich's security clearances were reinstated but the court
gave the government the "go-ahead" to initiate new proceedings against them consistent
with its opinion. By this time, however, Ulrich was not in a job requiring security clearance.
Id. at 754 & n.32.
212. Id. at 754.
213. Id.
214. 490 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1973).
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that since McKeand initiated the suit under review, his fear of disclo-
sure could not have been very great. In addition to objecting to the
majority's finding of a rational nexus, Judge Peckham suggested a
novel solution to the problem: "[T]he Department of Defense can eas-
ily cure the danger to national security allegedly posed by all homosex-
uals. It can abandon its arbitrary system of revoking security
clearances solely on a finding of homosexuality and, thus, endhomosex-
uals' fears that public exposure will cost them their security
classifications.'
'215
The attitude of the court in the subsequent decision of Marks v.
Schlesinger21 6 illustrates the unrealistic naivete and idealism of Judge
Peckham's suggestion. The court in Marks upheld the denial of a fed-
eral employee's request for a higher level of security clearance required
in conjunction with his civilian job, despite the fact that he had previ-
ously held a Top Secret clearance for four years while in the Navy. 217
When confronted with allegations concerning his sexual preference,
Marks cooperated with the investigation, answering part of the inter-
rogatories put to him. However, he refused on the grounds that such
questions violated his right to keep his intimate sex life private, 21 8 to
answer questions regarding the names of his sexual partners, the types
of sexual acts performed, the number of such sexual acts with each
partner, the states in which the acts were performed, and whether he
intended to continue engaging in homosexual acts.
The court pointed out that persons seeking federal employment
have a greater obligation to furnish information about themselves than
the average private employment applicant. By failing to answer the
questions, Marks made it impossible for the government to make a de-
termination regarding his eligibility. Nevertheless, the court noted that
if Marks had answered and had then been denied a security clearance,
the burden would have been on the government to show a rational
nexus between Marks' homosexual conduct and his ability to safeguard
classified material. However, if McKeand21 9 is the standard for finding
a nexus, the outcome would presumably have been much the same
even if Marks had answered.
The most disconcerting common element in the security clearance
cases is that not one of the persons denied a clearance had ever abused
215. Id. at 1266 (emphasis added).
216. 384 F. Supp. 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
217. Id. at 1375.
218. Id. at 1376.
219. See text accompanying notes 214-15 supra.
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his privilege and most had held their clearances for a considerable
number of years. The equally disheartening result is that the services
of many extremely qualified employees were lost to the government or
to government projects.
Despite the unquestionably grave results of security clearance de-
nials or revocations, the courts have failed to rigorously defend consti-
tutionally protected interests. Although the applicant's right to be free
from intrusions into the privacy of his or her sex life has been recog-
nized to a limited extent, the courts have been considerably less protec-
tive of an applicant's due process rights.
V. Military
In no area of employment has the homosexual individual been
more rigidly discriminated against in the last three decades than in the
United States armed forces. 220 The current highly repressive policy
had its genesis in a Department of Defense directive to all branches of
the armed services which stated that "known homosexual individuals
were military liabilities and security risks who must be eliminated."
'22'
Two methods of "eliminating" homosexuals from the military that
have been consistently used are court-martial and administrative
discharge.
Courts-martial are regulated and governed by the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (hereinafter U.C.M.J.) which became effective on
May 31, 1951.222 Under the U.C.M.J., homosexual behavior is found
to be criminal through the application of any of three articles: Article
125 which prohibits sodomy,223 Article 80 which covers attempts to
commit a punishable offense, 224 and Article 134, entitled "General Ar-
ticle," which covers "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces. '225 Violation of any of these Articles by homosexual be-
havior will subject the offender to a maximum sentence of five years at
hard labor coupled with either a dishonorable or bad-conduct dis-
220. This is in marked contrast to ancient cultures in which homosexual soldiers were
prized. For example, "[t]he famous 'sacred band of Thebes' was a force of elite shock troops
composed of pairs of lovers." A. KARLEN, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 27 (1971).
221. Note, Homosexuals In the Military, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 465, 468 (1969). For a
concise history of U.S. military attitudes prior to this directive, see id. at 465-67.
222. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940
(1976)).
223. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1976).
224. 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1976).
225. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1976).
charge and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. 226
At the time of its enactment, the U.C.M.J. was considered a re-
markably progressive code which provided new and expanded due
process safeguards for military persons. Further protection was pre-
sumably afforded when, at the same time the U.C.M.J. was enacted,
Congress established the Court of Military Appeals for direct review of
court-martial decisions. 227 This court, which is made up of civilians,
"has demonstrated deep concern for the constitutional rights of service-
men.''228 Perhaps because of these developments, as one commentator
has suggested,
a pronounced trend developed [in the armed services] to substitute
administrative discharge action for trials by court-martial in in-
stances where a major objective was to eliminate a troublemaker
from the service. The administrative discharge was speedy, and ap-
parently [at that time] it was not subject to judicial review. More-
over, an undesirable discharge given administratively could subject
the recipient to many of the same consequences that would accom-
pany a punitive discharge.229
226. 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES 25-14 (rev. ed. 1969).
227. Courts-martial were for years sacrosanct from judicial review. However in 1953,
shortly after the U.C.M.J. became effective, the Supreme Court in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137 (1953), also approved a limited standard of judicial review of convictions by courts-
martial. The Court affirmed the right of lower federal courts to review such proceedings,
particularly in habeas corpus cases, upon a showing that the petitioner's rights were not fully
protected. However, the Court noted that "when a military decision has dealt fully and
fairly with an allegation raised in that [habeas corpus] application, it is not open to a federal
civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence." Id. at 142.
228. Everett, MilitarAdministrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966 DUKE L.J.
41, 68. Since the emphasis in the 1960's and 1970's has been on administrative discharges,
this Article will not deal with judicial review of courts-martial. However, the interested
reader might read the following cases to see how homosexuality was and is handled under
the U.C.M.J.: United States v. Lovejoy, 41 C.M.R. 777 (N.C.M. 1969) (naval lieutenant
convicted on the testimony of an enlisted man with whom he had lived as his lover and who
was granted immunity from prosecution); United States v. Yeast, 36 C.M.R.890 (A.C.M.),
petition for review denied, 36 C.M.R. 541 (1966) (upholding search and seizure of homosex-
ual photographs and literature); United States v. Hooper, 9 C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417,
(1958) (former Rear Admiral Hooper convicted ten years after his retirement on three
charges of homosexual conduct that occurred after he had retired); United States v. Vaughn,
20 C.M.R. 905 (A.C.M. 1955), petition for review denied, 21 C.M.R. 340 (1956) (serviceman
convicted of" 'an indecent, lewd and lascivious act by placing his hands upon the private
parts' of [a named boy]" during an expedition with a group of boy scouts and sentenced to a
dishonorable discharge and one year at hard labor); United States v. Jones, 13 C.M.R. 420
(C.M. 1953) (serviceman convicted of sodomy and sentenced to a dishonorable discharge
(suspended), total forfeiture of pay and confinement at hard labor for two years); United
States v. Knudson, 7 C.M.R. 438 (N.C.M. 1951) (a sailor acquitted by a California court of
sodomy but retried by Navy and found guilty).
229. Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966 DUKE L.J.
41, 96.
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At present, there are five types of discharges from the armed
forces, honorable, general, undesirable, bad conduct, and dishonora-
ble.230 The type of discharge given may have serious effects on the in-
dividual's subsequent civilian life and career. Since over ninety percent
of all service personnel leave with honorable discharges, 23' anything
less is unusual and calls attention to the holder of such a discharge.232
Moreover, various veteran's benefits are dependent upon the type of
discharge.
233
While bad conduct and dishonorable discharges may only be
given as a result of a court-martial,234 the other three types of dis-
charges may be given as a result of an administrative process. An hon-
orable discharge is a "separation from the service with honor '235 and
may be awarded to an enlisted person on the grounds of convenience to
the government or unsuitability.236 A general discharge is similarly a
"separation from the service under honorable conditions issued to an
individual. . . whose military record is not sufficiently meritorious to
warrant an honorable discharge" 237 and may be issued on the grounds
of convenience to the government, unsuitability, unfitness or miscon-
duct.238 An undesirable discharge, on the other hand, is an administra-
tive "separation from the service under conditions other than
honorable"23 9 and may be issued on the grounds of unfitness or
misconduct.240
Homosexuality or sexual perversion is specifically included as
230. There are separate regulations governing administrative discharges for each branch
of the service. However, the content is basically the same. Except when reference is made to
a particular case, for the purposes of this Article all general references will be to the Navy
regulations because the largest number of administrative discharges for homosexuality are
issued by the Navy. See C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILI-
TARY 52 (1971).
231. Id. at 38.
232. The armed forces are evidently well aware of the stigma attached to any discharge
other than honorable. "Both officers and enlisted men who resign or accept an undesirable
discharge must sign a waiver recognizing ... that they expect to find difficulty in civilian
life due to the character of their separation. E.g., SEC NAV Instruction
1900.9(6)(c)(2)(b)(1)(2), 20 April 1964." Note, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FORDHAM L.
REV. 465, 469 n.36 (1969).
233. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 331 (1970).
234. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(d)-(e) (1978).
235. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(a) (1978).
236. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(a)(1)(iv), (vii) (1978).
237. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(b) (1978).
238. Id.
239. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(c) (1978).
240. Id.
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grounds for discharge for unsuitability,24 1 unfitness, 242 and can be in-
ferred to be grounds for a separation for the convenience of the govern-
ment243 and for misconduct. 244 These current regulations are predated
by special policy statements issued by each service regarding the sepa-
ration of homosexual military personnel.2 45 In general, these directives
classified homosexual personnel into three or four classes and specified
how each class was to be treated. A Class I homosexual is a person
who, while under military jurisdiction, has engaged in a homosexual
act involving force, fraud, or intimidation of a minor. Such a person is
usually separated from the armed services by a court-martial under the
U.C.M.J. A Class II homosexual is a person who, while under military
jurisdiction, has engaged in, or attempted to engage in, or solicited
under aggravated conditions, a homosexual act. A Class III homosex-
ual is a person who exhibits, professes or admits homosexual tenden-
cies or who solicits a homosexual act in the absence of aggravated
circumstances. Lastly, a Class IV homosexual is a person who engaged
in homosexual behavior before entry into the service or who failed to
admit his or her homosexuality at the time of entry and thus entered
the armed services fraudulently. Administrative separation is consid-
ered to be generally appropriate for Classes II through IV.246 Most
persons separated under Classes II through IV receive general dis-
charges, although some receive undesirable discharges and a few re-
ceive honorable discharges.
247
Two commentators conclude that between 2000 and 3000 individ-
uals each year are separated from the armed forces with less than hon-
orable discharges for reasons involving homosexuality. 248 This figure,
however, does not accurately reflect the number of homosexual indi-
viduals in the armed services because "most homosexuals remain un-
discovered by military authorities and complete their service with
241. 32 C.F.R. § 730.10(b)(7) (1978).
242. 32 C.F.R. § 730.12(b)(5)-(6) (1978).
243. 32 C.F.R. § 730.6(a)(l 1) (1978) provides for separation in the case of
"[s]ubstandard personal behavior which reflects discredit upon the service or adversely af-
fects the member's performance of duty."
244. 32 C.F.R. § 730.13(b)(1) (1978) provides for separation when a member of the
armed forces is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
245. Note, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 465, 468 (1969).
246. SEC NAV Instruction 1900.9A (20 April 1964).
247. This review has not dealt with officers, who must be court-martialed to be sepa-
rated. However, Class II through Class IV homosexuals who are officers are generally given
the opportunity "to resign 'for the good of the service'" and avoid trial. C. WILLIAMS & M.
WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY 28 (1971).
248. Id. at 53.
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honor. ' 249 Various studies show that seventy-five percent to eighty per-
cent of all homosexual soldiers, many of whom are officers,250 success-
fully complete their terms of service.
The administrative discharge is considered by the armed services
to be "one of the indispensible tools of quality control in personnel
management. ' 251 The original popularity of this device stemmed from
its apparent insulation from civil court review. However, in Harmon v.
Brucker,2 52 in 1958, the Supreme Court allowed judicial review of an
administrative discharge and opened the door to further attacks. Such
attacks are usually brought in the Court of Claims with respect to
claims for back pay or in a district court when the plaintiff wishes to
enjoin a threatened discharge or seek a judgment voiding a
discharge.2 53
The published federal court cases challenging administrative sepa-
rations fall into two broad categories. The first category encompasses a
series of similar cases spanning the years 1960 through 1975. In these
cases, the persons challenging their separation from the military did not
voluntarily admit their homosexuality and, in fact, all but one person
consistently denied it. Moreover, all of the cases were basically pre-
mised on procedural due process grounds such as failure to follow reg-
ulations, insubstantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious government
actions, improperly placed burden of proof, or improperly obtained ev-
idence. Finally, many of the cases remained unresolved in the sense
that they were dismissed or stayed pending exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies.
The second category of cases runs through the years 1973 to 1977,
slightly overlapping the first category of cases chronologically. In
marked contrast to the earlier cases, the persons more recently chal-
lenging separation from the military are all admitted "gays." Further-
more, these later cases are generally premised on substantive
constitutional grounds, such as the impropriety of certain treatment
based on a person's status, the protection of private consensual adult
acts by a right of privacy, the requirement of a "rational nexus" be-
tween behavior and the reasons for punishment, and the first amend-
249. Id. at 60.
250. Id.
251. Semeta, Administrative Discharge of Officers andAirmen, AIR FORCE L. REv., Sum-
mer 1975, at 79.
252. 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
253. See Meador, Judicial Determinations of Military Status, 72 YALE L.J. 1293 (1963),
for a general discussion of the function of the Court of Claims and the district courts in
reviewing military status.
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ment right of association. Although most of the court decisions hold
against the challenger, each contains important liberal changes in mili-
tary policy.
Only two years after the Supreme Court's decisions in Brucker,
254
permitting judicial review of administrative discharge, Fannie Mae
Clackum, an Air Force enlisted woman, brought an action in the
United States Court of Claims to recover back pay disallowed as a re-
sult of an allegedly invalid administrative discharge under "conditions
other than honorable. '255 When charges of homosexuality were
brought against her, Ms. Clackum refused to resign as requested and
demanded a court-martial. The Air Force refused to court-martial her
and instead discharged her under an Air Force regulation that pro-
vided that if the evidence indicated that conviction by a general court-
martial was unlikely, the Secretary of the Air Force could order her
administratively discharged.
25 6
In validating the discharge in Clackum v. United States, the court
took specific note of the consequences of such a discharge, noting the
Air Force's own regulations which observed that "the person so dis-
charged may be deprived of many rights as a veteran under both Fed-
eral and State legislation, and may expect to encounter substantial
prejudice in civilian life."1
2 5 7
While the court admitted that the Air Force could discharge Ms.
Clackum at will and without cause, it nevertheless stated that "it is un-
thinkable that it [the Air Force] should have the raw power, without
respect for even the most elementary notions of due process of law, to
load her down with penalties. ' 258 In particular, the court castigated the
Air Force for not informing Ms. Clackum of the nature of the evidence
against her and for not giving her a meaningful hearing.
Equally arbitrary proceedings were challenged with less success in
Beard v. Stahr.259 In that case Beard, a Regular Army officer, sought
to enjoin the Secretary of the Army from removing him from the active
254. See text accompanying note 252 supra. In Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958),
the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Army had exceeded his authority in issuing
less than honorable discharges to two soldiers based on their activities prior to their induc-
tion. A serviceman's discharge, the Court felt, should be an accurate reflection of the nature
of the service rendered.
255. Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
256. fd. at 227.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 228.
259. 200 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1961), vacatedper curiam, 370 U.S. 41 (1962).
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list, pursuant to a determination by a review board of officers2 60 that
Beard was unsuitable for continued service.
2 61
In support of his request for an injunction, Beard claimed that re-
quiring the officer under review to sustain the burden of proving that
he should be retained was unconstitutional. The court, however, re-
jected this contention and observed that "supervision and control over
the selection, appointment and dismissal of officers are not judicial
functions. . .[and] dismissals of officers are not limited or controlled
by the Bill of Rights. '2 62 Lt. Col. Beard was ultimately denied an in-
junction on the ground that he should have first exhausted all his ad-
ministrative remedies. Until the Secretary had actually removed his
name from the list of officers, the court considered Beard's action
premature.2
63
Members of the armed forces have been somewhat more success-
ful in obtaining a stay of administrative discharge proceedings. Such a
stay is important because the person in question remains in the service,
continues to be paid and retains all his or her benefits until a review
and final decision. The armed services always argue against such stays
on the grounds that if the Board of Correction finds for the service man
or woman, he or she will get rank and pay returned. However, the
court in Schwartz v. Covington264 apparently believed that the tempo-
rary stigma of an undesirable discharge was greater than the need to
terminate immediately, and consequently granted a stay of administra-
tive proceedings against Covington, an Army enlisted man. The court
applied a four point test under which the moving party must establish:
260. The Secretary of the Army is authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 3781 (1976) to convene
a board of officers to review the record of an active commissioned officer and to determine
whether he should be required to show cause for his retention on the active list. Such a
board might be convened because the officer had allegedly fallen below standards in his
performance of duty, because of moral or professional dereliction, or because his retention
would not be clearly consistent with the interests of national defense. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3781,
3791 (1976).
261. The plaintiffs alleged homosexuality was not really an issue before the court, be-
cause the court apparently accepted the proposition that the Army could remove a homosex-
ual soldier. 200 F. Supp. at 769 n.1. Moreover, the court did not question the quantum of
evidence in support of the Board's conclusion, even though plaintiffs behavior with an un-
dercover policeman in a YMCA bathroom was ambiguous and the Army's own psychiatrist
testified that the plaintiff was not a homosexual and should be retained.
262. Id. at 773.
263. The Supreme Court agreedper cur/am. 370 U.S. 41 (1962). Justice Douglas, how-
ever, dissented, indicating that the discretion of the Army to dismiss at will should be limited
where the dismissal is clearly stigmatizing. Moreover, Justice Douglas argued that Beard
was entitled to a hearing that comported with due process. Id. at 42-43.
264. 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965), modfying and affig 230 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
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(1) a likelihood of probable success on appeal, (2) irreparable injury
unless the stay is granted, (3) an absence of substantial harm to other
interested persons and (4) absence of harm to the public interest.
265
In concluding that the test had been satisfied, the court first deter-
mined that the findings of the review board would probably be over-
turned on appeal. The court suggested that the board had exceeded its
authority by giving an undesirable discharge without substantial evi-
dence of homosexual acts committed during the accused's present en-
listment or proof that the accused was a Class II homosexual.
266
Secondly, the court found irreparable harm to the soldier because of
the "stigma" attached to undesirable discharge. Lastly, the court found
that there was no substantial harm either to the government or to the
public. To the contrary, the soldier's service as an orderly in a hospital
had been exemplary.
267
In Unglesly i' Zimny,268 decided later the same year, the court ap-
plied the Schwartz 269 test but arrived at a different result. In that case,
an enlisted man asked for an injunction to prevent his separation from
the Navy. The petitioner had been given a general discharge under
honorable conditions by reason of "unfitness," namely, his homosexu-
ality. He argued that his due process rights had been violated because
his request that three witnesses be present at his hearing was denied.
In applying the Schwartz test, the court agreed that Unglesly
would suffer irreparable harm if given a general discharge., noting that
"[in our modern society where the vast majority of the nation's young
men must pass through the military services, discharge with anything
less than a record of honorable service constitutes a stigma of tremen-
dous impact which will have a lifelong effect."' 270 The court further
concluded that Unglesly's continued presence in the Navy did not pose
a threat of substantial harm either to other interested persons or to the
public interest.27I However, Unglesly's petition for an injunction failed
265. Id. at 538. This four-factored test was first articulated in a different context in
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and has since
been applied with respect to a variety of administrative proceediings. See Associated Secur-
ities Corp. v. SEC, 283 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1960); Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, 261 F.2d 830,
830 (2d Cir. 1958). However, the lower court in the instant case was first to apply the test to
armed forces discharge proceedings. Covington v. Schwartz, 230 F. Supp. 249, 252 (N.D.
Cal. 1964).
266. See text accompanying note 246 supra.
267. 341 F.2d at 538.
268. 250 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
269. See note 265 & accompanying text supra.
270. 250 F. Supp. at 716-17.
271. Id. at 717.
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because the court was not satisfied that Unglesly was likely to prevail
on appeal. In fact, the court found substantial admissible evidence to
sustain his separation.
Unglesly was equally unsuccessful with respect to his due process
challenge. While admitting that the military must conform to "mini-
mal requirements of constitutional due process" ' 272 and that "it would
be a better practice for the military to require the presence of witnesses
at administrative discharge hearings, '273 the court nevertheless con-
cluded that an administrative body performing an adjudicatory func-
tion is not required to follow all the procedural requisites required of a
judicial proceeding.
274
The Schwartz test was again applied in Crawford v. Davis275 where
an Army sergeant of eighteen years service sought to enjoin his dis-
charge under honorable conditions as a Class II homosexual. 276 While
the court quickly found that Sgt. Crawford would suffer irreparable
harm, it nevertheless denied the injunction because the petitioner had
failed to establish the three remaining elements of the Schwartz test.
The court found that the retention of Sgt. Crawford pending final
administrative action would cause substantial harm to the Army and
hence to the public interest. The court observed that "it would be
clearly inappropriate to hobble the Army by forcing it to retain even
one soldier, for an indefinite period of time, when there are serious
questions concerning his emotional health."277 Because there was
nothing in the record about Crawford's emotional health, the court,
presumably, characterized homosexuality as equivalent to emotional
sickness. 278 The court also found that Crawford was unlikely to prevail
on appeal. Even though the court admitted that some of Crawford's
constitutional rights had been violated, it concluded that those viola-
tions were basically irrelevant in the face of plaintiffs admission of ho-
mosexuality and the Army's authority to discharge its personnel.279
A similar disregard of a petitioner's constitutional rights was evi-
272. Id. at 718.
273. Id. at 719.
274. Id.
275. 249 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921 (1966).
276. Sergeant Crawford admitted his homosexuality, which he characterized as a "prob-
lem," after bring accused in an anonymous letter of participating in homosexual acts. Id. at
944.
277. Id. at 947.
278. This was not a particularly astonishing viewpoint in its day. For a typical view of
homosexuality in the late 1960's see Slovenko, Sexual Deviation: Response to an Adapta-
tional Crisis, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 222 (1968).
279. 249 F. Supp. at 951.
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denced by the court in Courtney v. Secretary of the Air Force,280 in
which Courtney, a second lieutenant in the Air Force, sought to have a
discharge under conditions other than honorable28' upgraded to a more
favorable discharge. Lt. Courtney asserted that the Air Force's refusal
to comply with his request was arbitrary and capricious in light of his
record, that he was not afforded the right of cross-examination, and
that his fourth, fifth and sixth amendment rights had been violated.
The court rejected these arguments and held that the procedural guar-
antees of the fifth and sixth amendments were not necessarily applica-
ble to administrative hearings.282 Deferring to the discretion of the Air
Force, the court observed the mandate of the Supreme Court in Orloff
v. Willoughby28 3 that "[o]rderly government requires that the judiciary
be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the
Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters. ' 284
With respect to the four Schwartz criteria, Messrs. Covington, Un-
glesly and Crawford were all successful in establishing that irreparable
harm would result from a discharge on the grounds of homosexuality.
While this might suggest that the courts are not totally insensitive to the
plight of the homosexual service man or woman, the adverse decisions
in Unglesly and Crawford nevertheless indicate that the courts will con-
tinue to give considerably more weight to the policies of the armed
forces in balancing the respective interests.
Moreover, the "harm" often perceived by the courts is the mis-
characterization of a heterosexual person as a homosexual person,
rather than the involuntary discharge from the armed forces for reasons
unrelated to an individual's ability to perform.
Thus, in Bray v. United States,285 the court found that the Air
Force had not followed its own regulations and that Sergeant Bray had
not been treated with "basic fairness." 286 The court observed that "[a]
280. 267 F. Supp. 305 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
281. Courtney was asked to resign when confronted with accusations of homosexuality.
He resigned and was given a less than honorable discharge but then rescinded his resigna-
tion. He did not deny his sexual orientation but wanted to obtain a better level of discharge.
After various administrative hearings he was still discharged under conditions other than
honorable.
282. 267 F. Supp. at 308.
283. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
284. Id. at 94.
285. 515 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
286. Id. at 1395. Bray, an Air Force Staff Sergeant who was discharged after eighteen
years of service, sued for active duty pay and for the retirement pay of a staff sergeant, based
on twenty years of active service. The sergeant asserted that if he had not been discharged,
he would have re-enlisted until he had completed his twenty years of service.
[Vol. 30
THE LEGAL POSITION OF HOMOSEXUALS
most severe stigma attaches in our culture to male homosexuality; error
in weighing the substantiality of the evidence that supports the Air
Force findings could result in grave injustice.
'287
On the other hand, at least two homosexual servicemen were un-
able to establish that irreparable harm would result from their separa-
tion simply because they had received "honorable,"28 but nonetheless
involuntary discharges. In Nelson v. Miller,289 a ten-year Navy enlisted
man was denied an injunction restraining the Navy from giving him an
honorable discharge (for the convenience of the government) because
of alleged homosexuality. The appeals court found that the plaintiff
had not suffered irreparable harm since the discharge was "honorable"
and since he could also be reprieved by a positive decision of the Board
for Correction of Naval Records.290
Similarly, the court in Benson v. Holloway291 concluded that ser-
viceman Benson suffered no irreparable harm because his discharge
was under honorable conditions. Moreover, in refusing to enjoin Ben-
son's separation from the Air Force the court concluded that his tempo-
rary retention would cause substantial harm to the Air Force and
observed that "[t]he problems of morale, as well as other problems that
may arise by having a now known homosexual present in the military,
which may confront the Air Force are sufficient to restrain this Court
from in any way interfering with the military authority at this
juncture."292
The second category of military cases marks the beginning of a
strong movement by gay persons in the military to challenge the then
accepted dogma which is illustrated by many of the preceding cases
and is succinctly summed up in a Navy policy statement:
Members involved in homosexuality are military liabilities who can-
not be tolerated in a military organization. In developing and docu-
menting cases involving homosexual conduct, commanding officers
should be keenly aware that members involved in homosexual acts
are security and reliability risks who discredit themselves and the na-
val service by their homosexual conduct.2
93
Without questioning the basic principle of the Navy's policy, the
287. Id. at 1391.
288. Honorable discharges may be awarded on the grounds of convenience to the gov-
ernment or "unsuitability." See text accompanying notes 235-36 supra.
289. 373 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 924 (1967).
290. Id. at 479-80. Subsequent to discharges, all the services have a civilian board of
final appeal, which corrects records. 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1976).
291. 312 F. Supp. 49 (D. Neb. 1970).
292. Id. at 51.
293. SEC NAV Instruction 1900.9(4)(a) (20 April 1964).
March 19791
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
court in Doe v. Chafee294 nevertheless imposed, for the first time with
respect to military proceedings, a requirement similar to the Norton
"rational nexus" standard.2 95 Unless a "nexus" between the service-
man's homosexuality and the quality of his military service could be
established, the court refused to sustain the separation of an avowed
homosexual individual.
However, in a feat of circular reasoning, the court found such a
"nexus." Because of his early'release from the service, which had been
compelled by his homosexuality, the court concluded that the quality
of the petitioner's military service was affected adversely and was con-
sequently inferior to the service of those who fulfilled their enlist-
ments.2 96 In addition, the court suggested that the quality of his service
might be affected because of the tension created by having a shipmate
lover.
The constitutionality of the Navy's policy was directly challenged
in Champagne v. Schlesinger297 by two women who were given general
discharges under honorable conditions.298 The women challenged their
discharges on the grounds that Navy policy as it related to private con-
sensual homosexual conduct between adults was void as
unconstitutional.
2 99
The court never reached this constitutional question,300 however,
294. 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The Navy enlisted man in question voluntarily
disclosed to his superior officer that he was having a homosexual relationship with a ship-
mate. He was told he would have to be separated from the Navy, but was promised no less
than a general discharge. Despite that promise, he was given an undesirable discharge.
When he found that he could not find work and that he was denied veteran benefits, he
appealed to the Board for Correction of Naval Records. When the Board had not acted on
his request after nine months, he brought suit. During the pendency of the suit, the Board
upgraded his discharge from undesirable to general. The plaintiff then pressed the court for
an honorable discharge. Id. at 114.
295. See notes 106-18 & accompanying text supra.
296. The court does not consider the fact that Doe may have been willing to fulfill his
enlistment. 355 F. Supp. at 112.
297. 506 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1974).
298. Id. at 981. One of the board members dissented, however, on the ground that the
women '"'have demonstrated their ability to perform in a military environment without con-
flict from their private sexual beliefs.'" .d.
299. Id. While both admitted their sexual preference, all the evidence indicated that
they engaged in sexual relations only off duty and off the base.
300. The court in Heisel v. Chalbeck, 405 F. Supp. 361 (M.D. Fla. 1976), also failed to
resolve the question of whether it was unconstitutional for the Navy to discharge the service-
man in question solely because of his status as a homosexual. Leaving the petitioner to
exhaust his administrative remedies, the court refused to issue an injunction under the
Schwartz criteria on the grounds that, since his discharge was honorable, he suffered no
irreparable harm.
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because the Navy adopted the surprising position that Navy regula-
tions do not require mandatory discharge of homosexuals.301 Conse-
quently, the court left the women to seek administrative review of their
discharges but guaranteed their right to return to the court when their
administrative remedies were exhausted.
30 2
The constitutionality of a similar Air Force policy was squarely
faced by the court in Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force.303 Sgt.
Matlovich, an avowed homosexual, 3°4 sought a declaratory judgment
that the Air Force regulation providing for the discharge of homosexu-
als was an unconstitutional abridgment of his rights to privacy and
equal protection. In the alternative, Matlovich alleged that since the
decision to discharge him was arbitrary and capricious and constituted
a denial of due process, he was entitled to reinstatement in the Air
Force.30
5
Judge Gesell delivered an oral opinion in the Matlovich case and,
with apparent reluctance, 30 6 found for the Air Force. On the issue of
privacy, Judge Gesell said he was bound by the recently decided case
of Doe v. Commonwealth'sAttorneyfor Richmond30 7 which clearly indi-
301. 506 F.2d at 984. Regulation 3420220 states: "Members may be recommended for
discharge ... ." Id.
302. Id. As of November 9, 1976, two years after the court's decision, the Board for
Correction of Naval Records had not disposed of the Champagne case. See Plaintiff's Reply
to Supplemental Submission of Defendant Regarding Summary Judgment, at 2, Saal v.
Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
303. No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976), reported in 2 SEx. L. REP. 53 (1976) and 45
U.S.L.W. 2074-75 (Aug. 17, 1976), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 2361 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 1978).
304. Sergeant Matlovich submitted a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force in which he
declared he was a homosexual. The Secretary of the Air Force honorably discharged
Matlovich after Matlovich had completely and thoroughly exhausted his administrative
remedies. Statement of Material Facts at 1-4, Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, No.
75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976).
305. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Matlovich v. Secre-
tary of the Air Force, No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976).
306. Judge Gesell in his opinion described Matlovich as follows: "He had had a most
commendable, highly useful service in the military over a long period of time, starting with
the Air Force in 1963 .... Here is a man who volunteered for assignment to Viet Nam,
who served in Viet Nam with distinction, who was awarded the Bronze Star while only an
Airman First Class, engaged in hazardous duty on a volunteer basis on more than one occa-
sion, wounded in a mine explosion, re-volunteered, has excelled in the Service as a training
officer, as a counseling officer ... and has at all times been rated at the highest possible
ratings by his superiors in all aspects of his performance, receiving in addition to the Bronze
Star, the Purple Heart, two Air Force Commendation Medals and a Meritorious Service
Medal." 2 SEx. L. REP. 53, 56 (1976).
307. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), a 'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). In Doe v. Common-
wealth'sttorney, two homosexual men challenged the constitutionality of a Virginia statute
that criminalized sodomy. The court held that the constitution did not bar the Virginia
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cated that "there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual
activity. ' 30 8 The court similarly disposed of Matlovich's claim that he
was denied equal protection because the military had failed to adopt a
policy, similar to that of the civil service, which required that a "ra-
tional nexus" between conduct and efficiency be shown in order to dis-
miss a federal civil servant.
30 9
Neither did the failure to extend the "rational nexus" standard to
military proceedings constitute a violation of due process. Again Judge
Gesell felt constrained by recent Supreme Court opinions, in particular
Kelley v. Johnson,310 and observed that:
[T]he Armed Forces . . .have a legitimate interest in assuring full
readiness for combat and can, of course, act to protect recruitment,
security of military information where applicable and over-all effi-
ciency. It may establish standards of acceptable behavior when con-
duct impinges directly or indirectly on discipline and the fullest
achievement of appropriate military objectives.
3 1
Given these considerations, Judge Gesell concluded that the Air Force
regulation at issue was not so "irrational that it may be branded
arbitrary. "312
Lastly, while the Air Force admitted that it was possible to make
rare exceptions,31 3 the Air Force argued that the decision as to whether
such an exception should be made "is a completely subjective judgment
statute, concluding that the constitutionally protected right of privacy must be narrowly
drawn to include only marital privacy. Id. at 1202.
308. 2 SEx. L. REP. 53 (1976). Judge Gesell also noted two other recent cases which
supported this position: Singer v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th
Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), which upheld the dismissal of a
federal civil servant because he publicly flaunted his homosexuality and State v. Bateman,
113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976), in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that statutes
forbidding sodomy and lewd conduct as applied to consenting adults did not violate defend-
ants' first amendment right to freedom of expression. At the time of Judge Gesell's opinion,
Singer had not yet been remanded by the Supreme Court. See text accompanying notes
134-47 supra.
309. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 106-48 & accompany-
ing text supra.
310. In Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the test of
the validity of an Air Force's regulation is "not ... whether the [State] can 'establish' a
'genuine public need' for the specific regulation. It is whether respondent can demonstrate
that there is no rational connection between the regulation . . . and [the end served by the
affected agency]." Id. at 247.
311. 2 SEX. L. REP. 53, 56 (1976).
312. Id.
313. "Exceptions to permit retention may be authorized only where the most unusual
circumstances exist and provided the airman's ability to perform military service has not
been compromised." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Dis-
covery at 1, Matlovich v. Secretary of Air Force, No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976).
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which depends on the facts of each case" 314 and is solely within the
discretion of the military. Judge Gesell found that all issues had been
presented openly and fairly to the Air Force authorities and, conse-
quently, did not question the Air Force's decision not to make such an
exception in Matlovich's case.
315
Having concluded that Matlovich could not prevail, Judge Gesell
embarked on a remarkable speech, addressed to the Air Force:
This is a distressing case. It is a bad case. It may be that bad cases
make bad law. Having spent many months dealing with aspects of
this litigation, it is impossible to escape the feeling that the time has
arrived or may be imminent when branches of the Armed Forces
need to reappraise the problem which homosexuality unquestionably
presents in the military context.
The Services are admittedly involved in matters of immediate
and clear importance. They not only have problems with respect to
performing the obvious military task but there are moral, religious
and privacy overtones that cannot and should not be overlooked.
We all recognize that by a gradual process there has come to be
a much greater understanding of many aspects of homosexuality.
Public attitudes are clearly changing. Some state legislatures have
already acted to reflect these changing public attitudes, moving more
in the direction of tolerance. Physicians, church leaders, educators
and psychologists are able now to demonstrate that there is no stan-
dard, no preconceived stereotype of a homosexual which, unfortu-
nately, some of the Air Force knee-jerk reaction to these cases would
suggest still prevails in the Department ...
The Armed Forces have been in many ways leaders in social
experimentation and in their adaptability to changing community
standards. . . . Here another opportunity is presented. While the
Court has reached its conclusions, as a judge must do, on the law, I
hope it will be recognized that after months of intense study of this
problem, matters within and without the record, the Court, individu-
ally, for what it is worth, has reached the conclusion that it is desira-
ble for the military to reexamine the homosexual problem, to
approach it in perhaps a more sensitive and precise way.
316
The results of such a reexamination were apparently approved of
by Judge Gesell in Berg v. Clayton,317 in which he upheld the honora-
ble discharge of Vernon Berg, graduate of Annapolis, Ensign in the
United States Navy and an avowed homosexual. The opinion reveals a
314. Id. at 25.
315. On December 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed. 47 U.S.L.W. 2361 (Dec. 12, 1978). The court questioned "the absence of articu-
lated standards" and "the absence of any reasoned explanation" that would make it possible
for the court "to decide whether or not there has been an abuse of discretion in this instance
or whether improper factors have played a material role." Id.
316. 2 SEx. L. REP. 53, 56-57 (1976).
317. 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977).
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significant shift in Navy policy. Instead of contending that it is at-
tempting to maintain moral standards or that acknowledged homosex-
uals are security risks, the Navy now adopted the position that
"homosexuals present an obstruction to efficient operations. ' 31 8 The
court concluded that "[g]iven the extreme deference" courts pay to mil-
itary procedures, "the regulation has not been shown to be unconstitu-
tionally irrational." 319
Shortly after the Matlovich decision, the District Court for the
Northern District of California handed down a decision in Saal v.
Middendorp20 representing the first clear-cut victory for gay persons in
the military.321 After successfully obtaining an honorable discharge in
lieu of a general discharge, 322 Navy enlisted woman Saal was assigned
a reenlistment code which effectively precluded reenlistment. Saal ar-
gued that she was deprived of due process by being made ineligible for
reenlistment because of her homosexuality. She alleged that Navy pol-
icy as enunciated in SEC NAV 1900.9A 32 3 was unconstitutional on its
face because it presumed every homosexual unfit, and that 1900.9A as
applied specifically to her was unconstitutional because it deprived her
318. Id. at 80. The court considered the Navy's rationale for this new policy and ob-
served: "First, [the Navy] contends that in a confined situation, such as aboard ship, enlisted
men would react to a homosexual officer in such a way as to destroy the officer's credibility
and his ability to command. The officer would be subject to ridicule and lack of respect,
thus making him an ineffective leader. Second, this situation would compound the already
severe pressures faced by all officers aboard ship, putting the homosexual officer in an un-
usually difficult position, thus further decreasing his effectiveness." Id.
319. The court was not unaware that if sexual preference constituted a "suspect class" or
was considered a "fundamental right" its decision might have been different. See id. at 80
n.l. "The Court is aware of the claim that the Navy is acting unlawfully in even considering
the reactions of others toward homosexuals. There are problems inherent in burdening a
class of people because of the reactions they engender. However, where the class that is
burdened is neither 'suspect' nor engaged in constitutionally protected behavior, the Gov-
ernment may take the reactions of third parties into account in setting its policies." Id.
320. 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
321. Other recent cases indicate an inconsistent attitude toward homosexuals on the part
of the armed forces. Following the establishment of President Carter's special Viet Nam
discharge-review program, former Radioman Third Class Robert Martin, an acknowledged
homosexual, was granted an honorable discharge from the Navy. Martin had originally
been separated from the service in 1971 with a general discharge despite a vigorous court
battle. The Advocate, Nov. 30, 1977, at 12. A Wave Petty Officer, accused of "homosexual
tendencies," was not discharged from the Navy despite an alleged affair with a female air-
man; the airman, however, was discharged. Lesbian Connection, Aug. 1976, at 9.
322. Saal sought and obtained a preliminary injunction, preventing her separation from
the Navy with a general discharge on the basis of her admitted homosexuality. Meanwhile,
Saal's enlistment period was running out. Her application for an extension was denied by
the Navy and at the end of her enlistment period she was honorably discharged. Id. at 194.
323. See notes 245-47 & accompanying text supra.
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of her ability to reenlist despite demonstrated fitness for military
service.3
24
While the court agreed with the Navy that homosexual acts are not
a constitutionally protected activity and that the plaintiff had no consti-
tutional right to continued employment by the Navy, the court held
that, because of the indisputably stigmatizing effects of the Navy's ac-
tions, Saal was entitled to due process protections. 325 The court paid
deference to the Navy's discretion with regard to personnel matters, but
pointed out that a person does not surrender his or her constitutional
rights upon entering the armed services.
The court rejected the Navy's rationale for the mandatory exclu-
sion of homosexuals,326 observing that the same rationale could equally
apply to persons other than homosexuals. Yet, the court noted, only
homosexuals were classified as "intolerable" and singled out for
prompt separation. Moreover, Navy policies provided no procedure
for determining if the particular homosexual person did in fact present
324. The transparency of the Navy's justification for precluding Saal's reenlistment, her
alleged "unfitness," was revealed by the consistently outstanding service evaluations which
she attached to her pleadings. The last evaluation, dated 1 Mar. 1975 - 31 July 1975, con-
cluded: "Highly recommended for advancement and reenlistment." Saal v. Middendorf,
427 F. Supp. at 204 app. A.
325. Id. at 198-99.
326. The Navy's reasons for mandatory discharge without an individualized determina-
tion were stated as follows: "It is considered that administrative processing is mandatory.
This is because it is perceived that homosexuality adversely impacts on the effective and
efficient performance of the mission of the United States Navy in several particulars.
"(a) Tensions and hostilities would certainly exist between known homosexuals and
the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest homosexuality, especially in the
unique close living conditions aboard ships.
"(b) An individual's performance of duties could be unduly influenced by emotional
relationships with other homosexuals.
"(c) Traditional chain of command problems could be created, i.e., a proper com-
mand relationship could be subverted by an emotional relationship; an officer or senior en-
listed person who exhibits homosexual tendencies will be unable to maintain the necessary
respect and trust from the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest
homosexuality, and this would most certainly degrade the individual's ability to successfully
perform his duties of supervision and command.
"(d) There would be an adverse impact on recruiting should parents become con-
cerned with their children associating with individuals who are incapable of maintaining
high moral standards.
"(e) A homosexual might force his desires upon others or attempt to do so. This
would certainly be disruptive.
"(f) Homosexuals may be less productive/effective than their heterosexual counter-
parts because of: (I) Fear of criminal prosecution; (2) Fear of social stigmatization; (3)
Fear of loss of spouse and/or family through divorce proceedings as a result of disclosure;
(4) Undue influence by a homosexual partner." Id. at 201 n.10.
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the problems perceived by the Navy.327 Therefore, the court concluded
that "[p]laintiff's showing in this case--demonstrating a record of serv-
ice judged outstanding by Navy command even during the period of
the pending litigation-establishes that at least as applied to her, the
mandatory exclusion policies and regulations are irrational and
capricious.
'328
The court emphasized that it was not requiring the Navy to enlist
or retain gay persons or precluding the Navy from excluding homosex-
ual individuals if their homosexuality renders them unfit for service.
Rather, it held that "due process requires plaintiff's fitness to serve to
be evaluated in the light of all relevant factors and free of any policy of
mandatory exclusion. '3
29
Despite the decision in Saal, homosexual members of the armed
forces have been substantially less successful in achieving job security
and recognition of their constitutionally protected rights than homosex-
ual employees of the federal or state governments. Even the Saal deci-
sion does not represent unqualified progress in that direction. The
holding is narrowly formulated to prohibit only mandatory exclusion
of homosexual service men and women. Moreover, the continued va-
lidity of that holding remains questionable since the decision is cur-
rently being appealed by the Navy.330
In addition, neither the Saal court nor other courts have unequiv-
ocally adopted the "rational nexus" due process test with respect to
military proceedings. 331 Although the courts in Doe v. Chafee332 and
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force333 purported to require some
connection between the homosexuality of the serviceman and the qual-
ity of his military service, those courts clearly accepted the military's
determination that such a connection existed. Consequently, until the
courts prove less willing to defer to the traditional autonomy of the
327. Id. at 202.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 203.
330. Phone conversation of July 13, 1978 with Mary C. Dunlap, Saal's attorney, con-
firmed that the case is in the Ninth Circuit, consolidated with two other cases involving
administrative discharges of homosexual service personnel.
In one of these cases, Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the court
followed Saal, but went further in protecting the rights of homosexual service men and
women by requiring the showing of a nexus between homosexual conduct and unsuitability
for service. Id. at 212.
331. One court explicitly adopted the "rational nexus" standard. That decision, how-
ever, is being appealed along with Saal. See note 330 supra.
332. See notes 294-96 & accompanying text supra.
333. See notes 303-16 & accompanying text supra.
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military's quasi-judicial proceedings, homosexual service men and wo-
men can presumably expect little relief from the courts in their battle to
enter and remain in the armed services.
V. Professional and Occupational Licensing
Laws requiring a license to practice a particular profession or oc-
cupation abound in the United States today and "embrace most of the
activities that come readily to mind, running the length of the alphabet
from abattoir operators to yacht salesmen." 334 Three states list over
164 licensed occupations and five states list between 130 and 164.
Among the remaining states, the number of licensed occupations range
from 60 to 129.
335
The ostensible purpose of such licensing is public protection.336 In
theory, the imposition of various regulations guarantees that only qual-
ified practitioners will exist and the public will be protected. However,
the theoretical justification belies less admirable reasons for licensing.
Many commentators feel that licensing that limits supply is more pro-
tective of the practicioner's economic well-being than of the public's
welfare. Moreover, license fees are often a source of income to the
state.
Two professions traditionally subject to such regulation are law
and medicine. Because these practitioners are at least in theory subject
to high ethical standards, an inherently subjective and arbitrary inquiry
into the private morality of the applicant occasionally occurs. 337 The
denial of entrance into a profession toward which time and money
have been invested or the revocation of a license to practice is a severe
penalty, especially when the denial or revocation is based upon an ad-
ministrative determination, which is predictably arbitrary and arguably
irrelevant to the individual's ability to practice his or her profession.
Applicants to the medical or legal professions, who face charges that
their homosexuality renders them unsuitable to practice, are particu-
larly subject to this kind of administrative treatment.
In McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners,338 the court sus-
334. Gelhorn, Occupational Licensing-A Nationwide Dilemma, 109 J. ACCOUNTANCY
39 (1960).
335. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER ADMIN., MANPOWER RESEARCH MONOGRAPH
No. 11, Occupational Licensing and the Supply of Nonprofessional Manpower (1969).
336. Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in
California, 14 STAN. L. REv. 533, 533 (1962).
337. Teachers, of course, are also licensed in a sense. Their certification is discussed in
section on Teaching in Public Schools at text accompanying notes 367-449 infra.
338. 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1973). Seventeen years before
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tained the disciplining of a homosexual doctor who had been convicted
of the misdemeanor of disorderly conduct for soliciting or engaging in
lewd or dissolute conduct in a public place.339 In concluding that the
medical board's decision was correct, the court considered the appel-
lant-doctor's contention that the alleged conduct bore no relation to his
practice of medicine. While distinguishing both Norton v. Macy 340 and
Morrison v. State Board of Education341 on the grounds that those cases
involved private, noncriminal acts while this act was both public and
criminal,342 the court nevertheless sought to establish some connection
between the appellant's conduct and the potential effect upon his
practice:
[Als an internist he is in intimate physical contact with his patients,
and while he may be dedicated to treating them in an exemplary
professional manner, the opportunity to falter and his frailty in exer-
cising restraint exist. Unfortunately, appellant's problem apparently
stays with him most, if not all of the time; and in light of his present
conduct, there is little assurance that it will be relegated to isolated
places and occasions away from his patients.
343
The court gave great weight to the determination by the licensed physi-
cians on the medical board that his problem might affect his practice.
344
In his dissent, Presiding Justice Kaus emphatically attacked the
majority, arguing that the record contained no substantial evidence on
the vital question of whether this act of "moral turpitude" affected the
appellant's ability to practice his profession.345 Justice Kaus suspected
McLaughlin a similar issue reached the California Supreme Court in Lorenz v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 46 Cal. 2d 684, 298 P.2d 537 (1956). The court overturned the lower
court opinion and the recommendation of the Board of Medical Examiners and restored the
license of an allegedly homosexual doctor. However, the license revocation was overturned
because of a procedural error, rather than on substantive grounds. Id. at 687, 298 P.2d at
539.
339. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 1978). The doctor was arrested by a plain-clothes
police officer when the doctor allegedly touched the officer's pants around his "private
parts."
340. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Norton held that a reasonably foreseeable connec-
tion must exist between an employee's "potentially embarassing conduct and the efficiency
of the [civil] service" before he may be dismissed. See text accompanying notes 106-18
supra.
341. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). The court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Tobriner, ruled that a school teacher could be dismissed for homosexual
activities only if those activities would adversely affect his students or fellow teachers. See
text accompanying notes 377-84 infra for a discussion of Morrison.
342. 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1014-16, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353, 356-57 (1973).
343. Id. at 1015, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (emphasis added).
344. Id. at 1017, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
345. The only evidence Justice Kaus found indicated that the appellant was a fine physi-
cian. Id. at 1018, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
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"that the problem of the oversexed physician---'gay' or 'straight'-is as
old as medicine itself."' 346 While he interpreted the majority's opinion
to mean that any doctor who violated acceptable standards of sexual
behavior could be disciplined without proof that his deviation affected
his professional competence, he also detected a double standard:
Yet, I cannot bring myself to believe that the court would justify dis-
ciplining a doctor on no evidence at all except proof that he violated
§ 647(b) of the Penal Code by propositioning a policewoman in'plain clothes,' though we could say with just as much substance that
a doctor who seeks sexual gratification by way of a sidewalk pickup,
is never without his 'problem' and that his intimate contact with pa-
tients of the opposite sex provides him with opportunity to falter.
347
Lawyers also must deal with professional disciplinary bodies. In
most states, possession of a "good moral character" and lack of evi-
dence of crimes of "moral turpitude" are prerequisites to admission to
the Bar.348 Many states have special screening committees to pass on a
candidate's character. However, because these committees operate far
out of the public eye, relatively little is known about how they
operate.
349
In 1957, the Supreme Court of Florida, in its per curiam opinion
in State v. Kimball,350 approved the disbarment of Harris L. Kimball.
The opinion does not mention homosexuality but only alludes to an act
"contrary to the good morals and law of this State." 351 However, ex-
amination of the cases 352 arising out of Kimball's subsequent applica-
tion to the New York bar reveal that Kimball had been convicted of
sodomy, a felony under Florida law.
With respect to that subsequent application, the New York
Supreme Court ruled that, despite a favorable recommendation by the
Committee on Character and Fitness, Kimball could not be admitted
in New York because of his conduct in Florida sixteen years earlier.
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed in a one paragraph per
346. Id. at 1019, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
347. Id.
348. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 301 (1959).
349. In 1971, a graduate of the Ohio State University Law School who was an avowed
homosexual sought admission to the Ohio Bar. To make that determination the Supreme
Court of Ohio appointed a special committee which ultimately admitted the person in ques-
tion. However, since the issue was dealt with by special committee, the fact that in Ohio
homosexuality is not a reason for denial of admission to the Bar was not made a matter of
public record.
350. 96 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1957).
351. Id.
352. In re Kimball, 40 App. Div. 2d 252, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302, rev'dper curiam, 33 N.Y.2d
586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973).
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curiam decision, concluding that since Florida's disbarment was not
controlling, the recommendation of the Committee was dispositve.
In 1970, Florida again disbarred an attorney on grounds of his
conviction of a crime involving homosexual conduct. In Florida Bar V.
Kay,353 the Supreme Court of Florida in a per curiam opinion affirmed
the disbarment of a man convicted of indecent exposure while partici-
pating in a homosexual act with a consenting adult in a public lavatory.
The court did not discuss how his homosexual conduct affected his le-
gal practice but merely agreed with a lower court that "respondent's
conduct was blatantly contrary to good morals.
'354
Chief Justice Ervin concurred in the decision on the grounds that
disciplinary proceedings were the exclusive responsibility of the Board
of Governors of The Florida Bar, but expressed concern as to the ab-
sence of a showing that a substantial nexus existed between Kay's "an-
tisocial act" and a manifest permanent inability to practice law
responsibly.
355
Perhaps Chief Justice Ervin's publicly expressed concern
prompted the Florida Board of Bar Examiners to request guidance
from the Florida Supreme Court with regard to the admission of Rob-
ert Eimers.356 Although Eimers admitted his homosexual status,
357
there was no record of any criminal convictions for homosexual activity
nor did Eimers admit any homosexual conduct. The court in Florida
Board of Bar Examiners v. Eimers358 ordered Eimers admitted, but spe-
cifically limited its ruling to persons having the "status" of homosexual.
Despite the narrow holding, the court explicitly recognized the homo-
sexual applicant's due process rights by requiring a showing of a "ra-
tional connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law." The Florida Court's significant change of attitude in the eight
years since Kay is reflected in the court's statement that
"[gjovernmental regulation in the area of private morality is generally
353. 232 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1970).
354. Id. at 379.
355. The chief justice called attention to the "substantial nexus" requirement of Norton
v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and a similar line of cases. In addition, Chief
Justice Ervin also indirectly criticized the circumstances of Kay's arrest, noting that
"[e]vidence of antisocial behavior ferreted by peeping has never enjoyed widespread legal
approval." 232 So. 2d at 380.
356. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners v. Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978). The court cited
Chief Justice Ervin's previous statements. Id. at 10.
357. While Eimers admitted his preference upon questioning, the matter initially was
brought to the board's attention when an informer wrote to the board as a form of black-
mail. N.Y. Times, March 21, 1978, at 20, col. 1.
358. 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978).
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considered anachronistic" without a showing of a rational nexus be-
tween private behavior and public welfare.
359
In 1976 an American Bar Association subcommittee asked bar as-
sociations across the country whether sexual preference was a factor
considered in their respective admission procedures. No state bar ad-
mitted seeking such information from an applicant. Forty-five state
bar associations denied having any policy, formal or informal, with re-
spect to the admission of homosexual individuals. Six state bar as-
sociations, including Florida, did not indicate whether or not they
adhered to such a policy.360 Such a report would seem to indicate that
bar associations try to avoid the issue and only react when forced to by
events. 3
6'
As previously indicated, the legal and medical professions are only
two among many professions and occupations which are state licensed.
Not all require good moral character,362 but many require other
qualifications that implicate the homosexuality of the applicant. For
example, in Doe v. Department of Transportation,363 the court upheld
the finding of the National Transportation Safety Board that the appli-
cant had a "character or behavior disorder severe enough to have re-
peatedly manifested itself by overt acts." 364 Such a disorder constituted
statutory grounds for denial of the medical certificate necessary for a
pilot's license. In reaching its decision, the court considered the testi-
mony of an Air Force psychiatrist 365 that the applicant was a "constitu-
tional psychopathic personality," as well as the applicant's conviction
of sodomy and several traffic violations. The court justified the severity
of the penalty as a necessary incident to its main concern, the safety of
the airways.
366
The extent to which homosexual persons are denied licenses on the
basis of their sexual preference is simply not clear. Since there are few
359. Id. at 10.
360. Florida High Court Upholds Right of Homosexuals to Practice Law, N.Y. Times,
March 21, 1978, at 20, col. I.
361. See note 357 supra.
362. It is surprising how many licensed occupations have morals requirements. In 1962
in California, gross immorality was a ground for disciplinary proceedings against barbers,
cosmetologists, funeral directors, embalmers, and pharmacists. Note, Entrance and Discipli-
nary Requirementsfor Occupational Licensees in California, 14 STAN. L. REv. 533, 548
(1962). For the current statute, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4350 (West 1978).
363. 412 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1969).
364. Id. at 675.
365. The psychiatrist's conclusions were drawn exclusively from the applicant's medical
and service records. The psychiatrist did not personally examine the applicant. Id. at 679.
366. Id. at 680.
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published decisions, it is most likely that homosexual individuals in
licensed professions keep a low profile for fear of potential dismissal or
discipline. From those cases which have been published, however, it is
evident that the homosexuality of a prospective licensee is often a dis-
positive factor. While at least one court has adopted the "rational
nexus" due process requirement to a limited extent, the courts have
generally been less willing to recognize the due process rights of homo-
sexual applicants for licenses than those of their counterparts who are
already gainfully employed.
VII. Teaching in Public Schools
Public school teaching is probably the most controversial employ-
ment area for the homosexual person.367 Three factors complicate the
employment status of the public school teacher. Teachers are public
employees and thus are entitled to the same type of due process protec-
tions afforded other government employees. At the same time, teachers
are also licensed and are, therefore, subject to licensing requirements
similar to other professions. Lastly, teaching is generally singled out as
a particularly sensitive and important profession because of its impact
on the lives of young persons.
In all fifty states, a teaching certificate, granted by the state, must
be obtained in order to teach in a public school system at the elemen-
tary or secondary level.368 The homosexuality of an individual teacher
367. While 56% of a population sample agreed that homosexuals should have equal
rights in terms of job opportunities, 65% of the population sample felt homosexuals should
not be hired as elementary school teachers. Homosexuals Move Toward Open Life As Toler-
ance Rises, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1977, at 34, col. 1. See also LaMorte, Legal Rights and
Responsibilities of Homosexuals in Public Education, 4 J. LAw-EDUC. 449 (1975). Much of
the objection to homosexual persons as teachers is based on a popular though mistaken
belief that homosexual individuals are child molesters. Child molestation is not a homosex-
ual phenomenon. See Richards, supra note 25, at 988.
Pedophilia, a sexual preference for children, is distinct from homosexuality. See D.J.
WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 212-17 (1977); D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 118-19
(1967); Comment, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior. The Crime and IPs
Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J. 623, 629 (1961). Homosexual men primarily prefer men of their
own age rather than children. INSTITUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH, SEX OFFENDERS 639 (1965);
M. SCHOFIELD, SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 147-55 (1965), cited in W.
BARNETr, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 129-30 n.51 (1973). In fact, child
molesters tend to be heterosexual in orientation. SCHOFIELD, supra; INSTITUTE FOR SEX
RESEARCH, supra at 277-79, 303-34, 332-34. Moreover, child molesters are almost never
female, either heterosexual or homosexual. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY, supra at 115; INSTI-
TUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH, supra at 9.
368. This section of the Article will focus entirely on the public elementary and secon-
dary school systems.
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may be raised on application for the teaching certificate 369 or on appli-
cation for a particular teaching position. It can also become an issue as
a cause for dismissal from a particular job and, more severely, as a
cause for the revocation of the license to teach.
The main legal issues confronting the homosexual teacher are dis-
missal from a current position and revocation of his or her teaching
certificate. While dismissal from a current position is certainly injuri-
ous to the teacher, revocation of his or her teaching certificate is a per-
sonal catastrophe. Without proper credentials a teacher cannot be
hired anywhere in that state and is thus essentially banned from his or
her profession. All states have statutes that permit the revocation of
teaching certificates (or credentials) for immorality, moral turpitude, or
unprofessionalism. 370 Homosexuality is considered to fall within all
three categories. Dismissals of homosexual teachers, as differentiated
from loss of credentials, have also usually been based on charges of
"immorality."
Revocation of credentials and dismissals under other applicable
provisions of the California Education Code have been frequently and
often successfully challenged. Two provisions in the California Educa-
tion Code have been used to remove homosexual teachers. Section
13207371 requires mandatory revocation of teaching credentials of any-
one convicted of certain sex offenses including rape, molestation, sod-
omy, oral copulation, indecent exposure and lewd conduct in a public
place.3 72 Actual conviction is unlikely because quite often sex offenses
are plea bargained and the offender pleads guilty to a much lesser of-
fense such as disorderly conduct. In such cases, section 13202 required
the State Board of Education to revoke or suspend a teaching creden-
tial "for immoral or unprofessional conduct. . . or for evident unfit-
369. While it is well established that states have the power to set the standards for teach-
ig certificates, Vogulkin v. State Bd. of Educ., 194 Cal. App. 2d 424, 15 Cal. Rptr. 335
(1961); People v. Flanigan, 347 Ill. 328, 179 N.E. 823 (1932); Marrs v. Matthews, 270 S.W.
586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), there is no case law and little data on any initial exclusion of
homosexual persons from the teaching profession. See Horenstein, Homosexuals in the
Teaching Profession, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 125 (1961) for interviews with school officials as
to school policy with respect to the applications of homosexual teachers.
370. Horenstein, Homosexuals in the Teaching Profession, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 125, 125
(1961).
371. Former CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13207 (currently codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 44425, 87335 (West 1978)).
372. These offenses were listed in former CAL. EDUC. CODE § 12912 (currently codified
at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44010 (West 1978)).
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ness for service."
373
The California courts first applied section 13202 to a teacher's ho-
mosexual conduct in Sarac v. State Board of Education .374 Sarac, a
male teacher pleaded guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct for alleg-
edly soliciting two undercover policemen to engage in a homosexual
act. Since this conviction for disorderly conduct did not fall within the
purview of section 13207, the State Board sought to remove Sarac's
credentials to teach under section 13202 for "immoral and unprofes-
sional conduct." Observing that homosexual behavior is "clearly" im-
moral behavior 375 and thus, in effect, declaring that homosexual
conduct per se constitutes unfitness to teach, the court upheld the
Board's decision to revoke Sarac's credentials. The court noted that
there was an "obvious rational connection" between Sarac's homosex-
ual behavior and the revocation of his credentials because of his "statu-
tory duty to 'endeavor to impress upon the minds of the pupils the
principles of morality' and his necessarily close association with chil-
dren. '376 The court apparently was less impressed with the testimony
of the twenty-three character witnesses who testified as to Sarac's
fitness to teach than it was with the testimony of the two arresting
officers.
Two years after the Sarac decision, the California Supreme Court,
in Morrison v. State Board of Education,377 sought to clarify the murky
standards surrounding teacher credential revocation. Morrison re-
signed from his teaching position after his homosexuality was disclosed
to his superior by a former sexual partner. 378 The State Board of Edu-
cation subsequently conducted a hearing and as a consequence revoked
Morrison's license to teach. In his appeal to the courts, Morrison
claimed that the standard of section 13202-"immoral and unprofes-
sional conduct"-was vague and thus legally infirm. While the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court said that the statute was not vague as long as it
373. Former CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13202 (currently codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 44421, 87331 (West 1978)).
374. 249 Cal. App. 58, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967).
375. Id. at 63, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The court stated: "Homosexual behavior has long
been contrary and abhorrent to the social mores and moral standards of the people of Cali-
fornia as it has been since antiquity to those of many other peoples. It is clearly, therefore,
immoral conduct. Id. For a view challenging this assertion see Richards, supra note
25, at 988-99.
376. Id. at 63, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73.
377. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
378. Morrison engaged in private consensual homosexual acts with another teacher for a
one-week period. Id. at 218-19, 461 P.2d at 377, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
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was narrowly construed to relate specifically to the particular profes-
sion involved, the court observed:
"The private conduct of a man, who is also a teacher, is a proper
concern to those who employ him only to the extent it mars him as a
teacher .... Where his professional achievement is unaffected,
where the school community is placed in no jeopardy, his private acts
are his own business and may not be the basis of discipline."
379
The court held that the Board of Education could not "abstractly
characterize" conduct as "immoral," "unprofessionar' or "involving
moral turpitude" within the meaning of the Education Code unless the
conduct indicated that the person in question was unfit to teach.380 Jus-
tice Tobriner, writing for the majority, specified factors which should
be considered in making such a determination:
[Tihe likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected stu-
dents or fellow teachers, the degree of such adversity anticipated, the
proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct, the type of teaching
certificate held by the party involved, the extenuating or aggravating
circumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct, the praiseworthiness
or blameworthiness of the motives resulting in the conduct, the likeli-
hood of the recurrence of the questioned conduct, and the extent to
which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse impact or chilling
effect upon the constitutional rights of the teacher involved or other
teachers.
381
Applying this standard to Morrison's particular situation, the court
found that the record contained no evidence that his conduct indicated
unfitness to teach and, consequently, the revocation of his teaching i-
cense was improper. In arriving at this conclusion, the court specifi-
cally disapproved the simplistic equation, found in Sarac, that
homosexuality equals unfitness to teach. Moreover, the court noted
that "[i]n determining whether discipline is authorized and reasonable,
a criminal conviction has no talismanic significance," 382 and rejected
the idea that conviction of a sex crime automatically indicated unfitness
to teach.
379. Id. at 224, 461 P.2d at 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (quoting Jarvella v. Wil-
loughby-Eastlake City School District, 12 Ohio 288, 233 N.E.2d 143 (C.P. Lake Cty.
1967)).
380. Id. at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186. The court also pointed out that
different professions will have different standards of professional conduct: "A particular
sexual orientation might be dangerous in one profession and irrelevant to another. Ne-
crophilism and necrosadism might be objectionable in a funeral director or embalmer, uro-
lagnia in a laboratory technician, zooerastism in a veterinarian or trainer of guide dogs,
prolagnia in a fireman, undinism in a sailor, or dendrophilia in arborist, yet none of these
unusual tastes would seem to warrant disciplinary action against a geologist or shorthand
reporter." Id. at 227 n.l, 461 P.2d at 385, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
381. Id. at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (footnotes omitted).
382. Id. at 218-19 n.4, 461 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
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The Morrison court was sensitive to the severe consequences of the
revocation of a professional license and apparently wished to protect
the licensee from the vicissitudes of popular notions of morality and
immorality.
383
The standard for revocation of teaching credentials developed by
Justice Tobriner in Morrison closely resembles the due process stan-
dard of Norton v. Macy,384 requiring a demonstrated connection be-
tween a person's homosexuality and the purported inability to properly
perform his or her job. The California courts, however, have not con-
sistently applied that standard. In Moser v. State Board of
Education,385 the court upheld the revocation of Moser's teaching cre-
dentials under section 13202 on the grounds of immorality. 38 6 The
court distinguished Morrison, observing that in Morrison the peti-
tioner's behavior was private and noncriminal while in Moser it was
public and criminal. As a result the court left undisturbed the essential
holding of Sarac, namely, "that evidence of homosexual behavior in a
public place constitutes sufficient proof of unfitness for service in the
public school system. '387 The Moser court ignored the specific stand-
ards enumerated in Morrison as well as the admonition that the crimi-
nality of the act was not to be the deciding factor in determining
unfitness to teach.
388
383. Id. at 239, 461 P.2d at 394, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
384. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). This case held that a reasonably foreseeable con-
nection must exist between a federal government employee's homosexual conduct and the
efficiency of the service before he or she can be dismissed. See notes 106-18 & accompany-
ing text supra.
385. 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1972). Moser was not the first case to reach
the courts after the articulation of the Morrison standard. In Amundsen v. State Bd. of
Educ., Civ. No. 37942 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Dec. 17, 1971), an unpublished case, the court
held "that the Board could not revoke the credentials of a teacher convicted of a crime based
on a homosexual encounter without evidence relating that act to fitness to teach." Willem-
sen, Sex and the School Teacher, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 839, 849 (1974). For a discussion
of the problem of unpublished cases, see text accompanying note 28 supra; notes 516-28 &
accompanying text infra. See also To Publish or Not To Publish-That is the Question, 2
SEX. L. REP. 18 (1976).
386. Moser was convicted of a homosexually related offense not covered by § 13207 and
hence his credentials were challenged under § 13202 for "immorality."
387. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 992, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
388. Another California case, contemporaneous with Moser, dealt with the revocation of
teaching credentials but did not involve a homosexual teacher. Consistent with the
Morrison decision, this case held that mere conviction of a crime without more, was not
proof of unfitness to teach. Comings v. State Bd. of Educ., 23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (1972). The Supreme Court of California refused to review either Moser or
Comings. This refusal may be a result of the fact that the complexion of the court had
changed. Two months after Morrison, Chief Justice Traynor, part of the Morrison majority,
retired. Thus the four-person Morrison majority became a three-person minority who voted
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The Morrison standard was once again circumvented by the court
in Purfoy v. State Board of Education.389 Purifoy argued that section
13207 violated his due process rights because the provision for
mandatory revocation upon conviction of certain crimes conclusively
presumed that a person was unfit to teach, without evidence, notice or a
right to be heard.
In what appears to be a blatant misconstruction of Purifoy's con-
stitutional argument, the court concluded that Purifoy had his day in
court when he was convicted of the crime in question and, therefore,
was not deprived of his due process rights upon the subsequent revoca-
tion of his credential. According to the court, proof of unfitness re-
quired in Morrison was unnecessary in Purifoy because section 13207
required only a conviction of a specified crime. The court further
noted that persons convicted of such crimes "constitute a class which
the Legislature identified as constituting a dangerous element in the
school community and which in its discretion it put under appropriate
controls.
'390
In 1973 the California Supreme Court decided Pettit v. State Board
of Education,39 apparently in an attempt to clarify the proper stand-
ards to be applied with respect to revocation of teacher credentials.
The Board of Education sought to revoke Ms. Pettit's teaching license
under section 13202 on the grounds of "immorality 392 and was conse-
quently required, under the Morrison standard, to prove that her con-
duct rendered her unfit to teach. The court upheld the revocation of
Pettit's professional license, distinguishing Morrison in three ways.
First, it pointed out that Morrison's behavior was not criminal while
Pettit's was. Second, while Morrison's behavior was private, the court
considered Pettit's behavior public.3 93 Finally, the court found that the
testimony of three school administrators, suggesting that Pettit might
attempt to inject her unorthodox views of sexual morality into the
to hear Moser and Comings. See Willemsen, Sex and the School Teacher, 14 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 839, 851 nn.88 & 89 (1974).
389. 30 Cal. App. 3d 187, 106 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
390. Id. at 197, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
391. 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973).
392. Pettit did not involve homosexual conduct but rather heterosexual fellatio. More-
over, Pettit was not convicted of the crime of oral copulation, which would have brought her
automatically under the mandatory revocation provision of § 13207, but was convicted of
conduct outrageous to public decency. For a review of all types of sexual behavior that have
been held to affect teachers, see Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 19 (1977).
393. The court's characterization of Pettit's conduct as "public" is arguable since the
conduct in question took place in a private home among consenting adults. The behavior
became known only as a result of police surveillance.
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classroom and would be unable to act as a moral example for the chil-
dren she taught 394 constituted sufficient evidence of her unfitness to
teach.
Justice Tobriner, author of the majority opinion in Morrison,
wrote a vigorous dissent. Not only did he criticize the apparent disre-
gard of the Morrison direction that a criminal conviction is not ipso
facto the basis for revocation, but he disagreed strongly with the major-
ity's characterization of Pettit's behavior as public. 395 Moreover, Jus-
tice Tobriner questioned the sufficiency of the evidence of Pettit's
unfitness particularly since the three alleged experts only expressed
their opinions, without presenting any reasons for their conclusions. 396
Justice Tobriner pointed out that none of the experts knew Pettit,
"none considered her thirteen year record of competent teaching; none
could point to a single instance of past misconduct with a student, nor
articulate the nature of any possible future misconduct." 397 The ex-
perts, according to Justice Tobriner, were working under an unproven
premise that plaintiff's behavior at the "swingers" party in and of itself
demonstrated she could not set a good example to her students and that
she was, therefore, unfit. Such assumptions, he felt, were unsupported
and invariably led to the conclusion that proof of immoral conduct,
whatever it may be, would always justify revocation. 398 The Morrison
standard, which the court in Pettit evidently chose to ignore, was
designed precisely to avoid such arbitrary and discriminatory decision
making.399
In conclusion, Justice Tobriner suggested that "the majority opin-
ion is blind to the reality of sexual behavior. Its view that teachers in
their private lives should exemplify Victorian principles of sexual mo-
rality and in the classroom should subliminally indoctrinate the pupils
in such principles is hopelessly unrealistic and atavistic.' ' 4°°
The Pettit decision, which has been severely criticized, 40' seems to
have removed some of the legal obstacles to the revocation of a Califor-
394. Pettit had been a teacher of the mentally retarded in an elementary school for 13
years. The dissent notes that throughout her career her competence had been unquestioned.
10 Cal. 3d at 35, 513 P.2d at 893, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 669 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
395. See note 393 supra.
396. 10 Cal. 3d at 41-43, 513 P.2d at 898-99, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
397. Id. at 43, 513 P.2d at 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id at 44, 513 P.2d at 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
401. See Note, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation & Dismissal for Sexual
Conduct, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1442 (1973); 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 404 (1974); 1973 UTAH L.
REV. 797.
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nia teacher's license by seriously undermining the Morrison standards.
In fact, subsequent cases have upheld dismissals on the grounds that
the teachers in question had been accused of sex-related crimes even
though the charges had been dropped or, in one case, the accused had
been acquitted.
In Board of Education v. Calderon,40 2 Mr. Calderon, a male homo-
sexual teacher, challenged his dismissal by the school board, contend-
ing that his acquittal of a sex-related offense403 precluded the Board
from using that charge as a grounds for dismissal. The court disagreed
and asserted that under the Education Code the legislature intended to
permit school boards to shield children of tender years from possible
detrimental influence of teachers who commit the sex offenses de-
scribed in the Education Code "even though they are notfound guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.' '4°4 The court cited Pettit for the proposi-
tion that the risk of having Calderon in a classroom was not that he
might engage in the act again, but that he could not act as an example
for his pupils or teach them moral principles.
4°5
Moreover, the court reasoned that neither the Board's dismissal of
Calderon nor the resolution of the instant civil action was barred by
Calderon's prior acquittal in the criminal case. The different degree of
proof required in criminal and civil or administrative actions effectively
precluded application of res judicata principles with respect to Calde-
ron's dismissal.
4°6
In Governing Board of Mountain View School District v. Metcalf 40 7
the court similarly upheld the dismissal of a homosexual teacher, de-
spite court dismissal of the underlying criminal charge.408 The school
board dismissed Metcalf, concluding that the act of oral copulation of
which he had been accused was evidence of "immoral conduct." Met-
402. 35 Cal. App. 3d 490, 110 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1973).
403. Calderon was accused of and acquitted of oral copulation with another man. Cal-
deron was put on a compulsory leave of absence from his school while the criminal issue was
resolved and subsequent to his acquittal, was notified that he was being dismissed. The trial
court upheld his dismissal and found that the defendant had engaged in oral copulation as
charged by the schoolboard and that such behavior was depraved, dissolute, corrupt, inde-
cent, shameless, and hence constituted "immoral conduct." Id. at 493, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
404. Id. at 496, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 921 (emphasis added).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974).
408. Metcalf was charged with engaging in homosexual prostitution and, specifically, in
an act of oral copulation. However, evidence supporting that charge had been improperly
obtained and was excluded from the criminal proceeding, which was subsequently
dismissed.
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calf argued that the improperly obtained evidence should have been
excluded from the dismissal hearing. The court observed that whether
the exclusionary rule could be invoked in an administrative hearing
depended on the purpose of the statute authorizing the hearing and
determined that where the purpose of the statute was to protect chil-
dren the rule did not preclude admission of such evidence. Citing
Pettit, the court concluded that Metcalf s conduct indicated "a serious
defect of moral character, normal prudence and good common
sense" 40 9 and therefore evidenced an unfitness to teach.410 Thus, the
conduct itself, once labeled immoral, established the unfitness to teach.
Such a facile application of the Morrison standard was unequivo-
cally rejected by the California Supreme Court in Board of Education v.
Jack A. 411 In that case, the school board sued a teacher, who had been
arrested for homosexual solicitation but never charged with that offense
in order to establish its right to discharge him from a tenured position
on the grounds of "immoral conduct" and "evident unfitness for serv-
ice."'4 12 The court concurred in the finding of the lower court that this
conduct did not demonstrate unfitness to teach. Justice Tobriner, writ-
ing for the majority, pointed out with approval that the trial court had
framed its findings in terms of fitness to teach and had examined the
conduct against the standards suggested in Morrison. The trial court
found that the defendant's conduct had not come to public attention,
that he was not likely to repeat such behavior, and that he did not pres-
ent a threat to fellow teachers or students. Moreover, the trial court
considered defendant's sixteen year record of competent teaching.
41 3
Having determined that the trial court's findings were supported
by credible evidence, 414 the court considered the board's alternative ar-
gument, namely that proof that the defendant committed a public sex-
ual offense demonstrates unfitness to teach per se. Justice Tobriner
pointed out that automatic dismissal by statute only applies to persons
convicted of a specified crime. He observed that Morrison established
409. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
410. Id.
411. 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1977).
412. Id. at 694, 566 P.2d at 603, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
413. 1d. at 694-96, 566 P.2d at 603-04, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
414. Although the Board of Education argued that defendant might be unable to fulfill
his duty to set an example and instruct students in good morals and that his act evidenced a
lack ofjudgment and discretion, Justice Tobriner disposed of these arguments by saying that
they were "really no more than disputable inferences which the trial court rejected in favor
of other inferences more favorable to defendant." Id. at 669, 566 P.2d at 606, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 704.
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the right of a person not so convicted to a fitness hearing and that
"proof of the commission of a criminal act does not alone demonstrate
the unfitness of a teacher, but is simply one of the factors to be
considered."
41 5
In Jack A, the Supreme Court of California reaffirmed the
Morrison standard and emphasized that a California teacher should
not be dismissed nor lose his or her license under section 13202, even
where the person has engaged in unorthodox sexual conduct, unless his
or her unfitness to teach can be demonstrated. Consequently, the re-
quirement of a nexus between conduct and teaching fitness seems well-
established in California. Moreover, mandatory revocations of creden-
tials of homosexual teachers under section 13207 will probably become
less common now that California has decriminalized private consen-
sual adult sex.416
Decisions in other states, however, do not reveal equally optimistic
prospects for the homosexual teacher.417 Acanfora v. Board of
Education,418 one of the first cases involving an admitted homosexual
that gained national attention, produced some impressive rhetoric but
in effect did little to advance the position of homosexual teachers. Jo-
seph Acanfora sought reinstatement to his position as a junior high
school teacher, after being transferred to an administrative position
with no student contact upon public disclosure of his sexual prefer-
ence.419 While the district court observed that "private, consenting
adult homosexuality should enter the sphere of constitutionally protect-
415. Id. at 702 n.6, 566 P.2d at 608, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
416. 1975 Cal. Stat., ch. 71, § 7 (effective July 1, 1976). Continued equitable treatment
of homosexual teachers in California was assured by the defeat of the Briggs Initiative in the
November 7, 1978 election. That measure would have amended the State constitution to
allow school boards to dismiss or refuse to hire school teachers, teacher's aides, school ad-
ministrators or counselors for "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting
private or public sexual acts between persons of the same sex."
417. See also Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1963). In this case, the Supreme
Court of Florida reviewed the revocation of the teaching certificates of three Florida teach-
ers, two women and a man, who admitted to participation in homosexual activities. The
court set aside the revocations on procedural grounds because the board of education failed
to follow its own regulations with regard to revocation.
418. 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
419. Joseph Acanfora, while in college, had joined a gay student organization and had
been an active participant. His "openness" caused his college, Penn State, to forward his
application for a teaching certificate to the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education without a
favorable recommendation. While his Pennsylvania certification was pending, Acanfora
was hired as a junior high school science teacher in Maryland by the Board of Education of
Montgomery County. After the Maryland school year had begun, the Pennsylvania Secre-
tary of Education called a widely publicized press conference and announced that Acanfora
would indeed be given his Pennsylvania certificate.
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able interests, ' 420 and concluded that discrimination among teachers
on the basis of homosexuality was not permissible,421 the court never-
theless found against Acanfora.
The court reasoned that the instruction of children carries with it
special responsibilities whether a teacher be heterosexual or homosex-
ual and that every teacher has to scrupulously keep private his or her
personal life. The court observed that since homosexuality is a sensi-
tive, emotion-laden subject, that tends to "breed misunderstanding,
alarm and anxiety, a sense of discretion and self-restraint" must guide
the homosexual teacher to "avoid speech or activity likely to spark the
added public controversy which detracts from the educational proc-
ess."'422 The court concluded that Acanfora had failed to exercise such
discretion by making "repeated, unnecessary appearances on local and
especially national news media.
'423
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit overruled portions of the lower
court's opinion, holding that Acanfora's public statements were pro-
tected by the first amendment,424 but found against Acanfora on the
question of his reinstatement. The court concluded that Acanfora
could not prevail on appeal because he had deliberately omitted his
membership in the gay student group from his Maryland job applica-
tion. Because the Maryland school officials would not have hired
Acanfora had they known about his membership, the court concluded
that he had obtained his position through fraud and could not "now
invoke the process of the court to obtain a ruling on an issue that he
practiced deception to avoid. '42
5
A year later, a lesbian school teacher won what one commentator
terms a "Pyrrhic victory. '426 In Burton v. Cascade School District
Union High School No. 5,427 Peggy Burton won her battle when the
court found the statute under which she was fired unconstitutionally
vague, but she lost the war when the court refused to reinstate her. Ms.
420. 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Md. 1973).
421. Id. at 856.
422. Id.
423. Id. Subsequent to the initiation of the suit, Acanfora became an object of media
interest and appeared on several local and national radio and television shows to discuss his
case.
424. 491 F.2d at 501.
425. Id. at 504. The court felt Acanfora had "bootstrapped" himself into the issue and
thus lost standing to raise the constitutional issue. See 48 TEMPLE L.J. 384 (1975).
426. Comment, Remedial Balancing Decisions and the Rights of Homosexual Teachers. A
Pyrrhic Victory, 61 IOWA L. REv. 1080 (1976).
427. 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), aff'd, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
839 (1975).
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Burton's contract was terminated on the grounds of "immorality" after
she acknowledged that she was a practicing homosexual. The district
court found the relevant statute void for vagueness, noting that "immo-
rality means different things to different people and its definition de-
pends on the idiosyncracies of the individual school board member." 428
However, the court only awarded monetary damages and refused to
reinstate Burton to her teaching position.
429
The issue of reinstatement was appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
430
Although the court ultimately upheld the lower court's remedy, it nev-
ertheless recognized the difficulty of balancing Burton's interest in com-
pleting her wrongfully terminated contract against the competing
interest in avoiding the disruption which her reinstatement would
inevitably cause.431 Burton argued that a similar antagonism would
arise if she were fired because of race or religion and subsequently rein-
stated. The court refused to equate being fired for homosexuality with
a dismissal in violation of other constitutional rights and concluded
that "the nature of the constitutional right sought to be vindicated is
not such as to compel reinstatement frequently ordered in response to
racially motivated dismissals, or to those aimed at punishing the exer-
cise of free speech. ' 432 The dissenting judge considered reinstatement
proper, noting that "if community resentment was a legitimate factor to
consider, few Southern school districts would have been integrated.
'433
Many such constitutional issues remain unresolved as a result of
the Supreme Court's failure to grant certiorari in Gaylord v. Tacoma
School District No. 10.434 James Gaylord had been a high school
teacher for twelve years and had received excellent evaluations on all
occasions. When a student reported to a vice-principal that he thought
Gaylord was a homosexual person, Gaylord admitted his homosexual-
ity. The Tacoma School Board discharged Gaylord for "immorality,"
an enumerated ground for dismissal under Washington law and Gay-
lord sued.
On appeal from the second of two lower court decisions, 435 the
Washington Supreme court first reviewed the trial court's findings that
428. Id. at 255.
429. See 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 781 (1976).
430. 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
431. Id. at 853.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 855 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
434. 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
435. The trial court's first decision was remanded by the Washington Supreme Court in
Gaylord v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 85 Wash. 2d 348, 535 P.2d 804 (1975) because
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Gaylord "admitted his status as a homosexual" and therefore "from
appellant's own testimony it is unquestioned that homosexual acts were
participated in by him, although there was no evidence of any overt act
having been committed.14 36 Applying general principles of evidence
and construction, the supreme court held that in interpreting Gaylord's
admission that he was a homosexual person, "the construction must be
adopted which is least favorable to him." 437 The least favorable con-
struction in the court's estimation was to consider him an overt, practic-
ing homosexual person. The court noted that Gaylord had the
opportunity "to explain that he was not an overt homosexual and did
not engage in the conduct the court ascribed to him.
'438
Next, the court concluded that "homosexuality is widely con-
demned as immoral and was so condemned as immoral during biblical
times. ' 439 The court assumed that Gaylord knew homosexuality had
''serious consequences" because he had kept his own sexual preference
secret from his parents and that Gaylord felt comfortable with his ho-
mosexuality because he apparently desired no change. Consequently,
the court concluded that Gaylord "made a voluntary choice for which
he must be held morally responsible." 440
Having decided that Gaylord was an overtly homosexual person,
that homosexuality was immoral, and that Gaylord had chosen this im-
moral conduct voluntarily, the court turned to the issue of whether
Gaylord's performance as a teacher was impaired. The lower court
found that while Gaylord's status as a homosexual person was un-
known, his efficiency was not affected; but that when this fact was pub-
licly disclosed, his efficiency was impaired. Although the school board
had been responsible for making that disclosure, the supreme court
said Gaylord had taken the risk of public disclosure by seeking out
homosexual company. As evidence that Gaylord's ability to teach
would be impaired, the court relied on the testimony of three fellow
teachers and one student who objected to Gaylord remaining on the
staff. In addition, the principal, vice-principal, and retired superinten-
dent all testified that Gaylord's continued presence would create
problems. Last, but hardly least, the court concluded that if Gaylord
the trial court had improperly applied the statutory burden of proof by giving special em-
phasis to the testimony of school officials.
436. 88 Wash. 2d at 294, 559 P.2d at 1344.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 295, 559 P.2d at 1345. The court referred to Jewish and Catholic encyclope-
dias among others as authority for this conclusion.
440. Id. at 296, 559 P.2d at 1346.
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were retained it would indicate adult approval of homosexuality.
Moreover, the court felt that if Gaylord were retained, his ability to
teach principles of morality to his students would be impaired.441
The dissent took issue with the majority on all points, contending
that Gaylord was discharged because of his status not his conduct and
that the Board had failed to prove that Gaylord's performance as a
teacher was impaired. Noting that much of the testimony was purely
speculative, the dissent argued that "[m]ere speculation coupled with
status alone is not enough to establish a detrimental effect upon Gay-
lord's teaching ability."
442
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari 443 in Gaylord leaves
standing the decision of the Washington Supreme Court, a decision
which arguably gives school boards carte blanche to fire homosexual
teachers on the basis of status alone.444 Certiorari also was denied on
the same day in Gish v. Board of Education. 445 Gish was a New Jersey
high school teacher of seven years when he assumed the presidency of
the New Jersey Gay Alliance (N.J.G.A.). Shortly thereafter the board
of education adopted a resolution directing Gish to undergo a psychiat-
ric examination pursuant to a New Jersey statute which allows such a
direction whenever "an employee shows evidence of deviation from
normal physical or mental health."446 While the board purported not
to question Gish's right to participate in the N.J.G.A., it nevertheless
determined that Gish's activities displayed evidence of deviation from
normal mental health that might affect his ability to teach and, there-
fore, directed him to be examined. The New Jersey Superior Court
upheld the board's right to order such an examination, saying the
board's determination was fair and reasonable and was the logical deci-
sion of reasonable and fair-minded men who had evaluated Gish's be-
havior and who were concerned with his fitness as a teacher.447 On the
other hand, the court felt that the examination required nothing of
Gish but his time.
448
The refusal of the Supreme Court to review these two decisions
441. Id. at 298, 559 P.2d at 1347.
442. Id. at 305, 559 P.2d at 1350.
443. 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
444. See 53 WASH. L. REv. 499 (1978); 14 WILLAMETr L.J. 101 (1977).
445. 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337 (1976), petition for certfcation denied, 74 N.J.
251, 377 A.2d 658, cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 233 (1977).
446. Id. at 99, 366 A.2d at 1339.
447. Id. at 105, 366 A.2d at 1342.
448. At last report the school board had transferred Gish to an administrative position
with a $4,000 annual raise. The Advocate, Feb. 8, 1978, at 11.




At the present time, the ability to marry is regulated by the state.
Once validated, the marriage relationship confers upon its participants
preferential tax treatment, a right of action with regard to a fatal acci-
dent of the spouse, social security benefits, and the protection of the law
of intestate succession. Moreover, the married couple benefits from in-
numerable nongovernmental benefits such as employee family health
care, group insurance, lower automobile insurance, family member-
ships in various organizations, and the ability to hold real estate by the
entirety. Beyond these legal and economic benefits, marriage is gener-
ally viewed as psychologically beneficial to the participants by
strengthening the stability, emotional health, and societal respectability
of the relationship. 4 5
0
Given the legal, economic, and psychological benefits of marriage,
it is not surprising that homosexual couples who live in committed rela-
tionships would also wish to procure these benefits. A number of ho-
mosexual couples have tried to effectuate a legal marriage but to date
no court has recognized such a union.
45
In Baker v. Nelson452 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to al-
low the marriage of Richard Baker and James McConnell,453 conclud-
ing that the Minnesota statute governing marriage did not authorize
449. This power is somewhat more restricted with respect to university professors. See
Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977), discussed at text
accompanying notes 832-38 infra.
450. For an excellent discussion of the societal purposes of legally recognized marriages,
see Veitch, The Essence of Marriage-A Comment on the Homosexual Challenge, 5 ANGLO-
AM. L. REV. 41 (1976).
45 1. This section will not deal with the validity of marriage of transsexuals. For discus-
sions of this subject, see M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2
All E.R. 33 (P. Div'l Ct.); Comment, The Law and Transsexualism:. A Faltering Response to a
Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288 (1974); 8 AKRON L. REV. 369 (1975).
452. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
453. McConnell sued the University of Minnesota in McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F.
Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rep'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046
(1972), for refusing to hire him as a librarian. It was this attempted marriage with Baker
which prompted the University of Minnesota's refusal to hire McConnell. See text accom-
panying notes 156-68 supra for a discussion of McConnell.
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same-sex marriages. Although the Minnesota statute did not specify
the sex of the parties, the court decided that the term marriage was to
be construed according to common usage.
454
The two men argued that such an interpretation was unconstitu-
tional as a denial of equal protection because restricting marriage to
opposite sex couples was an irrational and invidious discrimination
that infringed upon their fundamental right to marry. While the court
did not deny that marriage was a fundamental right, it rejected the con-
tention that the state's classification of persons authorized to marry was
irrational. The court characterized the institution of marriage "as a
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and
rearing of children." 455 When the gay men pointed out that some het-
erosexual couples often do not want or cannot have children but are
nevertheless permitted to marry, the court observed that the classifica-
tion by the state of who may or may not marry is "no more than theo-
retically imperfect" and that "abstract symmetry is not demanded by
the Fourteenth Amendment.1
456
The court also rejected the analogy to Loving v. Virginia,457 in
which the Supreme Court overturned an antimiscegenation statute.
The court in Baker found there to be a clear commonsense, as well as
constitutional, distinction between a restriction based on race and one
based on sex.4
58
While their appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court was pending,
Jack Baker and Jim McConnell received a marriage license from a
Minnesota court clerk and were married by a minister. Baker then ap-
plied, by virtue of his veteran's status, for an increase in benefits for his
dependent spouse. When the Veterans' Administration denied the
claim on the grounds that McConnell was not his spouse, Baker and
454. The court referred to Websterr Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary to deter-
mine the meaning of the term "marriage." 291 Minn. at 311 n.1, 191 N.W.2d at 186. Web-
ster's defines marriage as "the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as
husband or wife." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1384 (1966).
Black's provides the following definition: "Marriage ... is the civil status, condition, or
relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other
and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded on
the distinction of sex." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (4th ed. 1951).
455. 291 Minn. at 312, 191 N.W.2d at 186. This procreational model of sexual love has
been challenged. See Richards, supra note 25, at 978-81, wherein the author argues that
rejection of the procreational model was the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
456. Id. at 314, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
457. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
458. 291 Minn. at 314, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
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McConnell sued. In McConnell v. Nooner,459 the court of appeals up-
held the decision of the Veterans' Administration on the grounds that,
pursuant to regulations of the Veterans' Administration, 460 the validity
of a veteran's marriage is determined in accordance with the law of the
state where the veteran resides.
In Jones v. Hallahan,46' two lesbians sued the county clerk to com-
pel the issuance of a marriage license.462 The women claimed that they
were deprived of their constitutional right to marry, to associate, and to
freely exercise their religion.
Like Minnesota's statute, the Kentucky statute neither specified
the sex of those eligible for marriage nor defined marriage. The Ken-
tucky court, like the Minnesota court in Baker, resorted to the popular
definition of marriage463 and took judicial notice of the fact that "mar-
riage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue
licenses. '464 The court decided that the women were not prevented
from marrying by the statute of Kentucky, but "rather by their own
incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined."465 Cit-
ing with approval Baker v. Nelson, the court concluded that the prohi-
bition on same-sex marriage did not impinge upon any
constitutionally-protected interests, including the guarantee of religious
freedom under the first amendment. The court cited Reynolds v. United
States,466 which sanctioned the prohibition of polygamy, for the propo-
sition that the interest in the free exercise of religious beliefs can be
outweighed by the greater interest in an orderly society.
A more comprehensive discussion of the constitutional implication
of prohibitions against homosexual marriage is found in Singer v.
Hara,467 in which two homosexual men sued to compel issuance of a
marriage license.468 The petitioners claimed that the statutes of the
459. 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976).
460. 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1970).
461. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
462. A similar action was dismissed by the court in Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626
(E.D. Wisc. 1972), because plaintiffs had failed to submit an answering brief in response to
defendant's supporting brief. The court said that the absence of plaintiffs' memorandum
would require the court "to speculate on the plaintiffs' arguments in this relatively novel
area of the law." Id. at 626.
463. The court referred to Webster's New International Dictionary, Century Dictionary &
Encyclopedia and Black's Law Dictionary. 501 S.W.2d at 589.
464. Id.
465. Id. (emphasis added).
466. 98 U.S. 145 (1978).
467. 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). For a similar case arising in a Canadian
court, see Re North and Matheson, 52 D.L.R.3d 280 (1974).
468. John Singer, one of the two plaintiffs in this case, was the plaintiff in Singer v.
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State of Washington did not prohibit same-sex marriages; but that if
such a prohibition did exist, it violated the Washington State Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) as well as the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.469 The court summarily dismissed the petition-
ers' first argument, concluding that "it is apparent from aplain reading
of our marriage statutes that the legislature has not authorized same-
sex marriages.
'470
The impact of the newly enacted state ERA was not clear. The
petitioners argued that a law that permits a man to marry a woman but
will not permit him to marry a man creates a classification based on sex
and, therefore, is impermissible under the ERA. The petitioners fur-
ther claimed that the fact that marriage licenses are denied equally to
both male and female couples does not cure the discrimination. They
observed that a similar argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Loving v. Virginia,471 namely, that antimiscegenation statutes did not
violate constitutional prohibitions against racial classification because
the statutes affected both racial groups equally.472 The court concluded
that the two cases were not analogous. Unlike the parties in Loving,
who were barred from marrying because of an impermissible racial
classification, the petitioners in Singer were not being denied entry into
the marriage relationship because of their sex but because, by defini-
tion, that relationship can only be entered into by persons of opposing
sex.47
3
The court noted a generally recognized exception to an "absolute"
interpretation of the ERA where differentiation between sexes is based
on unique physical characteristics of a particular sex rather than upon a
person's membership in a particular sex. Thus, since the fundamental
reason that the state refuses to recognize same-sex marriages is founded
upon "unique physical characteristics of the sexes," namely, the "im-
United States Civil Service Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034
(1977). Singer's attempted marriage helped spark the controversy which resulted in his be-
ing fired by the EEOC. See notes 134-48 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of
Singer.
469. 11 Wash. App. at 248, 522 P.2d at 1188-89.
470. Id. at 249, 522 P.2d at 1189 (emphasis added). The meaning of the statute is not
quite as "plain" as the court would like to convey. A 1970 amendment to the statute substi-
tuted the word "persons" for men and women. Although this change is subject to several
interpretations, the court concluded that the revision was implemented solely to eliminate
the different age requirements for the respective sexes.
471. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
472. 11 Wash. App. at 252-53, 522 P.2d at 1191.
473. Id. at 254-55, 522 P.2d at 1191-92.
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possibility of reproduction, '474 that classification falls within the excep-
tion to the strict interpretation of the ERA and is not
unconstitutional.
475
The court similarly rejected the petitioners' argument that prohibi-
tion of same-sex marriages constituted a denial of equal protection.
First, the court concluded that it was not compelled to apply strict scru-
tiny to this classification because neither a suspect classification nor a
fundamental right was involved. While the court admitted that a clas-
sification based on sex may be inherently suspect, the court neverthe-
less reiterated its conclusion that the prohibition against same-sex
marriages does not discriminate on the basis of sex but is a logical con-
sequence of the commonly understood nature of the marriage relation-
ship.476 In addition, the court summarily rejected the petitioners'
alternative argument that homosexuals constituted a suspect class.
477
The court's reasoning with respect to the second ground for apply-
ing strict scrutiny is less clear. While recognizing that marriage is a
fundamental right, the court evidently defined that right narrowly to
exclude same-sex marriages.
478
After determining that strict scrutiny was not required, the court
used the less exacting "rational basis" standard. The court concluded
that the public interest in affording a favorable environment for the
growth of children constituted "a rational basis for the state to limit the
definition of marriage to exclude same-sex relationsips."479
Until legislatures change the statutory definition of marriage or
until the courts recognize that prohibition against same-sex marriages
violates constitutionally protected interests, two homosexual individu-
als cannot marry one another. However, as long as financial and legal
benefits accrue to heterosexual marital units, it seems likely that many
homosexual family units will continue to seek legal recognition through
marriage480 or will pressure legislatures to create another new status
with the same legal and financial benefits.
474. Id. at 260, 522 P.2d at 1194-95.
475. Id. For a different conclusion, see Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82
YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
476. 11 Wash. App. at 862, 522 P.2d at 1196.
477. Id. For petitioner's argument that homosexuals constitute a suspect class, see id at
262 n.12, 522 P.2d at 1196. See also Chaitin & Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect?, 8 LINCOLN L.
REv. 24 (1973).
478. 11 Wash. App. at 260, 522 P.2d at 1195.
479. Id. at 247, 522 P.2d at 1197. The court admitted that married persons are not re-
quired to have children and conceded that it was within the power of the legislature to
change the definition of marriage without harm to the Constitution.
480. One lesbian couple was jailed for staging a sit-in demonstration at the office of the
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IX. Divorce
A large number of homosexual persons enter into traditional het-
erosexual marriages despite their sexual preference.481 Some of these
marriages survive until the death of one of the spouses; others end in
divorce. Whether or not the homosexuality of one of the partners is the
actual reason for the divorce, it is highly likely that the issue of homo-
sexuality will not be mentioned in the pleadings.48 2 Because few di-
vorces involve homosexuality and few divorce cases are appealed, there
are few published cases dealing with homosexuality as grounds for di-
vorce.483 In states that have limited grounds for divorce the element of
homosexuality has caused problems of characterizations.
The earliest reported divorce proceeding in which homosexuality
clearly was the issue484 is Poler v. Poler.48 5 Although the court of ap-
peals conceded that sodomy was not among the enumerated grounds
county clerk when the license bureau denied them a marriage license. Lesbian Connection,
Sept. 1977, at 8.
481. Here, as elsewhere, the definition of homosexuality becomes confusing. Many per-
sons who have had a single or limited homosexual experience undoubtedly enter into heter-
osexual marriages. For example, according to Kinsey 37% of all males after puberty have
had a homosexual contact to orgasm. A. Karlen, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 444
(1971). Probably the heterosexual drive of these persons is stronger than their homosexual
drive. However, given societal pressures, it is fair to assume that many persons who are
predominantly homosexual marry. It may be a marriage of convenience where the other
party willingly provides a "cover." More likely the predominantly homosexual individual
marries because he or she really has not faced up to his or her sexual preference or, perhaps,
because he or she thinks marriage will effect a "cure." The actual number of such persons is
impossible to estimate. In Tearoom Trade, a sociological study of male homosexual sex in
public restrooms, Humphreys found that 54% of his subjects were married men currently
living with their wives. L. HUMPHREYS, TEAROOM TRADE: IMPERSONAL SEX IN PUBLIC
PLACES 105 (1970).
482. There are a variety of reasons why homosexuality will not be mentioned in the
pleadings. The homosexual spouse may have hidden his or her preference completely. On
the other hand the nonhomosexual spouse may not wish to stigmatize his or her ex-spouse or
may not wish the homosexuality of his or her spouse to become a matter of public record.
Given the existence of such broad grounds for divorce as "mental cruelty", the subject often
can be avoided.
483. In 1960, there were 393,000 divorces and annulments in the United States. In 1970,
there were 708,000 and in 1975, there were 1,026,000. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC,
ATLAS AND YEARBOOK 707, 712 (31st ed. 1977). Divorces are generally heard in lower
courts with the judge acting as the finder of fact. In divorce and custody cases, "the facts"
rather than "the law" often decide the case. Appellate courts pay great deference to the
judge's findings of fact. As most domestic relations lawyers know, trial judges are seldom
reversed.
484. There are other divorce cases, earlier in time, which deal with sodomy with animals
and other acts characterized as "unnatural.' This section only deals with divorce proceed-
ings in which sexual acts between persons of the same sex are at issue. Seegenerall, Annot.,
78 A.L.R.2d 807 (1961).
485. 32 Wash. 400, 73 P. 372 (1908).
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for divorce, and despite the fact that it was not clear whether sodomy
should be considered adultery or cruelty, or even an independent
ground,486 the court nevertheless upheld the decree awarded on that
ground. The court noted that the divorce statute allowed a court to
grant a divorce for any other cause deemed sufficient and that sodomy
had been regarded, at common law and in the ecclesiastical courts, as a
ground for divorce.
In Crutcher v. Crutcher,48 7 the Mississippi Supreme Court decided
that pederasty, 488 like sodomy, should be classified as "cruel and inhu-
man" treatment and consequently within the statutory grounds for di-
vorce. The court observed that "unnatural practices of the kind
charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and . ..would
make the marriage relation . . . revolting.
48 9
A Florida court in Currie v. Currie490 also found that the homosex-
ual conduct of the husband was one of several factors that together
constituted extreme cruelty to the wife and thus provided grounds for
divorce. In this case, the husband not only had refused to have sexual
relations with his wife for over five years but also took a young man
into their home with whom he "gave expression to unnatural love...
even before his wife's eyes."
'49 1
While some courts were willing to consider homosexuality as "ex-
treme cruelty," others adhered to a more literal approach. In Cohen v.
Cohen,4 9 2 the wife sued for divorce based on sodomy even though, at
that time, the only ground for divorce under the applicable New York
statute was adultery. As a part of her proof the wife provided the court
with the record of her husband's conviction for that crime. While the
court's sympathies were clearly with the wife, the court refused to grant
the divorce because sodomy did not constitute adultery as defined by
the court. 4
93
Another court avoided a similar problem of statutory construction
in Santos v. Santos.494 The court rejected "gross misbehavior and
486. Id. at 402, 73 P. at 373.
487. 86 Miss. 231, 38 So. 337 (1905).
488. "[Plederasty: Homosexual anal intercourse between men and boys as the passive
partners. The term is used less precisely to denote male homosexual anal intercourse."
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 115 (4th ed. 1975).
489. 86 Miss. at 235, 38 So. at 337.
490. 120 Fla. 28, 162 So. 152 (1935).
491. Id. at 34, 162 So. at 154.
492. 200 Misc. 19, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
493. The court defined adultery as "sexual intercourse of two persons, either of whom is
married to a third person." Id.at 19-20, 103 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28.
494. 80 R.I. 5, 90 A.2d 771 (1952).
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wickedness" as grounds for divorce but nevertheless declared the mar-
riage void from its inception. On the day of their marriage, the wife
refused to have "normal sexual intercourse" with her husband and in-
stead wanted only "unnatural intercourse. ' 495 Three days later, the
wife left to live with a girl friend of "questionable reputation. '496 Ac-
cording to the court, this behavior clearly indicated that the wife had
fraudulently concealed her tastes and intentions. Although the trial
court considered this behavior analogous to adultery, it did not give a
divorce on those grounds because the husband had failed to meet the
requisite burden of proof.
More recently courts have considered the homosexuality of one
spouse as part of a pattern of conduct, sufficient to constitute grounds
for divorce.497 In A.B. v. C.D.498 the court awarded a divorce to the
husband on the ground of indignities. Evidence showed that the hus-
band returned home one day and found his wife and her woman friend
engaged in an act of sodomy.499 In granting the divorce, the court ob-
served that one act of sodomy alone was insufficient to establish
grounds for divorce, a continuous course of conduct was required. The
court found the requisite course of conduct in the fact that the wife had
left home to live with her woman friend.
In H. v. H. 500 a husband was similarly granted a divorce on the
ground of "extreme cruelty." 0'° The wife had maintained an active ho-
mosexual relationship and eventually began living with her female
495. Id. at 7, 90 A.2d at 772.
496. Id.
497. The opinion in Gilmore v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955), suggests
that the alleged homosexual conduct of the wife was not the determining factor. While the
exact nature of the sexual conduct is not really clear, it appears that the wife and another
woman engaged in sexual conduct in the presence of the husband, apparently with his ap-
proval. Because the husband also was sexually active outside the marriage, the trial court
concluded that the parties were inpari deli/to with respect to sexual matters. Id. at 149, 287
P.2d at 773. The fact that the husband was nevertheless granted a divorce on the grounds of
"extreme cruelty" suggests that the court must have considered factors other than the wife's
homosexuality.
498. 74 Pa. D. & C. 83 (1950).
499. In most jurisdictions sodomy laws apply to homosexual acts by persons of either
sex. But see Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939) (crime of sodomy as
defined by Georgia statute cannot be accomplished by two women); Comment, Constitu-
tional Protection ofPrivate Sexual Conduct Among Consenting Adults: Another Look At Sod-
omy Statutes, 62 IowA L. REv. 568, 568 n.6 (1976).
500. 59 N.J. Super. 227, 157 A.2d 721 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
501. The husband also received custody of the two children. Id. at 232, 157 A.2d at 727.
For a discussion of custody cases in which one parent is a homosexual person, see section on
custody at text accompanying notes 513-631 infra.
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lover. In granting the divorce, the court spoke harshly about
lesbianism.
It is difficult to conceive of a more grievous indignity to which a
person of normal psychological and sexual constitution could be ex-
posed than the entry by his spouse upon an active and continuous
course of homosexual love with another. Added to the insult of sex-
ual disloyalty per se (which is present in ordinary adultery) is the
natural revulsion arising from knowledge of the fact that the spouse's
betrayal takes the form of a perversion ...
• . . Few behavioral deviations are more offensive to American
mores than is homosexuality. Common sense and modern psychiat-
ric knowledge concur as to the incompatibility of homosexuality and
the subsistence of marriage between one so afflicted and a normal
person.
50 2
In Richardson v. Richardson,50 3 a wife sought divorce on the
grounds of "constructive desertion" claiming that she had to leave
home because of her husband's alleged homosexuality. While the court
indicated that "a pattern of homosexual activity on the part of one
spouse could be so demeaning to the self-respect of the other that the
latter would be justified in leaving the household, ' ' 504 the court refused
to grant the divorce because there was not sufficient evidence of such
activity. 5
05
The issue of divorce on the grounds of homosexuality was simi-
larly disposed of on a point of evidence in Luley v. Luley, 50 6 in which
the wife sought divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment
because her husband was a "sexual pervert. ' 50 7 As corroboration of his
propensities, the trial court allowed the wife to introduce evidence of
an attempted homosexual act that allegedly took place five years prior
to their marriage. The court of appeals concluded that the admission
of such evidence was prejudicial error 50 8 and vacated the decree
awarded by the trial court.
Admission of evidence in support of the homosexual spouse was
upheld in Feuti v. Feuti.50 9 When the wife filed for divorce on the
502. Id. at 236-37, 157 A.2d at 726-27.
503. 17 Md. App. 665, 304 A.2d 1 (1973).
504. Id. at 670, 304 A.2d at 5.
505. Id. at 671, 304 A.2d at 5.
506. 234 Minn. 324, 48 N.W.2d 328 (1951).
507. She claimed that during their marriage he had made "improper" requests for mas-
turbation and fellatio. Id. at 325, 48 N.W.2d at 329.
508. The court observed, "It is not proper to raise a presumption of guilt on the ground
that, having committed one wrongful act, the depravity it exhibits makes it likely he would
commit another." Id. at 326, 48 N.W.2d at 329.
509. 92 R.I. 219, 167 A.2d 757 (1961).
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grounds of extreme cruelty and neglect, the husband cross-petitioned
for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty and gross misbehavior.
The wife's alleged gross misbehavior was an "illicit sexual relation"-
with "Miss R."5 10 The trial court granted Mrs. Feuti the divorce and
denied Mr. Feuti's cross-petition. On appeal, the supreme court af-
firmed, concluding that the trial court's admission of the testimony of
certain witnesses that they had "observed nothing immoral" in Mrs.
Feuti's relationship with Miss R.51 was not an abuse of discretion.
While neither homosexuality, lesbianism, nor sodomy seems to be
grounds for divorce in and of itself, most courts are willing to consider
homosexual behavior as part of a pattern of cruelty or misconduct and
thus as adequate grounds for divorce. 512 This approach often leads to
arbitrary results as courts attempt to conceptualize homosexuality in
terms of the traditional statutory grounds for divorce. If the courts in-
stead objectively examined the alleged misconduct and its effect upon
the marriage relationship, wholly apart from whether the misconduct
involved homosexual or heterosexual activity, the results would pre-
sumably reflect more rational adjudicating.
X. Custody
The exact number of children who have homosexual parents is un-
known. However, an approximation of that figure is possible. Various
experts estimate that there are between eight million and sixteen mil-
lion lesbian women in the United States513 and that among these wo-
men, 1.5 million to 5 million may be mothers.514 Assuming each
mother has an average of two children and assuming, according to the
most conservative estimate, that 1.5 million lesbian women are
510. Id. at 221, 167 A.2d at 758.
511. Id. at 222, 167 A.2d at 759.
512. In Towend v. Towend, No. 639 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Portage County 1975), which is
discussed with the custody cases at notes 621-28 & accompanying text infra, the court
granted the husband a divorce from his lesbian wife on the grounds of extreme cruelty. Of
course, in the new no-fault divorce states such issues are largely irrelevant. Traditional
"faults" may nevertheless play an important part in property, alimony, and custody deci-
sions. See Kretzschmar v. Kretzschmar, 48 Mich. App. 279, 210 N.W.2d 352 (1973). See
section on Custody at text accompanying notes 513-631 infra.
513. D. ROSEN, LESBIANiSM-A STUDY OF HOMOSEXUALITY 63 (1974); Trial Brief for
Plaintiff at 1, Stamper v. Stamper, No. 75-054-550-DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County
1975).
514. Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation
Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 691 (1976); Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 1, Stamper v. Stamper,
No. 75-054-550-DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County 1975); see Law Note, The AvowedLes-
ban Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: 4 Constitutional Challenge that Can No Longer
Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 799, 820 (1975).
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mothers, approximately three million children may have lesbian
mothers. There are fewer estimates on the number of gay fathers.
Since gay men are presumed to outnumber gay women significantly,
there may well be a comparable number of children of gay men.
515
Obviously, not all of these children are the subjects of custody bat-
tles. First, some homosexual parents stay married until their children
are no longer minors. Second, some parents split amicably and work
out custody arrangements without any discussion of the homosexuality
of one or both of the spouses. Some of these parents may hide their
sexual preference from their former spouse so that homosexuality never
becomes an issue. Finally, there are other homosexual parents whose
former spouse has disappeared, died, or in the case of an illegitimate
birth, never participated in the childrearing process. Therefore, mil-
lions of homosexual parents are raising their children without any state
intervention. Other parents have not been so fortunate.
Gathering material on how homosexual parents fare before the
courts in custody battles is extremely difficult. All the methodological
problems previously discussed with respect to gay issues in general 51
6
are present to an even greater extent with respect to child custody cases.
A commentator notes that "few cases are reported where the mother's
lesbianism is an issue, and even where reported, the factual bases of the
decisions are often omitted or truncated." 517 For example in Spence Y.
Durham,51 8 the majority opinion never mentions the parent's homosex-
uality, but indicates that it will not discuss a situation that "was beyond
the pale of the most permissive society. '5 19 Only the dissent discloses
the fact that the mother allegedly engaged in homosexual activity.
520
Another commentator suggests, "The statement of facts found in
the cases may be misleading in that they are conservatively drawn in
deference to the privacy of the parties and the sensibilities of the pub-
lic."' 52 ' For example, the only published decision in O'Harra v.
O'-arra522 is the brief opinion of the Court of Appeals of Oregon,
523
515. Gay men make up approximately 13.95% of the male population. Letter from Paul
H. Gebhard, Institute of Sex Research, Inc. (Mar. 18, 1977).
516. See notes 26-29 & accompanying text supra.
517. Harris, Lesbian Mother Child Custody" Legal and Psychiatric Aspects, V BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCH. AND L. 75 (1977).
518. 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973).
519. Id. at 678, 198 S.E.2d at 541.
520. Id. at 698, 198 S.E.2d at 552.
521. Lauerman, Non-Marital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. REV.
647, 649 (1977).
522. No. 73-384E (Or. Cir. Ct. 13th Jud. Dist. June 18, 1974), aft'd, 530 P.2d 877 (Or.
App. 1975), reportedin 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 24 (1974).
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affirming the lower court's decision: "We have examined the record in
this case and are satisfied that the trial court made the correct decision.
Because there is a potential for harm to persons involved, we conclude
that no useful purpose would be served in publishing a detailed
opinion."-524
Many cases are not published at all.525 As one author observed:
"[Tihe issue is rarely mentioned above the level of a whisper, and the
few cases that reach the appellate level are almost always ordered ex-
cluded from official and unofficial reports.
'526
Not only are appellate cases often unpublished, but trial court
records are often sealed. In fact a Michigan circuit judge, in a recent
article, recommended this procedure. 527 These judicial practices create
a dearth of precedent in the area, obscuring judicial discrimination
against gay parents and depriving attorneys and scholars of valuable
and needed materials.
5 28
Suits in which gay parents fight to keep their children have been
523. In re 0 and 0, 20 Or. App. 201, 530 P.2d 877 (1975).
524. Id. at 202, 530 P.2d at 877. Similarly, in Spence v Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198
S.E.2d 537 (1973), in which a mother successfully obtained custody of her children, the
majority opinion does not refer to the mother's alleged homosexuality. The court apparently
felt that the mother had "reformed" and that "[t]o perpetuate this evidence. . would per-
haps put a stumbling block in the way of [the] mother's continued restoration." Id. at 678,
198 S.E.2d at 541. Only the dissent alludes to the fact that the mother had perhaps engaged
in homosexual behavior. The dissent felt that the children should be left with their grand-
parents to guard them "against the then clear and present danger of corrupt moral teaching,
by example, by the mother and her chosen associates." Id. at 693, 198 S.E.2d at 549. In this
case, it is extremely unclear whether the mother in fact was a homosexual person in any
sense of the word. However, it is apparent that at the time of the case she had established a
lifestyle that seemed to include no erotic or emotional attachments with either sex and thus
won the court's approval.
525. The nonpublication issue is so real and so controversial that noted scholar Herma
Hill Kay, in her extremely well-regarded text, K. DAVISON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEx-
BASED DISCRIMINATION (1975), discusses unreported lesbian mother cases. Professor Kay
applies the California standards with respect to certification for nonpublication to determine
whether many of the child custody cases were properly denied publication. Id. at 275.
526. Armanno, The Lesbian Mother. Her Right to Child Custody, 4 GOLDEN GATE L.
REv. 1, 5 (1973).
527. Campbell, Child Custody: When One Parent Is Homosexual, 17 JUDGES' J., No. 2,
at 52 (1978).
528. For example, in O'Harra v. O'Harra, No. 73-384E (Or. Cir. Ct. 13th Jud. Dist. June
18, 1974), af'd, 530 P.2d 877 (Or. App. 1975), an Oregon court awarded the custody of three
boys to their father and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the court did not
spell out the basis of its decision, the mother's lesbianism was apparently at issue. Even
though the trial was long and the appellate argument extensive, the court refused to publish
a detailed opinion which might have provided guidance to subsequent litigants and their
attorneys. Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litiga-
tion Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 691, 696 n.21 (1976).
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few in number until quite recently. The great majority of cases have
occurred in the last five years. The reason for the increase in cases can
be attributed to a number of factors. First, a gay parent often refrained
from contesting custody for fear that his or her spouse might reveal his
or her sexual preference to parents, employer, and friends. Second,
when gay parents sued for custody, they generally lost. Losing the fight
over custody often meant losing their jobs as well and, consequently,
the financial wherewithal to continue the legal battle. The recent up-
surge in the number of cases is probably caused by a growing pride on
the part of most gay parents and a growing support system to help them
fight for the custody of their children.
529
Disputes concerning the custody of children of homosexual par-
ents usually arise in two contexts, in divorce proceedings between the
spouses and in "neglect" proceedings between one spouse and the state.
In divorce proceedings, the grandparents often intervene and seek cus-
tody of the children while in neglect suits, state social workers usually
seek to deprive the homosexual parent of the custody of his or her
child. This latter type of dispute usually only arises when the parent is
receiving welfare or has a criminal record, and a zealous social worker
becomes interested in the parent's life-style.
In theory, when a court decides, in the context of a divorce pro-
ceeding, which parent should be given custody of a child, it considers
only the "best interests of the child." This theory was originally ad-
vanced by Justice Cardozo, who observed that "[The judge] is not adju-
dicating a controversy between adversary parties, to compose their
private differences. He is not determining rights 'as between a parent
and a child' or as between one parent and another. . . .Equity does
not concern itself with such disputes . . . . Its concern is for the
child. ' 530 Other issues, such as the morality of the parent, are relevant
only to the extent they affect our concern for the child.531 However, the
gap between theory and practice is great and the "morality" of the par-
529. A number of organizations have been formed to give legal and emotional aid to
lesbian mothers in custody battles. Lesbian Mother's Defense Fund, located at 2446 Lorentz
Place North, Seattle, Washington 98109, is the best known.
530. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-44, 148 N.E. 624, 626, 211 N.Y.S. 429, 434
(1925).
531. Quoting Cardozo, one court observed: "'The law will not hold the crowd to the
morality of saints and seers.'" S. v. J., 81 Misc. 2d 828, 831, 367 N.Y.S.2d 405, 408, (Sup. Ct.
1975). This court than ruled: "The criterion to be applied to determinations of custody is
not whether the court condones the mother's mode of living or considers it to be contrary to
good morals, but whether the child is best located with the mother and there well behaved
and cared for." Id. at 833, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
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ents is often at issue. Consider, for example, the court's statement in
Bunim v. Bunim.532
Defendant here, in open court, has stated her considered belief in the
propriety of indulgence. . . in extramarital sex experimentation. It
cannot be that 'the best interests and welfare' of those impressionable
[children] will be 'best served' by awarding their custody to one who
proclaims, and lives by, such extraordinary ideas of right conduct.
5 33
In a neglect proceeding the standard is not the "best interests of
the child." Instead, a child can be removed from a parent if and only if
that parent is found to be unfit. Accordingly, in 1973 a California juve-
nile court in In re Tammy F ,534 removed four children from the cus-
tody of their mother when she was convicted of possession of
marijuana. Two of the children were subsequently returned to the
mother and two were placed in foster homes. When the court discov-
ered that the mother was a lesbian, the two children living at home
were again removed from the mother.535 "The court of appeals sus-
tained the juvenile court's order in an unpublished opinion, concluding
in part that '[t]he continuous existence of a homosexual relationship in
the home where the minor is exposed to it involves the necessary likeli-
hood of serious adjustment problems.' "536
Approximately a year later the same lesbian mother sought to
regain the two children originally placed and still living in foster
homes. The lower court concluded that it was in the best interest of the
children to leave them in a foster home because "the mother freely
concedes that she has been, is, and intends to continue living in a les-
bian relationship with another woman. ' 537 The case was appealed and
subsequently remanded for further proceedings.5 38 On remand, the ju-
venile court again found that it would be detrimental to the children to
return them to their mother and reaffirmed the order placing them in
532. 298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848, 86 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1949).
533. Id. at 394, 83 N.E.2d at 849, 86 N.Y.S.2d at 394. The author is indebted to N.
Lauerman, author of Non-Marital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. REV.
647 (1977), for calling attention to this quotation as well as to the quotation cited at note 531
supra.
534. 1 Civ. No. 32648 (Cal. App. Aug. 21, 1973),petitionfor hearing denied Nov. 7, 1973,
reported in 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 19 (1974).
535. Id. at 21.
536. Id.
537. In re Deana P., No. 10747-J (Cal. Super. Ct., Sonoma County July 12, 1973), re-
ported in 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 21-22 (1974).
538. 1 Civ. No. 3400 (Cal. App. July 2, 1974), reportedin 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. Rap, at
22 (1974). The unpublished appellate opinion does not mention the mother's
homosexuality.
an out-of-state foster home.
539
In deciding these two related cases, the lower court used the "best
interest of the child" test and the appellate court sustained the applica-
tion of this standard.540 As previously indicated, this is an improper
standard in a neglect hearing. In a neglect hearing, the state or moving
party must generally show harm to the child in order to justify removal
of a child from its parent. With respect to Tammy and her siblings, the
homosexuality of their mother, without evidence of harm, was consid-
ered sufficient cause to remove them from the custody of their natural
mother and place them in foster homes.
In People v. Brown, 54 1 a Michigan court reached an entirely oppo-
site conclusion from that reached by the California court in the two
previously discussed proceedings. A neglect proceeding was initiated
in a Michigan probate court by a petition alleging that the home in
which the Brown and Smith children were living was "unfit because the
mothers were living together in a state of lesbianism which created an
immoral atmosphere.
542
After a series of hearings and a variety of placements, the probate
court ordered that the children be placed in foster homes. The appel-
late court reversed and remanded, saying: "There was sufficient evi-
dence to support the conclusion that the women were engaged in a
lesbian relationship. However, there is very little to support the conclu-
sion that this relationship rendered the home an unfit place for the chil-
dren to reside. ' 543  On remand, the probate court granted the
prosecution's motion to dismiss and allowed the children to return to
their mothers.544 The Brown decision is generally recognized for the
proposition that a lesbian relationship is not a sufficient finding to
render a home an unfit place for children to reside. Thus, a nexus be-
tween parental homosexual conduct and harm to the children must be
shown, at least in Michigan neglect cases.
The most recent neglect case may also be the most unusual. At
539. 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 22 (1974).
540. Id.
541. 49 Mich. App. 358, 212 N.W.2d 55 (1973).
542. Id. at 360, 212 N.W.2d at 57.
543. Id. at 365, 212 N.W.2d at 59.
544. The probate court was clearly reluctant to return the children to their mother. The
court believed that the appellate court had ignored the fact that "this type of relationship
between the parties [is] illegal, and thus creates an immoral atmosphere in the home." In re
Brown 2 (Mich. P. Ct., Lapeer County Oct. 12, 1973).
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issue in In re Hatzopoulos 545 was the custody of Candace Hatzopoulos,
whose mother, Jeannette, had committed suicide. Jeannette Hatzo-
poulos had lived in a committed relationship with Donna Levy, an-
other lesbian woman, for thirteen years. During that relationship,
Candace was born. Her biological father never had any relationship or
contact with her. In 1974 Donna and Jeannette broke up because of
Jeannette's serious mental problems. However, Donna continued to
have constant and continuous contact with Candace. When Jeannette
commited suicide, Jeannette's sister and brother-in-law took Candace
but refused to let her see Donna Levy. The court examined the two
custodial alternatives and chose to give Donna Levy custody of the
child.
Donna's sexual preference has not affected the child in the past and
is not related to her ability to parent the child. Her strengths as a
parent to the child are her sensitivity, her ability to empathize with
the child, her warmth and her dependability. When sexual prefer-
ence would become significant to the child, Donna has the ability to
deal with it intelligently, openly and honestly.
546
The fitness standard, properly applied in neglect cases, is often in-
correctly applied in divorce proceedings. Thus, some courts have de-
nied custody to a homosexual parent not only because the child's best
interest presumably was served thereby, but also because the parent's
homosexuality was considered proof of parental unfitness.
One of the earliest published cases dealing with child custody and
a homosexual parent is Commonwealth v. Bradle. 547 At the time of the
divorce between the mother and the homosexual father, the court gave
general custody to the mother and temporary custody to the father,
which included alternate weekends and two weeks in the summer. In
what turned out to be a tactical error, the father appealed these limita-
tions. The appeals court not only took away his temporary custody but
gave the mother exclusive custody with the right to grant the father
such limited visitation as she deemed best for the children.
The court's decision was apparently precipitated by the fact that
Mr. Bachman, the father, was a homosexual individual. After review-
ing the evidence, the court said that Bachman's lifestyle revealed an
"erotic engrossment. ' 548 Although there was no evidence that Bach-
man allowed his propensities to be known by his children, the court
545. Colo. Juv. Ct., Denver County July 8, 1977, reportedin 4 FAMILY L. REP. at 2076
(1977).
546. Id.
547. 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 587, 91 A.2d 379 (1952).
548. Id. at 591, 91 A.2d at 381.
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warned that "the absence of harmful influences in the past does not
eliminate the probabilities of the future." 549 The court said that the
applicable standard was "the best interest and welfare of the child;" but
nevertheless considered the fitness of the parent, noting that "[i]n the
custody of [the father], [the children] may be exposed to improper con-
ditions and undesirable influences."
550
The homosexuality of the mother similarly influenced the court in
Immerman v. Immerman.55' Although the lower court ruled that evi-
dence of the mother's sexual proclivities was inadmissible 52 and
awarded custody to the mother, the appeals court reversed. The court
concluded that the exclusion of that evidence was erroneous and preju-
dicial because "[tihe moral character, acts, conduct and disposition of
one who seeks the custody of a child are relevant matters. '5 53 Thus, in
effect, the court held that the sexual orientation of the parent was rele-
vant in and of itself whether or not it affected the child adversely.
554
The court in Nadler v. Superior Court,555 reached a similar result,
but was nevertheless more sympathetic to the lesbian mother seeking
custody of her child. The California Court of Appeal rejected the
lower court, holding that homosexuality per se is conclusive of parental
unfitness and instructed the lower court to consider all the evidence in
making its decision.
On remand, the lower court once again granted custody to the fa-
ther. The lesbian mother was given Sunday visitation rights, on the
condition that another adult-"a relative who has no problems" and
who was presumably not a homosexual person-be present at the
time.556 As to Mrs. Nadler's future visitation rights the court said: "I
549. Id. at 593, 91 A.2d at 381.
550. Id. at 593, 91 A.2d at 381-82. Another early Pennsylvania case, Leonard v. Leo-
nard, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 424, 98 A.2d 638 (1953), was resolved in favor of a homosexual
father. However, the court upheld the father's visitation rights on the ground that his ex-
wife's allegations as to his "sexual perversion" and its alleged effect on their children was not
supported by the evidence. Id. at 426, 98 A.2d at 638-39.
551. 176 Cal. App. 2d 122, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1959).
552. The father wished to testify to the fact that he had discovered his wife in a compro-
mising position with another woman. Id. at 126, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
553. Id. at 127, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
554. A Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. Cortes, 210 Pa. Super. Ct. 515, 234 A.2d
47 (1967), in which a grandmother sought custody of her daughter's five children, similarly
excluded testimony with regard to the mother's homosexuality. Also, as in 1mmler, the court
of appeals reversed and remanded, noting that the excluded testimony may well have an-
swered questions vital to the welfare of the children.
555. 255 Cal. App. 2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967).
556. Nadler v. Nadler, No. 177331, unpublished op. at 67 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento
County Nov. 15, 1967).
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want this child protected, and if the lady takes therapeutics (sic) and
the psychiatrist can assure me, then I will look for unrestrained visita-
tion. '5 57 Wadler illustrates two common results. First, the homosexual
parent is allowed to see his or her own child only in the company of
another adult, usually a hostile relative. 5 8 Second, future visitation or
custody rights are predicated on either a "cure" or "giving up" of the
parent's homosexuality. 559 Such restrictions undoubtedly impair the
parent's ability to build or maintain a truly meaningful relationship
with a child. Moreover, conditioning the parent's right to see his or her
child upon a fundamental change in the parent's very nature, leaves the
parent with no real alternative.
Several years later, courts were still imposing restrictions upon the
visitation rights of homosexual parents. In 1974, a New Jersey court in
In re JS. & C.560 restricted the visitation rights of a homosexual fa-
ther,56 1 after determining that the father was an avowed and publicly
known homosexual, that he associated with other homosexuals and was
557. Id. at 68.
558. Another common restriction upon the visitation rights of the homosexual parent
was imposed in Nelson v. Nelson, No. 951,546 (Tex. Ct. Dom. Rel. No. 2, Harris County,
May 24, 1973). The court awarded custody to the father without stating the basis for its
determination. However, earlier, the court alluded to the mother's lesbianism, observing
that "[t]his gay liberation business, not bad of itself, does raise questions for us." The court
allowed the mother visitation but on the condition that "all visitations are to take place
outside of the presence of Claudia [Mrs. Nelson's life-partner] or any other lesbian-type
person."
Nelson v. Nelson is unreported and is not cited in any other articles. Lesbian Mothers
Defense Fund provided a copy of the proceedings to the author.
559. There is deep conflict among medical and psychiatric authorities over the issue of
"curing" homosexual individuals. Some authorities insist that "cure" is impossible; others
claim a "cure" rate of one-third among their homosexual patients. Belief in such a "cure" is
a direct function of whether homosexuality is considered an illness or merely a variation of
sexual behavior. Some authorities question the ethics of trying to inculcate a homosexual
person with an alien sexual pattern, particularly when such treatment is administered for the
sake of conformity to social convention. See A. KARLEN, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY
572-606 (1977); D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 241-75 (1977); J.D. Frank,
Treatment ofHomosexuals, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK FORCE ON
HOMOSEXUALITY FINAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS 63-68 (1972).
560. 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (1974).
561. The court analogized the father to a bank robber who is allowed visitation rights
only on the assumption that he will not expose his child to his "unacceptable line of en-
deavor." Id. at 497-98, 324 A.2d at 97. A homosexual parent who advocates breaking New
Jersey's sodomy laws can, the court reasoned, be similarly restricted. Accordingly, the court
imposed the following restrictions on the father's visitation rights: (1) during visitation the
father may not cohabit or sleep with any individual other than a lawful spouse; (2) during
visitation the father may not involve the children in any homosexual related activities or
publicity; (3) during visitation the father may '7ot be in thepresence ofhis lover. " Id. at 498,
324 A.2d at 97 (emphasis added).
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currently living with a homosexual "lover", and that the children asso-
ciated with his "lover" and other acquaintances during their visits.
562
The court nevertheless expressed some idealistic sentiments, ob-
serving that:
The parental rights of a homosexual, like those of a heterosexual, are
constitutionally protected. Fundamental rights of parents may not
be denied, limited or restricted on the basis of sexual orientation, per
se. The right of a parent, including a homosexual parent, to the
companionship and care of his or her child, insofar as it isfor the best
interest of the child is a fundamental right protected by the First,
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion. That right may not be restricted without a showing that the
parent's activities may tend to impair the emotional or physical
health of the child.
563
After reviewing all the very favorable testimony about the father
the court concluded that granting the father visitation rights would be
in the best interests of the children. However, the court also concluded
that unrestricted visitation would not be in their best interests and ob-
served: "The lack of understanding and controversy which surrounds
homosexuality, together with the immutable effects which are engen-
dered by the parent-child relationship, demands that the court be most
hesitant in allowing any unnecessary exposure of a child to an environ-
ment which may be deleterious.
''564
Equally stringent restrictions were imposed upon a lesbian mother
in Mitchell v. Mitchell 565 despite the fact that she was awarded custody
of her children. Mrs. Mitchell had three children and planned to live
with another lesbian mother who had already won custody of her three
children.566 Mr. Mitchell, however, chose to fight custody and sought
to make lesbianism the central issue. In what was at that time a new
strategy, Mrs. Mitchell stipulated to her lesbianism in order to focus the
court's attention on parental fitness and the child's best interests rather
than on the sexual preference of the mother.
At trial, the probation officer, a court conciliation counselor, and a
psychologist testified that Mrs. Mitchell should be appointed as the
children's custodian. Moreover, the children, ages fourteen, nine, and
562. Id. at 489, 324 A.2d at 92.
563. Id. (emphasis added).
564. Id. at 497, 324 A.2d at 97.
565. No. 240665 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County June 8, 1972). The facts of this
unpublished case are drawn from two sources, K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX-
BASED DISCRIMINATION 276-77 (1975) and 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 20-21 (1974).
Both sources derived their information from Mrs. Mitchell's attorneys.
566. This case was uncontested and that mother's lesbianism was never an issue. San
Francisco Chronicle, July 12, 1972, at 34, 37, col. 1.
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twelve, all wanted to stay with their mother. The only testimony to the
contrary was that of the father who claimed that Mrs. Mitchell's im-
moral conduct rendered her unfit and that he could provide a good
Christian home.
5 67
While the court, faced with such overwhelming evidence of Mrs.
Mitchell's fitness, gave Mrs. Mitchell custody, it also imposed restric-
tions which destroyed the possibility of establishing a new family unit.
The court prohibited Mrs. Mitchell from living with her "lover" 568 and
from associating with her unless the children were in school or visiting
their father. Thus, the price Mrs. Mitchell was required to pay to keep
her children was the destruction of a loving home with another adult
with whom she could share the burdens of child rearing.5 69
Similarly, in A. v. A., 570 a gay father was allowed to keep his two
sons but his life was considerably restricted. First, the court ordered
the Clackamas County Juvenile Department571 to supervise the father.
Second, to protect the boys from "possible pernicious influences" 572 the
trial court prohibited the defendant father from living with any man in
the family home. The appellate court specifically approved that
restriction.
The court was influenced by Nadler 73 and by the fact that there
was no evidence that the boys were exposed to deviant sex acts or that
their welfare was being adversely affected in any substantial way.5 7 4
567. See Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Liti-
gation Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 691, 698 (1976).
568. The author abhors the use of the word "lover." Lover connotes that the relation-
ship between the parties is short term and solely erotic. "Friend" is cute but hardly encom-
passes a loving relationship with a lifelong commitment. "Partner" sounds like a business
arrangement. "Spouse" is technically incorrect and "husband" and "wife" are traditional
roles inappropriate in a homosexual relationship. In order to avoid the use of the word
"lover," which the author sees as pejorative in this context, the term "life-partner" will be
used.
569. Recent studies have shown that the greatest problems faced by the children of ho-
mosexual parents stem not from the parents' sexual orientation but rather from the difficul-
ties inherent in all single parent households. Dr. Richard Green, who is in the process of
completing a study of matched pairs of children of homosexual and heterosexual parents,
says that "one is not seeing so far anything remarkable about these children [of lesbian
mother families]." In Re Ransom, unpublished op. at 41, No. 477051-8 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Alameda County Nov. 9, 1977).
570. 15 Or. App. 353, 514 P.2d 358 (1973).
571. Id. at 359, 514 P.2d at 361.
572. Id. at 356, 514 P.2d at 359.
573. Nadler v. Nadler, 255 Cal. App. 2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967). Nadler held that
homosexuality on the part of one parent does not make that parent unfit as a matter of law
to have custody of children.
574. 15 Or. App. at 358-59, 514 P.2d at 360.
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While this suggests that the court adopted a more favorable attitude
towards the homosexual father, the facts suggest the court may not
have had any choice but to give the father custody. The mother had
not had any contact with the boys for over ten years. She only decided
to initiate the custody suit after her third marriage.
The irrationality of judicial decision-making in child custody cases
is clearly illustrated in the cases of two lesbian mothers, Nancy Driber
and Marilyn Koop, who decided to live together. In Driber v.
Driber 575 the court apparently focused on the stability of the relation-
ship between the two women and awarded Ms. Driber custody of all
three of her children.
576
Nancy Driber's life-partner was not so fortunate. Another judge
in the same county heard Ms. Koop's case, and in Koop v. Koop 577
removed custody of two of her three children. Subsequently, the two
children ran away from their father and refused to return to live with
him. Marilyn Koop filed a petition seeking to have the children re-
turned to her. When brought before the court, the children, ages eleven
and thirteen, told the judge that they would not continue to live with
their father. Consequently, the judge directed the sheriff to place the
children in a juvenile detention home and ordered that the children be
made wards of the juvenile court. After three months in a juvenile
home the children were temporarily placed with their older half-sister.
After a lengthy hearing, in which a psychiatrist and a court social
worker testified in favor of the mother, the judge talked to the children,
both of whom expressed a desire to be with their mother. In addition,
the temporary custodian, the half-sister, thought the children would be
better off with their mother. Nevertheless, the court ordered placement
with the half-sister.578 The court was evidently impressed by the fa-
ther's testimony that the mother's relationship with Nancy Driber was
"immoral." The mother's "immorality" rather than the "best interests
of the children" was apparently the deciding factor.
575. No. 220748 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County Sept. 17, 1973), reported in 2
WOMENS RIGHT'S L. REP. at 23 (1974).
576. During that trial, Ms. Driber introduced into evidence a documentary film on les-
bian parenting. The film, Sandy and Madeleine's Family, was a result of the Schuster-
Issacson cases, see text accompanying notes 605-08 infra. The fathers in those cases argued
that the making of the film was one reason why Sandy and Madeleine should lose their
children.
577. No. 221097 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 17, 1973), affdmem., 16 Wash.
App. 1006 (1976).
578. Petition for Writ of Review from the Superior Court for Pierce County, Washing-
ton, Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, In re Koop, No. 2315-Il (Wash. App. June 19, 1976).
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Equally ambiguous notions of "immorality" prompted a Georgia
court in Bennett v. Clemens5 79 to award to the paternal grandparents
custody of their nine-year-old granddaughter. The mother wanted to
retain custody and the father testified that he was in favor of such an
arrangement. While there was no evidence of any sexually atypical be-
havior by the mother, on at least one occasion the mother allegedly left
the child with four female friends who "smoked 'pot' on occasions, en-
gaged in sexual acts with men and with each other in the presence
580 of
the child and otherwise taught the child about 'the gay life.'-58" In
upholding the award of custody to the grandparents the court of ap-
peals found that the trial court had exercised sound discretion to pro-
tect the welfare of the child.
582
The dissent, on the other hand, pointed out that there was no evi-
dence in the record that the child's physical needs were not being cared
for or that the child was neglected, abused, or mistreated in any way.
Moreover, a psychiatrist testified that the child had been living in a
"healthy environment." 58 3 According to the dissent, the grandparents'
only complaint was that the child was being brought up in an "im-
moral, hippy-type environment. '584 The dissent felt the trial court
clearly abused its discretion by imposing its own moral judgment in-
stead of considering the best interests of the child.
Where neglect, abuse, or mistreatment in some manner is absent, the
state has no right to inquire into what a parent teaches his child, or
with whom a parent allows his child to associate, or the type of envi-
ronment a parent permits his child to inhabit .... Within this rela-
tionship the family or parent adopts a moral standard for the
members' conduct and associations, and the state cannot intrude
upon or disrupt this relationship by asserting a different moral stan-
dard, conceived by judges, that must be adhered to.
585
Occasionally, the homosexuality of a parent is unnecessarily made
an issue. In Chaffin v. Frye,586 in which a lesbian mother lost custody
of her two daughters to her own parents, many factors other than the
mother's lesbianism could have led to the same result. Ms. Chaffin had
a record of five arrests and two convictions. She was characterized as
579. 230 Ga. 317, 196 S.E.2d 842 (1973).
580. Quite often, when courts allude to acts "in the presence of the child," it is unclear in
most contexts whether the courts mean in the same residence or actually in the presence of
the child.
581. 230 Ga. at. 319, 196 S.E.2d at 843.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 320, 196 S.E.2d at 844.
584. Id. at 321, 196 S.E.2d at 844.
585. Id. at 321-22, 196 S.E.2d at 844.
586. 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975).
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unstable socially and financially by a probation officer. She had in ad-
dition, some serious physical disabilities. Moreover, the children at is-
sue had lived with their grandparents most of their lives and were then
fifteen and thirteen.
Aside from these matters, which could have been determinative in
and of themselves, the court made Ms. Chaffin's homosexuality a major
issue. The appellate court concluded that the trial court was correct in
denying the mother custody of her children, observing that "homosexu-
ality is a factor which the trial court could consider."
' 587
[T]his factor is not merely fortuitious or casual, but rather it domi-
nates and forms the basis for the household into which the children
would be brought if custody were awarded to appellant. Appellant
does not merely say she is homosexual. She also lives with the wo-
man with whom she has engaged in homosexual conduct, and she
intends to bring up her daughters in that environment. The trial
court was not required to believe appellant's self-serving statements
about the present nature of her homosexual relationship .... 588
After noting that certain homosexual acts were then criminal in
California and that children should not be exposed to homosexuality in
their most formative and impressionable years, the court concluded
that "[i]n exercising a choice between homosexual and heterosexual
households for purposes of child custody a trial court could conclude
that permanent residence in a homosexual household would be detri-
mental to the children and contrary to their best interests." 589 The
court consequently upheld the trial court's decision 590 and awarded
custody to the grandparents who ironically had already raised two ho-
mosexual children.59'
In In re Jane B.,592 a lesbian mother was similarly unsuccessful in
obtaining custody of her child, even though at the time of divorce, cus-
587. Id. at 46, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
588. Id. at 46-47, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
589. Id. at 47, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
590. Justices Tobriner and Mosk dissented from the supreme court's denial of the peti-
tion for a hearing. Justice Tobriner wrote the majority opinion in Morrison v. State Bd. of
Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969), see notes 377-84 & accompany-
ing text supra, and the dissenting opinion in Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513
P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973), see notes 391-400 & accompanying text supra.
According to one commentator, the custody order in Chaffin was subsequently reversed
to allow the daughters to remain with their mother after three psychologists testified that it
would be detrimental to the children to be taken away from their mother. Law Note, The
Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody.- A Constitutional Challenge That
Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 799, 864 n.2 (1975).
591. The probation report indicates that Ms. Chaffin's brother is a homosexual person.
43 Cal. App. 3d at 43, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
592. 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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tody of the child was given to the mother. The child, who was ten at
the time of the decision, had been continuously with the mother from
the age of three. The mother began a homosexual relationship with
another woman when the child was nine and the two women and the
child lived together. The father, upon learning of the homosexual ar-
rangement, sought a change of custody.
The court rejected the mother's constitutional arguments, observ-
ing that while an adult's lifestyle is constitutionally protected that pro-
tection does not extend to situations where "innocent bystanders or
children.. . may be affected physically and emotionally by close con-
tact with homosexual conduct of adults. 593
The court examined a report that indicated that both parents were
physically and financially able to care for the child and heard the testi-
mony of two psychiatrists, introduced by the mother and father, respec-
tively. Although the court said it was not finding the homosexual
mother unfit per se, it nevertheless concluded that a "home environ-
ment with [a] homosexual partner in residence is not a proper atmos-
phere in which to bring up this child or in the best interest of this
child. ' 594 The court also specifically found that the child was "emo-
tionally disturbed by virtue of this environment and that the total cir-
cumstances warrant a change in custody." 595 The only testimony
which supported this conclusion was that of a school psychologist who
admitted under cross-examination that the divorce itself could be caus-
ing the child stress.
596
After taking the child from the mother's custody, the court circum-
scribed the mother's visitation rights. The child would not be allowed
to remain overnight with the mother or to visit the mother when the
mother's life-partner or any other homosexual persons were at home.
The mother also was ordered not to take the child to any place where
known homosexual individuals were present or to involve the child in
any homosexual activities.597 The last two admonitions seem gratui-
tous because the mother in this case led a very private life and appar-
ently had no connection with gay activist politics. 598
Some of the more recent cases indicate a growing trend among
593. Id. at 524, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
594. Id. at 525, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
595. Id. at 527, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
596. Id. at 518, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
597. Id. at 528, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61.
598. After citing with favor to In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (1974),
see notes 560-64 & accompanying text supra, where similar restrictions had been used to
control a gay activist father, the court presumably copied the order in that case.
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homosexual parent-litigants to aggressively assail the courts' conven-
tional attitudes about "morality" and homosexuality. Hall v. Hal,
599
in which a lesbian mother was allowed to retain custody of her daugh-
ter,600 marks the beginning of the use of experts on homosexuality6
0
and the beginning of an aggressive position by many homosexual par-
ents in defending their parental rights.
The case is also interesting because the issue of lesbianism and the
impact of a lesbian home were fully discussed. Dr. Richard Green,
probably the best known authority on homosexuality, was an expert
witness for the mother.60 2 The transcript of Dr. Green's testimony il-
lustrates a common occurrence in lesbian mother cases. After being
examined by counsel for both sides, Dr. Green was examined by the
judge who asked how "the sex act between lesbians [was]
accomplished? ,
603
A close examination of trial transcripts in cases involving lesbian
mothers reveals either an incredible ignorance on the part of judges or,
more likely, extremely distasteful voyeurism. If a woman has admitted
her lesbianism and if sexual acts in front of the child or children are not
at issue, the discussion of the explicit acts of the lesbian mother seems
highly irrelevant.
In what is probably the most famous lesbian mother case,604the
599. No. 55900 (Ohio C.P. Div. Dom. Rel., Licking County Oct. 31, 1974).
600. In Hall, all of the testimony was extremely favorable to Sarah Hall, the mother,
and her life-partner. "All David Hall, [the father,] did was to come into court and short
'Lesbian'." Plaintifls Post Trial Memorandum of Law & Fact, at 2. In this case that ap-
proach did not work.
601. For example, extensive expert testimony was used in Ranson v. Ranson. No.
477051-8 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County Nov. 9, 1977), in which the court ultimately
awarded the lesbian mother custody of her two children. The Advocate, Jan. 1. 1977, at 12.
During the trial, the mother introduced the testimony of Wardell Pomeroy, who co-
authored the Kinsey report, and Dr. Richard Green, an expert on homosexuality who also
testified at the trial of Hall v. Hall, see text accompanying note 602 infra. Dr. Green testified
that in his study of lesbian mothers he had found their children "unremarkable," that is, not
significantly different from children of heterosexual mothers. Court Hearing Reporter's Par-
tial Transcript of Proceeding Examination of Dr. Richard Green at 21, Ranson v. Ranson,
No. 477051-8 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County Nov. 9, 1977).
602. See Transcript at 2-51, Hall v. Hall, No. 55900 (Ohio C.P. Div. Dom. Rel., April
26, 1974).
603. Id. at 46.
604. The relationship at issue in Schuster-Isaacson has produced a film and a book on
lesbian parenting.
Perhaps In re Risher (Tex. Dom. Rel. Ct., Dallas County April 16, 1976) is the most
infamous lesbian mother case. That child custody case involving a homosexual parent went
before a Texas jury which removed a nine-year-old boy from his mother and gave custody
to the father. The boy had lived with his mother, the mother's life-partner and the life-
partner's minor daughter, since the divorce five years earlier. Because the decision was
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consolidated case of Schuster v. Schuster and Isaacson v. Isaacson,605
two lesbian women won at the trial court level the right to live and
raise their children together. At the time of their original contested
divorces the lesbianism of Sandy Schuster and Madeliene Isaacson was
thoroughly discussed. While the court awarded custody to the mothers,
it ordered that the family of two women and eight children split up.
Subsequently, the fathers petitioned for a change of custody based on a
change of circumstances. Both fathers argued that since they had re-
married they could provide adequate homes, that the mothers were in
fact living together against court orders, and that the two women had
publicized their relationship.
After a lengthy trial in which twenty-one witnesses were intro-
duced, including eleven psychiatrists and psychologists, the court found
that the change in circumstances was not sufficient to require a change
in custody from the mothers to the fathers. The court noted that "al-
most all of the testimony of all of the people who actually saw, ex-
amined, or talked to the children was that the children are healthy,
happy, normal, loving children.
'60 6
With regard to the homosexual orientation of the women, the
court was persuaded that the only predictable effect would be "that
these children will grow up knowing more about homosexuality and
human sexuality than most children [but]. . . that this knowledge need
not predispose them to become homosexuals. '607 However, the court
did warn the mothers not to put the children on exhibition for the cause
of homosexuality. On the other hand, the court found that two living
units were a hardship on the children and not in their best interest.
Although reversed on appeal, the court removed the restriction that the
families live in two separate households. At the conclusion of its opin-
ion the court stated:
I don't think this case should be regarded as any landmark decision
or as any stamp of approval by the Court on homosexuality. I think
made by a jury, no formal opinion is available. It seems quite clear, however, that Ms.
Risher's lesbianism was the main issue. On appeal, the Texas Fifth District Court of Civil
Appeals ruled that it could not decide on the merits because it lacked jurisidiction. Do It
Now, Feb. 1977. The case generated an extreme amount of national publicity, see TIME,
Jan. 10, 1976, and eventually even a book on the subject, G.G. GIBSON, By HER OWN
ADMISSION (1977).
605. Nos. D-36867, D-36868 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County Dec. 22, 1974), afl'd in
part, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978). On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that
part of the opinion that allowed the mothers to retain custody but ruled that the lower court
had erred in modifying the custody order to allow the mothers to live together.
606. Id. at 5.
607. Id. at 6.
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it is a case just like cases that we decide every day where we look to
the individuals to try and determine what is the best interests of the
children, and that is what I have attempted to do. 608
In W1hitehead v. Black,60 9 a lesbian mother again won custody
without any of the usual restrictions. However, that case really repre-
sents a personal victory for the mother rather than for lesbian mothers
in general. One commentator attributed Carol Whitehead's victory to
the fact that she did not "flaunt" her lesbianism and was not too far
"out of the closet."'6 10 Moreover, while the court admitted that the
most unique and unusual feature of the case was the lesbianism of the
mother,61 the court clearly indicated at the outset that it was not con-
cerned with "any so-called rights of the mother.
'612
The court observed that although the State of Maine had
decriminalized all private consensual sexual activity between adults,
the court was not precluded from considering the sexual activities of
parents. The sexual activity of the parent, according to the court, "be-
comes a relevant consideration, not for the purpose of censuring or cri-
tizing the manner in which the parent lives, but for the purpose of
determining the impact of the parent's lifestyle upon the minor
child.",6 13
Despite its examination into the mother's sexual activity, the judge
awarded custody to the mother, observing that courts could not always
attain the "ideal" home and often had to settle for a "custodial arrange-
ment which adequately meets the. . . needs of these children. '61 4 The
court's decision was apparently influenced by a highly favorable report
by a child psychiatrist, the fact that the child had lived continuously
with the mother for over five years, and the mother's attitude toward
her lesbianism. The court noted that "[s]he was aware that her homo-
sexual lifestyle could have an impact on her children and was intelli-
gently seeking to minimize, if not totally eliminate, that impact."
6 15
Another recent case, Stamper v. Stamper,61 6 resulted in an unusual
order of joint custody. The court used the criteria in the Michigan
608. Id. at I1.
609. Nos. CV-76-422, CV-76-426 (Me. Super. Ct., Cumberland County June 14, 1976).
610. 2 FAMILY L. REP. at 1138 (1976).
611. Unpublished opinion at 7, CV-76-422 & CV-76-426 (Me. Super. Ct., Cumberland
County June 14, 1976).
612. Id.
613. Id. at 8.
614. Id. at 11.
615. Id. at 10.
616. No. 75-054-550-DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County June 15, 1977).
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Child Custody Act617 to evaluate the custodial possibilities. On the
question of the moral fitnesses of the parents, the judge noted there "is
very little to choose between the parents. ' 61 8 In discussing the home
lives of the parties, the court used the neutral phrase "live-in associate"
to refer to both the father's and mother's current life-partners, evidenc-
ing little concern regarding the gender of the mother's sexual partner.
The court gave physical custody to the mother who was permitted to
continue living with her life-partner. The father was awarded extensive
visitation rights and joint responsibility for making decisions concern-
ing the child.
619
In ufllion v. Ceccarell, 620 the court demonstrated an equally indif-
ferent attitude towards the sexual preference of the mother. The les-
bian mother had custody of her younger son for two years during a
separation from her husband, while the older son resided with the fa-
ther. At the full custody hearing the court would not allow the intro-
duction of any evidence on the issue of sexual preference, concluding
that the only relevant issue was the fitness of the parents. Since the
court found both parents fit, the court concluded that the younger son's
need for nurturing from his mother was dispositive and permitted the
mother to retain custody of the younger son.
Although the foregoing cases suggest the development of a trend
in favor of awarding custody to the gay parent, two recent cases indi-
cate that many of the conventional attitudes and misconceptions re-
garding homosexuality still pervade the reasoning of some courts.
617. Child Custody Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.21-722.29 (West
Supp. 1978-79).
618. Unpublished opinion at 6.
619. Another Michigan court, applying the same Custody Act in S. v. S., No. 75-
16125DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Washtenaw County 1975), reached a similar result. After a care-
ful review of the factors incorporated in the Act, the court found for the mother and allowed
the children to reside in a home with both the mother and her life-partner. Commenting on
the relationship of the two women, the court observed that "[sitripped of natural revulsion
against their private homosexual interaction, Mrs. S. and Mrs. K. do appear mutually to
compliment each other and to have love, trust, understanding and respect for each other as
human beings."
This case is unpublished and the records suppressed. However, the opinion and order
in this case are in the files of the author by permission of the court. It is unfortunate that this
opinion was not published because of the careful, systematic method in which the court
evaluated the respective custodial alternatives against the criteria embodied in the statute.
The judge in this case was so impressed by this and another case he tried, that he wrote
an article to help other judges. See Campbell, Child Custody: When One Parent Is
Homosexual, 17 JUDGES' J., No. 2, at 52 (1978).
620. No. 490874-4 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County June 8, 1977).
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In Towend v. Towend,621 an Ohio court of appeal upheld an order
removing three young children from the custody of their lesbian
mother and placing them in the custody of their sixty-five-year-old pa-
ternal grandmother. The lower court decided the issue of the parties'
divorce as well as the issue of child custody.622 The court awarded the
husband a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty observing that the
lesbianism of the wife was not technically a ground for divorce in Ohio.
In discussing Lorraine Towend's lesbianism in the divorce context the
court made the following observations:
There is no question in the court's mind, of course, that society as a
whole disapproves of sexual aberration of any kind, particularly
homosexualism, [sic] and that is a very ancient disapproval. You
read in the Old Testament of Sodom and Gomorrah. . . .An over-
whelming majority of the people in this country strongly disapprove
of homosexualism [sic], regard it as a very wide aberration from what
they do approve as indicated by various cant appelations they give to
it, such as "Queer" "Fagot," and so forth, so there can be no question
in the court's mind that the conduct revealed here is against the mo-
res of our present day society, even this society that grows more
permissive.
In addition the court awarded custody of the three children to the
paternal grandmother after having found both the mother and the fa-
ther unfit. As to the mother, the court concluded:
Ordinarily, children of these years would be given to the mother.
The question arises 'should the court do that,' notwithstanding the
lesbianism of the defendant. I don't say that a mother cannot be fit
to rear her children even if she is a lesbian, but I wonder if she is fit
when she boldly and brazenly sets up in the home where the children
are to be reared, the lesbian practices which have been current there,
clearly to the neglect of supervision of the children. 624
The lower court seemed to suggest that if the mother changed her na-
ture, she might regain custody of her children. 62 5 In upholding the
lower court decision, the court of appeals noted that "the trial court
recognizes the general community disapproval of homosexual activity,
621. No. 639 (Ohio Ct. App., Portage County Sept. 30, 1976).
622. Towend v. Towend, No. 639 (Ohio C.P., Portage County March 14, 1975).
623. Unpublished opinion at 1 (Ohio C.P., Portage County March 14, 1975).
624. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). In its opinion, the court of appeals explained the trial
court's conclusion: "There was testimony that considerable time was spent in sexual acts
between appellant and Mrs. Dickinson and that they made love as many as five or six times
in one day." The trial court found that the lesbian practices were "clearly to the neglect of
supervision of the children." Towend v. Towend, No. 639, unpublished op. at 3 (Ohio Ct.
App., Portage County Sept. 30, 1976).
625. The appeals court observed: "I would think that a lesbian, for the sake of the chil-
dren, would have abandoned the practice. No. 639, unpublished op. at 13 (Ohio Ct.
App., Portage County Sept. 30, 1976).
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but. . . was not concerned with it beyond the direct adverse effect it
had on the children. We are of the opinion the trial court's decision
was not tainted by bias. 626
This case involves two elements common to other child custody
cases. First, part of Mrs. Towend's conduct which the court con-
demned involved a newspaper and TV/radio interview given at a gay
students organization of which she was a member. Despite the clear
first amendment implications of the court's holding, the court of ap-
peals dismissed Mrs. Towend's constitutional objections on the grounds
that the only issue before the court was whether Mrs. Towend was a
suitable person to raise her children. 627 Second, the case is one of the
most blatant examples of judicial voyeurism. Over objection of coun-
sel, the trial judge forced Mrs. Towend to respond to questions regard-
ing details of how Mrs. Towend engaged in love-making. Mrs.
Towend had, at that point, already admitted her lesbianism and admit-
ted the identity of her life-partner. The judge referred to these intimate
details on at least three occasions in his opinion.628
In Smith v. Smith,629 the court held that the mother's lesbianism
was not per se dispositive of her continued fitness as the custodian of
her two sons, but nevertheless examined "whether and to what extent
the emotional and mental health of the child [had] been affected by the
mother's deviant behavior." 630 Consulting clinical reports, the court
found that the social stigma of having a lesbian mother had a traumatic
emotional impact on one of the sons.
However, this case does not represent a clear example of judicial
homophobia. Three younger children were ultimately permitted to re-
main with the mother, and the two older boys who went to their father
had expressed a strong desire to live with him. In fact, this case repre-
sents positive precedent. The court stressed that "a causal connection
between lesbianism and its diverse effect upon the child should be
shown." 631
From the preceding discussion it is evident that some courts are
beginning to evaluate homosexual parents on the basis of their parent-
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. Assignments of Error & Brief of Defendant-Appellant, at 4.
629. N.Y. Fam. Ct., Richmond County Sept. 13, 1977, reportedin 2 FAMILY L. REP. at
2693 (1977).
630. Id.
631. Id. The court cited to what is probably the best article in this area, Hunter &
Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 691 (1976).
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ing abilities rather than on the basis of their sexual preference. How-
ever, in each case where a homosexual parent has succeeded in getting
a court to examine the situation with reasonable objectivity, the costs
have been excessive. Because the homosexual parent must first over-
come homophobia and misinformation before getting to the proper is-
sue of the child's best interest, he or she inevitably incurs tremendous
legal expenses without guarantee of success. If the case is lost at the
first level, the cost of appeal is staggering and often prohibitive. Justice
for the homosexual parent does not come cheaply or often.
XI. Unrecognized Families
Homosexual couples who are not allowed to enter into marriage
legally sanctioned by the state may nevertheless be able to achieve
some of the legal and financial benefits normally accruing to that rela-
tionship. One commentator 632 suggests that homosexual persons may
soon have the option of a "quasi-marital" status.
Although private consensual homosexual activity might be le-
galized in this country without creating many problems as it was in
Great Britain, the expansion of marriage to encompass homosexual
couples would alter the nature of a fundamental institution as tradi-
tionally conceived.
The Supreme Court may in the future decide that such altera-
tion is beyond its competence and therefore that marriage should be
confined to its present definition absent a positive move on the part
of individual state legislatures to broaden it. If such proves to be the
case, particular legal benefits available only to married couples might
still be attacked on equal protection grounds under both the Four-
teenth and Twenty-seventh Amendments.
If the Court granted homosexuals some of these bene-
fits-without compelling states to grant marriage licenses-it might
eventually create in effect a 'quasi-marital' status. State legislatures
might explicitly grant such a status, and specify the attendant
rights. 633
The Supreme Court's acceptance of such a quasi-marital status
does not appear to be imminent. At present, the most promising
method of obtaining many of the legal advantages of the marriage rela-
tionship without obtaining a legally sanctioned marriage is the use of
the private contract.634 One of the major impediments to the enforce-
ment of contracts between nonmarried cohabitors has been the finding
632. Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
633. Id. at 588-89.
634. In a comprehensive article, Leonore J. Weitzman suggests the use of contracts by
nonmarried cohabiting couples and specifically deals with contracts between homosexual
life-partners. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change-A Proposal
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by the courts that their meretricious relationship taints and, hence, nul-
lifies any agreement. In particular, public policy does not recognize
sexual acts as consideration for a contractual promise.
This interpretation of public policy prevented the enforcement of
contracts between nonmarried heterosexual cohabitors for many years.
However, the recent case of Marvin v. Marvin635 is generally considered
to have redefined the rights of nonmarried cohabitors with regard to
financial interests and property rights. The California Supreme Court
held that either party to a nonmarital relationship may enforce an ex-
press or implied agreement dividing accumulated property. Basing its
decision on the policy that "adults who voluntarily live together and
engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other
persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights,
'636
the court declared that express contracts between nonmarried
cohabitors could be enforced "except to the extent that the contract is
explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual serv-
ice."637 In the absence of an express contract, the court will look to the
conduct of the parties to see if such an agreement can be implied.638
While Marvin deals with two heterosexual persons, nothing in its
language limits its application to heterosexuals. Immediately after the
decision was rendered, there was much speculation as to whether it
would be applicable to homosexual persons. 639 Shortly thereafter, the
Marvin reasoning was applied to a lesbian couple, when a San Diego
superior court judge ordered Denease Conley to pay monthly support
to Sherry D. Richardson. 640 The two women had participated in a reli-
gious ceremony and had signed a written agreement dealing with
financial matters. When the relationship ended, Richardson brought
suit for support and division of accumulated property.
Whether other states will even follow Marvin with respect to heter-
osexual nonmarried cohabitors is still doubtful.641 It is even more
for Individual Contracts and Contracts in Lieu of Marriage, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1235-36,
1255, 1286-87 (1974).
635. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
636. Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
637. Id. at 665, 447 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
638. Id.
639. See Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Presering the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 937,
967-68 (1977); 90 HARV. L. REv. 1708, 1719 (1977).
640. The Advocate, July 12, 1978, at 12.
641. See Beal v. Beal, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2464 (Ore. 1978); Carlson v. Olson, 3 FAM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2467 (Minn. 1977). In these cases, the courts adopted a position similar to
Marvin. But see Rehak v. Mathis, FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1185 (Ga 1977) (rejecting Marvin
approach).
doubtful whether Marvin will be applied to homosexual couples, espe-
cially in the majority of states where homosexual conduct is still a
crime. Homosexual couples in the states rejecting the liberal reading of
Marvin will have to fall back on traditional common-law methods of
arranging their financial affairs such as wills and powers of
attorneys.
642
However, as the concept of family is redefined in American soci-
ety643 there are small but interesting changes which bring the homosex-
ual family closer to the mainstream. For example, under the New
York Human Rights Law644 any two people living at the same address
are considered "family" members even if they are not married or blood
relations. The New York law forbids discrimination on the basis of
marital status in public accommodations, employment, housing, and
credit. On May 24, 1978, the Detroit (Michigan) City Council similarly
amended its definition of "family" as applied to residential housing for
single family occupancy. The new definition removes the requirement
of consanguinity or marriage. This change was effectuated to bring
housing ordinances in line with the new city charter which forbids dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status.
645
Insurance companies also have discriminated against gay couples.
However, under a relatively new California regulation, California in-
surance carriers may not discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.646 Such discrimination is similarly prohibited by a Wisconsin
regulation.647 In late 1976, the Illinois Department of Insurance Regu-
lations ruled that Illinois insurance companies could no longer discrim-
inate against gays and single women.648
Another aspect of family life includes having and raising children.
While lesbian women have had children by artificial insemination,
649
the legal problems created by artificial insemination for both homosex-
642. See Rivera, Legal Planning for Loving Fartnerhsips, in OUR RIGHT To LOVE
(1978).
643. The "typical American family"-a married man supporting a wife and children-is
a mere six percent of the total of American families. Bell, Let's Get Rid of Families!., NEWS-
WEEK, May 9, 1977, at 19.
644. N.Y.ExEc. LAW § 291(2) (McKinney 1972).
645. See The Advocate, July 12, 1978, at 10. However, a Department of Housing and
Urban Development policy under which unmarried couples, including homosexuals, were
eligible for public housing was recently nullified. Lesbian Connection, Sept. 1977, at 12.
646. See 2 SEX L. REP. at 17 (1976).
647. See 2 SEX L. REP. at 30 (1976).
648. See 2 SEX. L. REP. at 41 (1976).
649. The Advocate, Feb. 22, 1978, at 6.
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ual and heterosexual couples are far from resolved.650 For those homo-
sexual individuals who do not wish to have children of their own, foster
parenting is an altruistic way of experiencing parenthood. In New
York City, a controversial new program has placed thirty youngsters
between the ages of twelve and seventeen with gay couples. These
young boys have all been rejected by their parents and shunned by
welfare agencies and heterosexual foster parents because of their
homosexuality.6
51
In 1974 the State of Washington revised its statutes dealing with
foster family homes to provide that a foster parent or parents must be
stable, loving, and ready to meet the emotional needs of the children.
These laws have been construed to include homosexual foster parents
who possess the interest and qualifications to be licensed. Such licens-
ing of homosexual foster parents was approved in In re Meyer,652 in
which a homosexual foster father was awarded custody of his homosex-
ual foster child. However, in a later case, In re DaVis, 653 the court re-
fused to place a sixteen-year-old boy who had been declared
incorrigible with a male homosexual couple who agreed to act as his
foster parents. The boy's previous foster and group home placements
had been unsuccessful because of his homosexual tendencies. Two
state social workers, two juvenile parole officers, a psychiatrist, a psy-
chologist, and a sociologist all agreed that the boy should be placed in a
gay foster home. His father, however, was opposed to the placement on
the grounds that it would effectively eliminate the boy's chances of
turning out "straight." 654 The court agreed, observing that "substitut-
ing two male homosexuals for parents does violence not only to the
literal definition of who are parents but offends the traditional concept
of what a family is.''655 While explicitly recognizing that the two men
could not legitimize their relationship under Washington law, the court
nevertheless criticized them for living in a meretricious relationship.
The court concluded that the boy "should be encouraged to behave
650. See generally, Note, The Legal Status of Artflcial Insemination: .4 Need For Policy
Formulation, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 409 (1970); Note, Artiicial Insemination: A Legislative
Remedy, 3 WEsT ST. U.L. REv. 48 (1975).
651. Franks, Homosexual Foster Parents: An Advance or a Peril, N.Y. Times, May 7,
1974, at 47.
652. No. J74031 (Wash. Sup. Ct., King Cty. Mar. 12, 1974), cited in Petition for Writ of
Review at 17, Koop v. Koop, No. 2315-I1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
653. 1 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2845 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1975).
654. Id. at 2846. The fallacy of this contention is discussed in Richards, supra note 25, at
729 & 756 n.235.
655. Id.
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normally regardless of his sexual orientation 656 and thus should not be
placed in a gay foster home.
Gay persons obviously have families and form family units with
concomitant legal and financial needs. However, the legal institutions
and policies of this country have only begun to recognize those
needs. 657 The provisions against discrimination in housing and insur-
ance have been adopted by only a relatively few states. Moreover, al-
ternatives to marriage and to traditional means of raising a family are
evidently still at the experimental stage. Consequently, until courts and
lawmakers are willing to either abandon the conventional lay and legal
definitions of marriage or create new legal forms creating equal protec-
tions for nonmarried cohabitors, homosexual couples must continue to
develop alternative ways to achieve the financial, legal, and emotional
benefits conferred upon the legally-recognized family unit.
Other Civil Issues
XII. Incorporation and Tax Exempt Status
Like many other citizens, homosexual Americans have organized
in groups to advance their cause, and like many other organized groups
they have seen the advantage of incorporation at some stage in their
organizational development. The two main benefits of incorporation
are the limited financial liability and more favorable tax status it af-
fords the individuals involved. In addition, numerous gay organiza-
tions have sought to incorporate in order to challenge more effectively
discriminatory laws against homosexual individuals.
A frequent choice of corporate form for these groups is the non-
profit corporation. Indeed, approximately one-third of all corporations
in the United States are nonprofit. 658 The primary advantage of select-
ing the not-for-profit form is the tax-exempt status which the organiza-
656. Id. at 2847.
657. When Gertrude Stein died in 1946, Alice B. Toklas, her life-partner of 40 years,
found herself at the mercy of the Stein family. Through various legal mechanisms, the Stein
family left her virtually penniless. See S. STEWARD, DEAR SAMMY: LETTERS FROM GER-
TRUDE STEIN AND ALICE B. TOKLAS 107 (1977); L. SINON, THE BIOGRAPHY OF ALICE B.
TOKLAS 247-50 (1977). Recently, the Portland, Oregon Town Council, concerned about
how gay couples who are splitting up deal with their property division, offered the gay com-
munity an arbitration service. The Advocate, Aug. 9, 1978, at 10.
658. A. CONARD & R. KRAUSS, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 605 (1977). "Every Ameri-
can State has a general law under which a nonprofit corporation can be formed for virtually
any lawful nonprofit purpose." Id. For an examination of non-profit incorporation for gay
organizations, see Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right of
Association, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979).
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tion may obtain under the federal Internal Revenue Code.659 Under
certain circumstances a nonprofit corporation can receive its own in-
come tax free,660 and under other circumstances the corporation can be
eligible to receive tax-deductible gifts from individuals.
661
Gay organizations have sometimes had difficulty in obtaining cor-
porate status. In Gay ActivistsAlliance v. Lomenzo, 662 the Gay Activists
Alliance (GAA) attempted to become incorporated under the New
York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law. The Secretary of State of New
York refused to accept their certificate of incorporation, stating that it
was not in an acceptable form because of the use of the word "gay,"
and further that its purposes were contrary to both the public policy
and to the Penal Law of New York.663 The GAA asked the court to
order the Secretary to accept the certificate. The trial court upheld the
Secretary's decision, ruling that such a decision, in the absence of
abuse, was within the Secretary's discretion. The court further indi-
cated that, by holding itself out as a homosexual civil rights organiza-
tion, the GAA must be professing a present or future intent to break
New York law. 64
In a short, curt decision, the New York Supreme Court re-
versed.665 The court said that nowhere in the statute is the use of the
word "gay" proscribed, nor is the word obscene or vulgar. Moreover,
659. A. CONARD & R. KRAUSS, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 606 (1977).
660. I.R.C. § 501.
661. I.R.C. §§ 170, 507.
662. 66 Misc. 2d 456, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
663. The purposes set forth in the proposed Certificate of Incorporation were: "(a) To
safeguard the rights guaranteed homosexual individuals by the constitutions and civil rights
laws of the United States and the several States, through peaceful petition and assembly and
non-violent protest when necessary; (b) To speak out on public issues as a homosexual civil
rights organization, working within the framework of the laws of the United States and the
several States but vigilant and vigorous in fighting any discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation of the individual; (c) To work for the repeal of all laws regulating sexual conduct and
practices between consenting adults; (d) To work for the passage of laws ensuring equal
treatment under the law of all persons regardless of sexual orientation; (e) To instill in
homosexuals a sense of pride and selfworth; (f) To promote a better understanding of homo-
sexuality among homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, in order to achieve mutual respect,
understanding and friendship; (g) To hold meetings and social events for the better realiza-
tion of the aforesaid purposes enunciated in (a) through (f) inclusive, above, and to achieve,
ultimately the complete liberation of homosexuals from all injustices visited upon them as
such, that they may receive ultimate recognition as free and equal members of the human
community." Id. at 456-57, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 995-96.
664. Id. at 458, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97. The court did not seem to understand the dif-
ference between status and conduct: "[lit would seem that in order to be a homosexual, the
prohibited act must have at some time been committed or at least presently contemplated."
ld. at 458, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97.
665. Owles v. Lomenzo, 38 App. Div. 2d 981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1972).
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the purposes of the group were not unlawful because "[i]t is well estab-
lished that it is not unlawful for any individual or group of individuals
to peaceably agitate for the repeal of any law."666 In a per curiam deci-
sion, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 667 The highest court
succinctly held that the Secretary of State did not have the power to
reject an incorporation certificate if the formal requisites were com-
plied with and the purpose was lawful, nor did he have the power to
decide that certain names were "inappropriate." Thus, GAA was al-
lowed to incorporate.
An attempted incorporation in Ohio in 1974 was not as successful.
The Greater Cincinnati Gay Society (GCGS) presented its articles of
incorporation as a nonprofit corporation to the Secretary of State, who
refused to accept the articles. In Grant v. Brown,668 GCGS brought suit
to enforce its rights. The Secretary claimed that he could not accept the
articles because homosexuality was a crime in Ohio. While the suit was
pending, the Ohio legislature enacted a new criminal code which
decriminalized private adult consensual sexual behavior for heterosex-
ual and homosexual persons alike. The Ohio Supreme Court held that
the Secretary acted correctly, notwithstanding the change in the law:
"We agree with the Secretary of State that the promotion of homosexu-
ality as a valid life style is contrary to the public policy of the state."
669
In a stinging dissent, Justice Stern pointed out that not only was
there no statute against homosexual conduct in Ohio, but there was no
judicially stated policy against homosexuality. He said that "nowhere
in the recorded decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court has any justice
ever used the term 'homosexual' or 'homosexuality', let alone dis-
cuss[ed] the policy implications of such a life style." 670 Justice Stern
also raised a constitutional issue by noting that both the Ohio and
United States constitutions permit people to speak and promote their
causes peaceably.67' In Justice Stern's view, the Secretary's job was es-
sentially ministerial, and a decision such as this one was an abuse of
power.
672
Interestingly, the attorneys for the state thought the articles should
be accepted, but the Secretary of State initially refused to retreat from
666. Id. at 982, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
667. GAA v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1973).
668. 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974).
669. Id. at 113-14, 313 N.E.2d at 848.
670. Id. at 118, 313 N.E.2d at 851 (footnote omitted).
671. See 8 AKRON L. REV. 375 (1975).
672. 39 Ohio St. 2d at 114-18, 313 N.E.2d at 849-51 (1974).
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his position.673 After the decision, however, the articles were resubmit-
ted and then accepted.
674
In re Thorn Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. 
675
raises an issue similar to the one in Brown. The Lambda Legal De-
fense and Education Fund sought the status of a legal assistance corpo-
ration in New York. Section 495 of the Judiciary Law of New York
676
prohibits the practice of law by corporations, but exempts corporations
that are organized for "benevolent" or "charitable" purposes and cor-
porations designed to assist persons without the financial ability to as-
sert their civil rights. 677 The stated purposes of the Lambda Fund were
to provide legal services without charge in situations where the legal
rights of homosexuals were substantially affected, to promote the avail-
ability of legal services to homosexuals by encouraging and attracting
homosexual persons to the legal profession, and to educate homosexu-
als about their legal rights.
678
The lower court, in a one-paragraph per curiam decision, said that
the described purposes of the Lambda Fund were "neither benevolent
nor charitable. '679 Moreover, the court said that there was no demon-
strated need for such a corporation because it had not been shown that
legal services would not be provided to homosexual persons by existing
lawyers. In response to Lambda's affidavit stating that many attorneys
will not accept cases involving homosexuality, the court replied that
this was "no more than a matter of taste" 6 0 and did not indicate a lack
of available legal services.
In a per curiam opinion, the New York Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that the lower court's decision was "unsupport-
able."'68 ' Judge Burke's concurring opinion more explicitly pointed out
that the Lambda application was substantially identical to that of the
Puerto Rican Defense Fund, which had been approved: "We can per-
ceive no rational distinction in the need for group legal services as be-
tween Puerto Ricans and homosexuals. Both groups are minorities
673. Id. at 115 n.2, 313 N.E.2d at 849.
674. Conversation with Powell Grant, President and Trustee of GCGS (Aug. 8, 1978).
675. 40 App. Div. 2d, 337 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1972).
676. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 495 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978-79).
677. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 495(5) (McKinney 1968).
678. 40 App. Div. 2d at 788, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
679. Id.
680. Id.
681. In re Thorn Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 609,301 N.E.2d
543, 347 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1973).
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subject to varied discriminations and in need of legal services. '682
On remand, the lower court granted the Lambda Fund's applica-
tion for incorporation 68 3 but struck one purpose from the proposed ar-
ticles which read: "to promote legal education among homosexuals by
recruiting and encouraging potential law students who are homosexu-
als and by providing assistance to such students after admission to law
school. '684 Without further elaboration the court said that such a pur-
pose did not fall within the type of legal services the Judiciary Act
permitted.
685
Once a group is incorporated, the next logical step is to obtain the
maximum tax benefits possible under the Internal Revenue Code.
686
It's Time, the newsletter of the National Gay Task Force, reported in
October 1977 on a significant policy change by the Internal Revenue
Service that affected gay non-profit corporations. It said:
The Internal Revenue Service has reversed its policy of denying
charitable tax-exempt status, under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code,
to otherwise eligible organizations that take the position that homo-
sexuality is an acceptable, alternative life style, rather than a 'sick-
ness, disturbance, or diseased pathology'. While any nonprofit
corporation is exempt from taxes on its income, the old IRS policy
prevented donors to gay charities from taking a tax deduction for
their contributions .... 687
Since the reported change a number of gay organizations have
been granted the right to receive tax-free gifts. 688 However, this alleged
policy change of the Internal Revenue Service has not been officially
promulgated and its exact dimensions are unknown.689 At the present
time, each request of a gay organization to be given section 501(c)(3)
682. Id. at 615-16, 301 N.E.2d at 546, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
683. In re Thom Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 42 App. Div. 2d 353, 350
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1973).
684. Id. at 354, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
685. If the court meant to inhibit the growth of the number of homosexual lawyers, it
was not very successful. See Gay Lawyers In and Out of the Closet, 8 JURIs DOCTOR 33
(1978).
686. See notes 659-61 & accompanying text supra. Incorporation is not always a prereq-
uisite to tax-exempt status. See I.R.C. § 501(c). For an examination of tax-exempt status for
gay organizations, see Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right of
Association, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979).
687. It's Time, Oct. 1977, at 1.
688. The Advocate, Aug. 9, 1978, at 10.
689. In a conversation on August 7, 1978 between the author and IRS Section Chief for
tax-exempt organizations, Jean Gessay, Ms. Gessay said that she was "not aware" of any
policy changes by the IRS. She said that if any gay organization had recently received a
new status it was because the new status was "appropriate." Moreover, she said she was
unaware of any written IRS policy about the tax-exempt status of gay organizations.
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status is being handled in the national IRS office on a case-by-case
basis.6
90
The proliferation of gay organizations and their current corporate
status indicates that few, if any, states are reading their incorporation
statutes strictly so as to exclude gay organizations. This fact, coupled
with the new IRS stance, should enhance the ability of gay organiza-
tions to further their causes.
XIII. Liquor Licensing Cases
The twenty-first amendment to the United States Constitution, re-
pealing prohibition, contained a broad grant of authority to the states
to regulate the use, distribution, and consumption of liquor. The ex-
pansion of regulation of the liquor industry to include the regulation of
premises licensed for the sale of liquor is justified by pointing to the
harmful potentialities arising from the sale of liquor. Under this
"harmful potentiality" theory, not only must the sale be regulated, but
the premises within which liquor is sold and consumed also must be
controlled in order to avoid the alleged potential harm.69'
Courts generally have subscribed to three theories when they up-
hold state regulation of liquor supply and consumption. The first the-
ory is that the state enjoys a "super" police power over liquor sale and
distribution and this power justifies the use of broad, general regula-
tions which would otherwise run afoul of the charge of unconstitutional
vagueness. Under the second theory, a license to sell liquor is a privi-
lege, revocable by the state at its discretion without ordinary due proc-
ess protections.692 The last theory allows a state to constitutionally
restrict forms of expression normally protected by the first amendment
because the twenty-first amendment confers more than normal state
authority over public health, welfare, and morals.693
In the 1950's and 1960's the broad power of the liquor control
690. In a conversation between the author and Mr. Jim Herbst of the IRS Cincinnati
office on August 7, 1978, Mr. Herbst said that he believes that a new policy is in effect with
regard to gay organizations but that he had received no written directives on the subject. His
understanding was that the national office now handles such requests on a case-by-case ba-
sis. He said that according to his understanding of past policy, gay organizations that advo-
cated homosexuality have been denied § 501 (c)(3) status because to grant such status would
be against public policy. Now, he said, if the organization is purely educational, it will
receive § 501(c)(3) status.
691. Comment, The Ohio Liquor Control Commission's Right to Regulate, 9 AKRON L.
REv. 695, 697 (1976).
692. Id. at 695.
693. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).
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agencies was used to eliminate, harass, and discourage gay bars. The
myths about the use of bars as meeting places and recreational sites for
homosexual persons largely have been disproved. For example, such
bars are not places where all homosexuals "hangout"; studies show that
only one homosexual in eight has ever visited a "gay" bar.694 Lesbians
have few bars and seldom go to them.695 Homosexuals do not drink
more than heterosexuals, 696 and gay bars do not cause homosexual-
ity.6 97 Although contacts for sexual activity are often made there, the
bars are probably more important as social centers for persons denied
other social outlets.
698
By far the greatest abundance of liquor licensing cases, spanning
the years 1952 through 1967, has been produced by the State of New
York. In 1952, Lynch's Builders Restaurant, Inc. v. O'Connell699 was
decided per curiam by the New York Court of Appeals. Lynch had
lost his liquor license because he allegedly "suffered or permitted the
premises to become disorderly '70 0 by knowingly allowing homosexual
activities on the premises. What the "activities" were, the opinion does
not specify; however, the court indicated there was "ample proof' and
that it was not "less probative" because a criminal charge based on that
activity was dismissed.70' Thus, according to the highest court in New
York, homosexual activity in a bar about which the licensee knew or
should have known rendered the bar disorderly and subject to a liquor
license revocation.
The next two cases, Stanwood United, Inc. v. O'Connell 70 2 and Peo-
ple v. Arenella,70 3 provided some guidance as to the kind of "activity"
which could result in license revocation. In Stanwood, the court said
that "[sluffering premises to become disorderly means something more
694. See A. KARLEN, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 525 (1971); D.J. WEST, HOMO-
SEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 23-24, 157, 162 (1977).
695. See generally A. KARLEN, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 524 (1971).
696. D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 202 (1977).
697. "Although such establishments are sometimes condemned as breeding grounds of
homosexuality, the charge is not convincing. Most of the people who go there (apart from
tourists and some straight friends) already are involved in the homosexual life." E. SCHUR,
CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 87 (1965).
698. "[Tjhey also serve the vital function of enhancing group cohesion and morale in the
face of persistent moral condemnation by the society as a whole. For the individual homo-
sexual, such places provide a much-needed opportunity to drop the mask he is often obliged
to wear in the 'straight' (non-homosexual) world." Id. at 86.
699. 303 N.Y. 408, 103 N.E.2d 531 (1952).
700. N.Y. ALCO. BEY. CONT. LAW § 106(6) (McKinney Supp. 1977-78).
701. 303 N.Y. at 410, 103 N.E.2d at 531.
702. 283 App. Div. 79, 126 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1953).
703. 139 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1954).
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than a mere happening on one occasion." 704 The charge resulting in
license revocation was based on a one-time observation by a policeman
of fifteen males acting "'in a female way.'"705 The police officer also
arrested one person who allegedly solicited him. The court was uncon-
vinced that the bar was a "gathering place for degenerates" because no
other complaints were registered either before or after the one police
visit.7
06
In Arenella, the court held that one ten-minute visit by a police-
man who then testified that the premises appeared to be a meeting
place for homosexual individuals was insufficient evidence to justify
revocation of a liquor license. However, the court explicitly stated that
"[i]f the premises in question were frequented by homosexuals or sex
deviates in an open and notorious manner, for the purpose of soliciting
others to commit lewd and indecent acts. . . then the premises would
be 'disorderly.' ",707 The court gave some protection to the owners of
gay bars when it said that "[u]nless some prohibited acts took place in
the premises, the mere fact that homosexuals patronized the place,
would not make the premises 'disorderly' within the meaning of the
statute."
708
In Fulton Bar and Grill, Inc. v. State Liquor Authority,70 9 however,
no prohibited acts were detailed. The finding of the state liquor au-
thority, that the licensee had "knowingly permitted the licensed prem-
ises to be used as a gathering place for homosexuals and degenerates
who conducted themselves in an offensive and indecent manner,
'710
was upheld by the court as sufficient to label the premises disorderly
and to justify revoking the license. In Gilmer v. Hostetter,71' the court,
upholding a license revocation, defined even more liberally the kind of
behavior that would constitute disorderly conduct when homosexual
individuals were involved. It held that "regular resort" by homosexual
persons to the bar in question made the bar "disorderly" even without
proof of homosexual solicitation.712 According to the court, this "disor-
der" could be inferred from observation on a number of occasions of
704. 283 App. Div. at 82, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
705. Id. at 80, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
706. Id. at 81, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
707. People v. Arenella, 139 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1954).
708. Id.
709. 11 App. Div. 2d 771, 205 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1960) (mem.).
710. Id. at 771, 205 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
711. 20 App. Div. 2d 586, 245 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1963) (mem.).
712. Id. at 587, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
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certain acts which indicated "overt homosexual tendencies. ' 71 3
In Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Authority,714 the lower
court made what might be viewed as a liberal statement when it said,
"[Mlere congregation of homosexuals, where there is no breach of the
peace, does not make the licensed premises disorderly . . . ,,715 This
statement seems to indicate that a court would look for a criminal of-
fense before judging a bar to be "disorderly." However, the court in
Kerma upheld the license revocation on the testimony of a policeman
who stated that "several of the patrons exhibited characteristics and
mannerisms which evidenced homosexual propensities; that he heard
several male patrons address each other in endearing terms and saw
several of them sit on the laps of others; that he was solicited by a male
patron for a lewd and indecent act; [and] that only male patrons were
present.'716 While "mere congregation" did not prove disorderly
premises, these further acts, the court held, were sufficient to uphold the
license revocation.
Kerma was appealed and reversed.717 The New York Court of
Appeals found no proof in the record of any breach of the peace, and
cited with approval the lower court's statement that a mere congrega-
tion without a breach of the peace was insufficient. Beyond that, the
court was critical of the basis of the lower court's decision. "Indulgence
in the inference that. . . 'several' . . . [of the] men in a grill. . . were,
from their dress and makeup, homosexuals does not support the addi-
tional inference that they would create disorder. ' 71 8 The court opined,
"It is reasonable to think that even though he dresses strangely a homo-
sexual may be orderly. ..,719 The court did warn that if the licensee
had known of the alleged homosexual solicitation that would be proof
of suffering or permitting a disorderly premise.
720
During the appeal of Kerma, the decision in K~fisia Foods, Inc. v.
New York State Liquor Authority72' was handed down. There the
court summarily upheld a license revocation because the licensee alleg-
edly permitted homosexual individuals to remain in his restaurant
713. Id.
714. 27 App. Div. 2d 918, 278 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1967) (mem.).
715. Id. at 918, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
716. Id.
717. Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 21 N.Y.2d 111,233 N.E.2d 833, 286
N.Y.S.2d 822 (1967).
718. Id. at 115, 233 N.E.2d at 835, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25.
719. Id. at 115, 233 N.E.2d at 835, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
720. Id. at 116, 233 N.E.2d at 835, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
721. 28 App. Div. 2d 841, 281 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1967) (mem.).
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while acting in a lewd and indecent manner. Three policemen testified
that they had been solicited,722 but the opinion does not indicate
whether or not the licensee knew or had reason to know of the
solicitations.
In Becker v. New York State Liquor Authority,723 the appeals court
upheld suspension of a liquor license on the grounds that the licensee
had permitted homosexual individuals to patronize his restaurant and
to conduct themselves in an indecent manner. As pointed out by the
dissent, no conviction of solicitation was involved. Upholding the sus-
pension on appeal,724 the New York Court of Appeals narrowed the
standard for suspending licenses by holding that fondling of primary
sexual organs in a licensed premise on a public dance floor constituted
"disorder" under the New York statute. The court made a further im-
portant point: such behavior, it said, constitutes "disorder" whether
between heterosexuals or homosexuals.
72 5
If Kerma and Becker are to be taken at their face value, a licensee
in New York can allow homosexual persons to frequent his bar without
fear that his license will be revoked or suspended as long as the licensee
does not knowingly permit solicitation on the premises nor allow fon-
dling of primary sexual organs among his patrons.
In spite of its limiting effect in license revocation cases, the Becker
decision was used to broaden coverage under a penal statute to include
owners of homosexual establishments. In People v. deCurtis,7 26 the de-
fendant was convicted of keeping a disorderly house in violation of a
New York penal law under which persons cannot "maintain or keep a
house of ill-fame. . . for the encouragement or practice by persons of
lewdness, fornication, unlawful sexual intercourse, or for any other in-
decent or disorderly act. .... ,,727 The statute was originally intended
to apply to heterosexual prostitution.728 In order to apply it to a restau-
rant that allegedly allowed homosexual activities on its premises, the
court used the definition from Becker that public fondling of primary
722. Id. at 842, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
723. 28 App. Div. 2d 980, 283 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1967) (mem.).
724. Becker v. New York State Liquor Auth., 21 N.Y.2d 289, 234 N.E.2d 443, 287
N.Y.S.2d 400 (1967).
725. Id. at 292, 234 N.E.2d at 444, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
726. 63 Misc. 2d 246, 311 N.Y.S.2d 214 (App. Div. 1970).
727. Former N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1146, cited in id. at 247, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
728. In Harris v. United States, 315 A.2d 569 (D.C. 1974), the District of Columbia court
analogized a homosexual health club to a heterosexual house of prostitution. On this basis,
the court found that the club was a "bawdy or disorderly" house, and could thus be a
nuisance per se.
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sexual organs constitutes "disorder" whether between heterosexual or
homosexual persons. Given this definition of disorder, the conviction
under the statute was upheld.
California, like New York, has a large group of liquor license
cases spanning the years 1951 through 1960. When Stoumen v.
Reily 7 2 9 was decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1951, it
appeared to be a clear victory for liquor licensees who catered to homo-
sexual patrons. The liquor license of the plaintiff had been revoked
because he was found to have conducted a disorderly house in viola-
tion of section 58 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.730 The con-
viction was supported by the licensing board's finding that "persons of
known homosexual tendencies patronized said premises and used said
premises as a meeting place."' 73' The California Supreme Court re-
versed, saying that no evidence of any illegal or immoral conduct on
the premises had been shown: "[Sjomething more must be shown than
that many of his patrons were homosexuals and that they used his res-
taurant and bar as a meeting place.
'732
Subsequent to Stoumen, the legislature added subdivision (e) of
section 24200 to the Business and Professions Code,7 33 which provided
for suspension of a license "where a portion of the premises of the li-
censee upon which the activities permitted by the license are conducted
are a resort for. . . sexual perverts." Moreover, a general community
reputation that a particular bar was a resort for sexual perverts was
allowed as proof of a violation of this section.
Initially, California appellate courts reconciled subdivision (e)
with Stoumen by construing the "something more" than mere pa-
tronage requirement to mean any homosexual activity, even if the ac-
tivity did not constitute a violation of the penal code. 734 In JVallerga v.
729. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
730. Section 58 provided: "Every licensee or agent or employee of any licensee who
keeps or permits to be used or sifers to be used, in conjunction with a licensed premises, any
disorderly house or place in which people abide or to which people resort, to the disturbance
of the neighborhood, or in which people abide or to which people resort for purposes which
are injurious to the public morals, health, conivenience or safety shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor." Id. at 715, 234 P.2d at 970.
731. Id. at 715, 234 P.2d at 971.
732. Id. at 717, 234 P.2d at 971.
733. Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1217, § 1, at 2230-31.
734. See Nickola v. Munro, 162 Cal. App. 2d 449, 328 P.2d 271 (1958); Kershaw v.
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 155 Cal. App. 2d 544, 318 P.2d 494 (1957). In
both cases, liquor licenses were suspended under § 24200(e) even though there was no evi-
dence of an illegal act. The court in Nickola ruled: "[Wlhen one male, by acts of the type
here involved, seeks sexual gratification from another in a public tavern, he has committed
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Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,73 5 however, the California
Supreme Court struck down subdivision (e), holding that it was uncon-
stitutional to revoke a liquor license solely on the basis that a bar or
restaurant is a resort for a certain class of persons: "something more"
must be shown.
7 36
While the Vallerga court struck down section 24200(e), it specifi-
cally called attention to another statute which could provide a basis for
license revocation in such cases. The court pointed out that article XX,
section 22 of the California Constitution vested in the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control the authority to revoke a license for good
cause when the continuance of the license would be "contrary to public
welfare or morals. ' 737 Under this authority, the Department of Alco-
holic Beverage Control revoked liquor licenses for violation of Califor-
nia Business and Professions Code section 2561,738 which prohibits
keeping a disorderly house. The revocations were upheld in Benedetti
v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,739 Morell v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control,7 40 and Stoumen v. Munro.741 As in the
New York cases,742 the catch-all notion of "disorderly house" was held
to embrace establishments visited by homosexual persons. In all cases,
the courts ruled that the licensee was not required to have actual
knowledge of the acts which made the premises a "disorderly
house." 743
acts of sex pervision and demonstrated that he is a sex pervert." 162 Cal. App. 2d at 457, 328
P.2d at 276.
735. 53 Cal. 2d 313, 347 P.2d 909, 1 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1959).
736. Warning that homosexuals may not be held to a higher degree of moral conduct
than heterosexuals, the court nevertheless said that "any public display which manifests
sexual desires, whether they be heterosexual or homosexual in nature" may be regulated.
Id. at 319, 347 P.2d at 912, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
737. Id. at 321, 347 P.2d at 913, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
738. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25601 (West 1964). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 24200(b) (West 1964) permits revocation of a license for violation of § 25601.
739. 187 Cal. App. 2d 213, 9 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1960).
740. 204 Cal. App. 2d 504, 22 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962).
741. 219 Cal. App. 2d 302, 33 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1963). Sol Stoumen, the petitioner in this
action, was also the petitioner in Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951). See
text accompanying notes 729-32 supra.
742. See text accompanying notes 699-728 supra.
743. In almost all of these cases, there are lengthy descriptions of the homosexual activ-
ity found to constitute disorder. Usually the activity includes same sex dancing, same sex
kissing, same sex hugging, and allegedly same sex fondling of private parts. There is usually
testimony that the men speak in high-pitched voices, giggle and mince and the women are
mannishly attired. Because of the repetitiveness of the testimony it has not been detailed
here. Usually there is no direct evidence of any sexual crime although the police agents
almost always allege that they were solicited for deviant sex acts. Sometimes there are con-
victions of patrons for these alleged solicitations. The whole issue of police harassment and
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The number of reported California cases falls off after 1961, per-
haps indicating that gay bars were gaining tolerance and that police
had begun to use their efforts in another direction. This conclusion is
somewhat undermined by Francisco Enterprises v. Kirby, 744 in which a
holder of an alcoholic beverage license in California attempted to en-
join the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control from revoking his
license. The plaintiffs allegations are novel with respect to liquor li-
censing cases. He claimed that the revocation proceedings were the re-
sult of a conspiracy among state officers to do away with his business
solely because it was frequented by homosexuals; that the proceedings
deprived him of due process and equal protection, and chilled his pa-
trons' rights of freedom of speech; and that the state statute under
which his license would be revoked as contrary to "public welfare or
morals" and "public morals, health, convenience and safety" was un-
constitutionally vague.745 The merits of these allegations were not
reached by the Ninth Circuit, which upheld a dismissal on jurisdic-
tional grounds.7
46
Pennsylvania courts have uniformly supported the state liquor
board in its license revocations. One of the grounds on which a suspen-
sion was upheld in the 1966 case of Anthony Wayne Bar and Restaurant,
Inc. ,747 was that the employees of the licensee permitted "disorderly or
improper conduct"7 48 on the licensed premises. The evidence support-
ing such a finding consisted primarily of observations by a police officer
of conversations, dancing, and suggestive actions by the male clientele.
The ground for suspension in another 1966 case, In re Revocation of
License of Clock Bar, Inc. ,749 was permitting solicitation of patrons for
entrapment of male homosexuals in California is detailed in Project, The Consenting Adult
Homosexual and the Law-. An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los
Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 647 (1966).
See also Sultan Turkish Bath v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 169 Cal. App. 2d 188, 337
P.2d 203 (1959). In Sultan, the city board of police commissioners revoked a Turkish bath
owner's license on the ground that the business was carried on in an unlawful and improper
manner. The complaint against Sultan alleged that his establishment was a "hangout for
male degenerates of all types who have committed on the premises indecent, lewd, lascivious
acts prohibited by law." Id. at 191-92, 337 P.2d at 205. The judge categorized the acts
performed there not only as illegal and immoral but also as "disgusting," id. at 196, 337 P.2d
at 208, and upheld the license revocation.
744. 482 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1973).
745. Id. at 484.
746. Id.
747. 42 Pa. D. & C. 2d 712 (1966), afifd, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 756 (1967).
748. Id. at 713.
749. 85 Dauphin C. 125 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1966).
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immoral purposes.750 Despite the fact that "[tihere was no evidence of
any solicitations of patrons except those encouraged by the agents" of
the Liquor Control Board,75' the court nevertheless upheld the
suspension.
The last Pennsylvania case to deal with gay bars was Freedman
Liqour License Case.752 There, an appeals court overturned a finding
of no public disturbance, and hence no disorder, to uphold the suspen-
sion of a restaurant liquor license. In its cursory discussion of the is-
sues, the court refused even to set out the "revolting" testimony leading
to the license revocation, except to say that it supported the liquor
board's findings. 753 The court cited Anthony Wayne Bar754 for the
proposition that activities by homosexuals constitute disorderly and im-
proper conduct.755 Again, as in other states, no reported cases appear
in Pennsylvania after the late 1960's.
A Louisiana case in 1957, Kotteman v. Grevemberg,756 upheld the
revocation of a permit to sell beer on the grounds that the general con-
duct of the establishment and the type of patrons who frequented it,
were "not conducive to an orderly, law abiding establishment. '757 The
charges included evidence that over 250 arrests had been made on the
premises over a two and one-half year period and testimony of police
that the bar was "notorious as a place in which perverts and sex devi-
ates congregated. '758 The court upheld the revocation saying, "On the
merits of the appeal we find little to discuss. 759
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in the 1964 case of Cesaroni v.
Smith,760 took much the same position as courts in sister states with
regard to revocation of licenses of bars patronized by homosexuals. In
Cesaroni, the court found the evidence sufficient to hold the licensee's
establishment was disorderly under the Rhode Island statute761 even
750. A second ground for the suspension, keeping of a disorderly house, was not sus-
tained. Id. at 130-3 1.
751. Id. at 132.
752. 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 132, 235 A.2d 624 (1967).
753. Id. at 134, 235 A.2d at 625.
754. See text accompanying notes 747-48 supra.
755. 211 Pa. Super. at 134, 235 A.2d at 625.
756. 233 La. 327, 96 So. 2d 601 (1957).
757. Id. at 330-31, 96 So. 2d at 602.
758. Id. at 335, 96 So. 2d at 603.
759. Id. at 334, 96 So. 2d at 603.
760. 98 R.I. 377, 202 A.2d 292 (1964).
761. The statute provided: "If any licensed person shall permit the house or place where
he is licensed to sell beverages under the provisions of this title to become disorderly so as to
annoy and disturb the persons inhabiting or residing in the neighborhood thereof, . . . and
if it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the board, body or official hearing such
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though no evidence in the record indicated that the conduct within the
bar disturbed those living in the neighborhood. The court held that the
legislature intended "to condition the continued operation of establish-
ments" on the licensee's ability to prevent conditions which directly or
"by indirection offend the sensibilities of the neighbors. '762 The bias of
the court is evident in its statement that the licensee permitted his bar
"to become attractive as a gathering place for deviates of both sexes, a
virtual house of assignation for perverts.
763
The single published case in Florida on the subject of gay bars,
Inman v. City of Miami,764 deals with the constitutionality of a Miami
ordinance prohibiting a liquor licensee from knowingly employing a
homosexual person, knowingly selling or serving a homosexual person
alcoholic beverages, or knowingly allowing two or more homosexual
persons to congregate or remain in his place of business. The court
upheld the law on the grounds that it had a rational relationship to
public health, morals, safety, and the general welfare. The court con-
cluded that "[t]he object of the ordinance as a whole is to prevent the
congregation at liquor establishments of persons likely to prey upon the
public by attempting to recruit other persons for acts which have been
declared illegal by the Legislature .... -765 No basis for the conclu-
sion that mere congregation by homosexual persons would lead to law-
breaking is revealed by the opinion.
In Paddock Bar, Inc. v. Division ofAlcoholic Beverage Control,766 a
New Jersey appeals court upheld the suspension of a liquor license
where the licensee was charged with permitting persons "who appeared
to be homosexuals" to congregate upon his premises.7 67 Where it was
clearly proven that the patrons had the appearance of homosexual per-
sons, actual proof of homosexual status was not required. "It is often in
the plumage," said the court, "that we identify the bird. '768 The court
charge that he has ... permitted to be done any of the things hereinbefore in this section
mentioned, then said board, body or official may suspend or revoke his license or enter other
order thereon." d. at 380, 202 A.2d at 294.
762. Id. at 384, 202 A.2d at 296.
763. Id. The court continued: "This obviously induced these unfortunate people to
flock to a place where they would be assured that their conduct would be tolerated and
where any residual reluctance at participation in acts of perversion would be overcome by
the availability of alcoholic beverages. ... .Id.
764. 197 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
765. Id. at 52.
766. 46 N.J. Super. 405, 134 A.2d 779 (1957).
767. The business was held to be offensive to common decency and public morals. Id. at
407, 134 A.2d at 779.
768. Id. at 408-09, 134 A.2d at 780. The characteristics involved included, among
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held that "it is inimical to the preservation of our social and moral
welfare to permit public taverns to be converted into recreational fra-
ternity houses for homosexuals and prostitutes.
769
Four years later, another New Jersey appeals court in Murphy's
Tavern v. Davis770 found in a fashion similar to Paddock that the pa-
trons looked and acted like homosexual individuals. Such appearance
and conduct was held to be a sufficient basis upon which to punish a
licensee who allowed such persons to assemble on his premises.77' The
court concluded that it was not "callous to the problem of the homosex-
ual medically or socially"772 but that tight control over the liquor busi-
ness mandated maintenance of accepted standards of public
decency.
773
In 1967 the New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with the issues raised
in Paddock and Murphy in the case of One Eleven Wines & Liquors Inc.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control.77 4 The court held that the
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control was unjustified in disciplining
licensees because persons with homosexual mannerisms were permitted
to congregate in their establishments. The court, citing to Robinson v.
California775 for support, pointed out that "though in our culture
homosexuals are indeed unfortunates, their status does not make them
criminals or outlaws. ' 776 Therefore, the court said, as long as homo-
sexual persons break no laws, they have a right to congregate in public,
and that includes patronizing taverns. The court said that the Depart-
ment of Alcoholic Beverage Control produced no evidence to show
what actual harm gay persons did in bars. The court warned that any
further proceedings by the Department should be based on "specific
charges of improper conduct" rather than on "general charges of mere
congregation.
'777
Thus the New Jersey court joins those of New York and California
others, "effeminate pitch of voice," "manipulation of cigarettes," giggling, and rocking and
swaying of posteriors in a "maidenly fashion." Id. at 409, 134 A.2d at 781.
769. Id. at 408, 134 A.2d at 780.
770. 70 N.J. Super. 87, 175 A.2d 1 (1961).
771. Id. at 95, 175 A.2d at 5.
772. Id. at 96, 175 A.2d at 6.
773. Id.
774. 50 N.J. 329, 235 A.2d 12 (1967).
775. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Robinson dealt with a California statute that made narcotics
addiction a misdemeanor. The Supreme Court held that the statute inflicted cruel and unu-
sual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments because it made the
"status" of drug addiction a criminal offense regardless of the offender's actual behavior.
776. 50 NJ. at 342, 235 A.2d at 18.
777. Id. at 342, 235 A.2d at 19.
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in agreeing that, in order to revoke a license under liquor regulation
statutes, something more must be shown than mere status of the bar
owner's patrons as homosexual. This posture is much to be preferred
over that of many states where the standards under which licensees are
prosecuted remain broad and for the most part ill-defined, thereby al-
lowing virtually rubber-stamp confirmation of prosecutions under state
liquor licensing statutes. Nevertheless, even under the stricter stan-
dard, the hands of the licensing boards are not tied. As the New Jersey
case, One Eleven Wines, points out along with the Vallerga case778
which it cites with approval, the courts have left plenty of space for the
beverage control departments to revoke licenses if they can show spe-
cific lewd and immoral conduct of patrons, with or without knowledge
of the licensee in some cases. Even if bar owners seemingly need have
little fear of prosecution from their licensing boards at present (to be
inferred from the fact that few cases are finding their way into the
courts), the lack of prosecution is more likely due to political disinterest
than lack of a strong statute or court approval of prosecutions by the
licensing departments.
XIV. Universities and Other Public Forums
The following cases, which relate to the first amendment rights of
homosexual individuals and their organizations, reveal that courts al-
most without exception have upheld the right of homosexual persons to
speak and organize. The bulk of these cases arise from confrontations
between universities and gay student organizations.
Associated Students of Sacramento State College v. Butz, 779 a Cali-
fornia superior court decision, presaged the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the landmark student organization case of
Hea4y v. James.780 In Associated Students, the college denied recogni-
tion to a homosexual group, Society for Homosexual Freedom, despite
the fact that the group had complied with all the proper procedures for
recognition.78 ' The court, in a straight-forward first amendment analy-
778. Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 313, 347 P.2d
909, 1 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1959). See notes 735-36 and accompanying text supra.
779. Civ. No. 200795 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento, Feb. 15, 1971), reported in 3 C.L.
BULL. 63 (1971).
780. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, the Supreme Court held that denial of university
recognition to a politically active student group, Students for a Democratic Society, affected
the group's first amendment rights and that recognition could only be denied under ex-
tremely narrow and strict circumstances. For an examination of the right of association doc-
trine as applied to gay organizations see Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organization and
the Right of Association, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979).
781. The college indicated that the denial was based on a number of factors: (1) Recog-
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sis pointed out that once public facilities are opened as a forum, the
state cannot censor ideas by denying access to the forum based on the
content of the ideas to be presented.782 Moreover, absent a clear and
present danger or reasonable grounds to believe that a serious evil will
result, free speech cannot be limited.783 Finding no evidence of immi-
nent illegal acts in the case at bar, the court ordered the college to re-
consider recognition of the group.
In Wood v. Davison,784 the first reported federal case to deal with
the right of a university to regulate the activities of a gay student organ-
ization, the state-supported University of Georgia allowed a homosex-
ual student organization to register but denied use of university
facilities to the group for a conference and dance. The basis for the
denial was that these activities were not within the purposes of the uni-
versity and "introduce[d] an element which is believed to be not in the
best interest of the University."
785
The court brought this case under the umbrella of the Supreme
court's opinion in Healy v. James.78 6 Healy held that denial of recogni-
tion to a student group, rather than denial of facilities, abridged first
amendment rights. The court noted, however, that Healy also dealt
with the second issue when it observed that denial of facilities was the
primary means of infringing on freedom of expression.787 The Wood
nition would endorse or promote homosexual behavior; (2) Recognition would draw homo-
sexuals to the campus; (3) Recognition would expose minors to homosexual advocacy and
practice; (4) Recognition would create too great a risk which might lead students to engage
in illegal behavior. 3 C.L. BULL. at 63.
782. "The idea that freedom of speech secures to speakers some right to use public
places for expression is the core of the 'public forum' concept." Note, The Public Forum:
Minimum Access, EqualAccess, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REv. 117 (1975). See
also Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forunt Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. I.
783. Citing to Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the court ruled that a limita-
tion on free speech will not be allowed merely because the ideas involved are unpopular or
embarrassing. The court stated: "The denial [of recognition] in this case seems to be based
on mere suspicion, disgust, unpopularity, and fear of what might occur. Mere suspicion
cannot be sufficient grounds for denying the Society and the petitioner certain constitutional
guarantees. The evidence presented at the hearing was woefully weak in support of any
reasonable fear that recognition of the Society would increase the risk that students would
engage in illegal homosexual behavior on the campus. The California Supreme Court has
ruled that it cannot be assumed that when a group of persons, some of whom are homosexu-
als, meet together that they shall use the meeting place for illegal activities; or that a person's
use of facilities can be denied on the bases [sic] of what one suspects he might do on such
premises." 3 C.L. BULL. at 63.
784. 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
785. Id. at 545 n.5.
786. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). See note 780 supra.
787. 351 F. Supp. at 546-47.
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court enumerated three possible circumstances under which denial of
facilities might be countenanced: (1) if the campus organization re-
fused to abide by reasonable regulations; (2) if there was a demonstra-
ble danger of violence or disruption; (3) if the meeting in question
violated state or federal law. 78 8 None of these circumstances being
present, the court found that the university had not met its burden of
justifying denial of access to the facilities.
Wood v. Davison was not appealed. Two years passed before the
next gay student organization case reached a federal court. In early
1974, a district court decided Gay Students Organization ofthe Univer-
sity of New Hampshire v. Bonner.78 9 Like Wood the case involved de-
nial of access to facilities rather than denial of recognition to the
homosexual student group.
After a complaint to the university by the Governor of New
Hampshire with respect to a dance sponsored by the Gay Student Or-
ganization (GSO), the university banned all social functions of that or-
ganization. Shortly thereafter, the organization sponsored a play at
which allegedly obscene materials were distributed by persons who
were not GSO members.790 The Governor of New Hampshire re-
sponded with an open letter to the trustees of the university:
[Ilndecency and moral filthy will no longer be allowed on our
campuses.
I am not interested in legalistic hairsplitting . . . . Either you
take firm, fair and positive action to rid your campuses of socially
abhorrent activities or I, as [G]overnor, will stand solidly against the




Not surprisingly, the university then ordered an even more rigid ban on
GSO social functions. A lawsuit ensued.7 92
In holding the university's action to be a clear violation of the first
amendment, the court used tests similar to those of Wood v. Davison.793
Finding no evidence of either refusal to obey university regulations,
violence, or violation of law,7 94 the court held that GSO was entitled to
788. Id. at 547-48.
789. 367 F. Supp. 1088 (D.N.H.), modified, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
790. Id. at 1090-92.
791. Id. at 1092.
792. As one of its defenses, the university pointed to the Governor's position. The dis-
trict court replied that "a State university may not be blackmailed into depriving its students
of their constitutional rights." Id. at 1100.
793. See text accompanying note 788 supra.
794. The university argued that GSO functions were "tantamount to criminal solicita-
tion of deviate sexual relations," 367 F. Supp. at 1100, contrary to New Hampshire law. The
court, however, found neither evidence of illegal behavior or solicitation at GSO functions
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use facilities in the same manner as other university student
organizations.
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed. 795 Responding to the uni-
versity's argument that "social events" are not among the class of pro-
tected associational activities, 796 the court noted that GSO was a cause-
oriented political group. As such, while its social functions do not con-
stitute "pure speech," its "conduct may have a communicative content
sufficient to bring it within the ambit of the First Amendment. ' 797 The
court found that "expression, assembly and petition constitute signifi-
cant aspects of the GSO's conduct in holding social events. ' 798 Because
the regulation of GSO's social events was based on the content of its
expression, the organization's freedom of expression was curtailed.
799
Mississiopi GayAlliance v. Goudelock,800 decided in 1976, involved
a clash between a nonhomosexual student organization and an off-
campus homosexual group. The newspaper of the University of Mis-
sissippi, a state-supported school, was run and edited by students. Its
editor, Mr. Goudelock, refused to accept a paid advertisement tendered
by the Mississippi Gay Alliance (MGA), an off-campus homosexual
group, announcing its Gay Center which offered counseling, legal aid,
and a library of homosexual literature. The Fifth Circuit affirmed a
district court decision in favor of the university. Both courts agreed
that the case did not involve the state action necessary to trigger a first
amendment review, because, although the paper was supported in part
by activity fees of students, university officials did not supervise or con-
trol the paper's content.80 1
nor that GSO advocated public homosexual acts, stating that the university could reason-
ably regulate if such situations actually arose.
795. 509 F.2d 652 (Ist Cir. 1974).
796. Id. at 659.
797. Id. at 660.
798. Id. at 660-61.
799. Like the district court, the First Circuit found no evidence of imminent lawless
action. The court ruled also that the university could regulate overt sexual behavior (hetero-
sexual or otherwise), id. at 663, but that it could not ban GSO's social functions consistent
with the first amendment.
In University of New Hampshire v. April, 115 N.H. 576, 347 A.2d 446 (1975), the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire turned aside the university's attempt to accomplish the
same results by an action in state court. The university-sought a determination of whether it
could permissibly regulate GSO activities if homosexuality were found to be an illness or
mental disorder. The state supreme court refused to hear the case on the basis of res judi-
cata; the university, the court said, was attempting to relitigate the issues already decided in
the federal court.
800. 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977).
801. Id. at 1075.
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In dictum, the court supported the position of student editor
Goudelock. 0 2 The court found that a Mississippi statute condemning
"any intercourse which is unnatural, detestable and abominable" 80 3
was constitutional, and, therefore, the editor had the right not to be
involved with such activity.
804
In a strong dissent,80 5 Justice Goldberg declared that the advertise-
ment in question was protected speech, and that it did not involve crim-
inal or illegal activity. The status of being "homosexual," he noted, is
not illegal in Mississippi. Justice Goldberg took the position that the
case should be remanded on the issue of whether the student newspa-
per constituted state action, implying that such state action was in-
volved. 80 6 If the paper's activities constituted state action, and it
accepted paid advertisements, then there must be equal access to that
service, without discrimination based on content. Thus, Justice
Goldberg would treat the state-supported student newspaper under the
public-forum doctrine, at least with respect to paid advertisements.
The Fourth Circuit case of Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews8
°7
is squarely in line with Wood and Bonner and has a strong factual
similarity to Healy. Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) re-
fused to recognize the Gay Alliance of Students (GAS) as a registered
student organization. The district court found that there was "no cog-
nizable constitutional deprivation" because of nonrecognition but nev-
ertheless ordered VCU to give GAS access to many university facilities
and services.808 The Fourth Circuit found a clear deprivation of first
amendment rights80 9 and ordered VCU to register the gay student or-
802. The judge's attitude toward the homosexual group became rather blatant when he
referred to them as "this off-campus cell." Id. at 1075 (emphasis added).
803. Id.
804. Id. at 1075-76. In a footnote, Justice Coleman, the writer of the majority opinion.
made it clear that he believed that no newspaper in Mississippi could be required to take
"solicitations for homosexual contacts." Id. at 1076 n.4. In so stating, the justice apparently
equated the Gay Center advertisement with solicitation.
805. Id. at 1076.
806. "I have little doubt that this court would review a decision by the students to ex-
clude blacks from participation on the newspaper staff as a decision imbued with state ac-
tion." Id. at 1085.
807. 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976).
808. See id. at 164.
809. Because the university gave no reasons why it withheld registration, the parties
stipulated to the university's probable reasons in the trial court: "I As a matter of logic,
the existence of GAS as a recognized campus organization would increase the opportunity
for homosexual contacts. 2 Recognition of GAS would tend to encourage some students to
join the organization who otherwise might not join. 3 Some students may benefit from
membership in GAS and some may not, and to some it would confer neither benefit nor
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ganization. In so holding, the court reiterated the Healy warning: a
university cannot restrict speech or association solely because it finds
the group's views abhorrent.8t 0 The concurring opinion echoed this
thesis: "The stifling of advocacy is even more abhorrent, even more
sickening. It rings the death knell of a free society."
81'
The 1977 case of Gay Lib v. University of Missouri8 t2 originated
with the university's refusal to recognize a homosexual student organi-
zation based on "a concern for the impact of recognition on the general
relationship of the University to the public at large." 1 3 In the course
of an administrative hearing on the issue, which included expert and
lay testimony, the hearing officer made a finding that recognition of
Gay Lib as a student organization would cause increased violations of
Missouri sodomy laws.814 This finding was the basis for the district
court's decision in favor of the university.81 5 Recognizing that denial of
recognition was an infringement of the first amendment, the district
court nevertheless reasoned that the university had overcome the heavy
detriment. 4 The existence of GAS would tend to attract other homosexuals to VCU." Id.
at 163-64.
The court found these reasons constitutionally insufficient to support an abridgment of
first amendment rights. In response to the university's argument that recognition of GAS
would increase the opportunity for homosexual contacts, the court said, "[E]ven if affording
GAS registration does increase the opportunity for homosexual contacts, that fact is insuffi-
cient to overcome the associational rights of members of GAS." Id. at 166.
810. Id.
811. Id. at 168.
812. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). For further discus-
sion of this case, see 46 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 489 (1978); 43 Mo. L. REv. 109 (1978).
813. 558 F.2d at 851.
814. The other findings of the hearing officer were that recognition of Gay Lib by the
university will: "(1) give a formal status to and tend to reinforce the personal identities of the
homosexual members of those organizations and will perpetuate and expand an abnormal
way of life, unless contrary to their intention as stated in their written purposes, the homo-
sexual members make a concerted effort to seek treatment, recognize homosexuality as ab-
normal and attempt to cease their homosexual practices;
(2) tend to cause latent or potential homosexuals who become members to become overt
homosexuals;
(3) tend to expand homosexual behavior which will cause increased violations of sec-
tion 563.230 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri;
(4) be undesirable insofar as homosexuals will counsel other homosexuals, i.e., the sick
and abnormal counseling others who are similarly ill and abnormal; and
(5) constitute an implied approval by the University of the abnormal homosexual life-
style as a normal way of live and would be so understood by many students and other
members of the public, even though, and despite the fact that, the University's regulations
for student organizations provide that recognition of an organization by the University does
not constitute approval or endorsement of the organization's aims or activities." Id. at 851
n.7.
815. 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
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burden imposed on it by Healy and was thus constitutionally justified
in its decision.8
16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed. The court pointed out that Healy, combined with the decisions
in Bonner and Matthews, militated for recognition. 81 7 The expert testi-
mony below, on the basis of which the district court found that viola-
tion of sodomy laws would result from recognition, was found
insufficient to justify prior restraint by the government for the group of
students in question.81 8 Gay Lib did not advocate breaking university
rules. The court stated, "It is difficult to singularly ascribe evil conno-
tations to the group simply because they are homosexuals."819 To do
so, the court said, would impermissibly penalize persons because of
their status.
820
Rehearing was denied en bane by the Eighth Circuit with a four-
four split in voting. The Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari.8 21 Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Rehn-
quist 822 made it clear that he wanted to hear the case so that he might
overrule the Eighth Circuit: "Writ large, the issue posed in this case is
the extent to which a self-governing democracy, having made certain
acts criminal, may prevent or discourage individuals from engaging in
speech or conduct which encourages others to violate those laws. 82 3
Rehnquist analogized the nonrecognition of the gay group to a
measles quarantine. "[T]he question is more akin to whether those suf-
fering from measles have a constitutional right, in violation of quaran-
tine regulations, to associate together and with others who do not
presently have measles, in order to urge repeal of a state law providing
that the measle sufferers be quarantined."8 24 Justice Rehnquist's view
of the constitutional rights of homosexual persons seems not to be in
doubt.
816. Id. at 1370. The court found that recognition of Gay Lib would be "likely to incite,
promote, and result in acts contrary to and in violation of the sodomy statute" of Missouri.
Id.
817. 558 F.2d at 853.
818. Id. at 854. The court was critical of the expert testimony, saying that the opinions
were without basis in scientific fact and were neither historically nor empirically verified.
Id.
819. Id. at 856.
820. Id.
821. 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Burger voted to hear the
case.
822. Justice Blackmun joined in this dissent.
823. 434 U.S. at 1082.
824. Id. at 1084. Presumably Justice Rehnquist believes homosexuality is contagious.
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The issues confronted by courts when organizations of homosex-
ual persons clash with the administrators of academia are also present
in cases involving nonuniversity forums. Toward a Gayer Bicentennial
Committee v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation ,825 for example, in-
volved the use of a state building as a forum for a homosexual organi-
zation. "Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Committee," composed of
representatives from a number of gay organizations in Rhode Island,
was formed to provide information to the public at large about the le-
gal, political, and social aspirations of homosexuals through the me-
dium of the bicentennial celebration. The group requested that the
Rhode Island Bicentennial Commission include in its official calendar
several events that the Committee proposed to conduct, and also re-
quested use of the Old State House as a site for one of the events.
The Commission denied the requests, 26 claiming that they failed
to satisfy the formal requirements for such proposals. The court found
no evidence that the stated reason controlled the Commission's action;
rather, it seemed clear that the homosexual nature of the Committee
provided the true motivation for refusing the requests. The court ruled
that the Bicentennial Commission had made the Old State House a
public forum, limited reasonably to the expression of bicentennial
themes. Having created a limited public forum, the Commission could
not restrict access arbitrarily. Therefore, the court ordered the Com-
mission either to accept the Committee's proposals or to formulate "in
writing, in clear and precise terms capable of even-handed application,
the standards to be used in evaluating the plaintiffs' request for
endorsement.
'827
Sixteen days later, the same parties were again before the same
court.8 28 The Commission had chosen to promulgate new standards
rather than accept the Committee's proposals. After the Committee
825. 417 F. Supp. 632 (D.R.I. 1976).
826. Id. at 633.
827. Id. at 641-42. The court also ruled that if the Commission decided to issue new
standards, the Committee must be afforded a fair opportunity to present a new proposal. Id.
at 642.
The court obviously could not resist the opportunity to comment: "I cannot help but
note the irony of the Bicentennial Commission expressing reluctance to provide a forum for
the plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights because they might advocate conduct
which is illegal. Does the Bicentennial Commission need reminding that, from the perspec-
tive of British loyalists, the Bicentennial celebrates one of history's greatest illegal events?"
Id.
828. Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation,
417 F. Supp. 642 (D.R.I. 1976).
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submitted a new proposal, the Commission again voted to deny bicen-
tennial endorsement.
The Committee's proposal included several events. The first was a
request for the use of the Old State House for an address on the subject
of treatment of homosexual persons during Colonial and Revolution-
ary times. The Commission refused the proposal829 on the ground that
access was tantamount to endorsement, and endorsement meant ap-
proval. The court reiterated its ruling that such reasoning was no ex-
cuse for curtailing first amendment rights830 and ordered the
Commission to grant the use of the forum.83'
Like the preceding case, Aumiler v. University of Delaware32 in-
volves no denial of recognition to a gay student organization. Strictly
speaking, Aumiller is an employment case but is discussed in this sec-
tion because the first amendment provides the basis for its holding.
Speaking in his capacity as the faculty advisor to a recognized gay stu-
dent organization, Richard Aumiller, a professor at the University of
Delaware, 833 made statements regarding homosexuality that were re-
ported in newspaper articles.8 34 The fact that Aumiller was himself gay
was known by his immediate superiors when he was hired, and by all
829. The Commission had first denied the request on the ground that the time slot was
already promised to another group. The Committee then agreed to reschedule.
830. 417 F. Supp. at 645.
831. Commission endorsement of the other proposed events, a parade, a Gay Pride Day
and a Gay Pride Week, was also at issue. The court said although these other events did not
involve access to a public forum, they did involve a constitutionally protected interest, free-
dom of speech. Therefore, the Commission, a state body, could not withhold its endorse-
ment arbitrarily. After an examination of the proposed events, the court ordered the
Commission to endorse the Congress of People with Gay Concerns and only withheld an
order on the parade because it would be too late to be effective. Id. at 647.
832. 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
833. While there are few cases on the subject, it would appear that university and college
teachers who are homosexuals are not discriminated against nearly as much as are elemen-
tary and secondary school teachers. According to The Advocate, June 28, 1978, at 15, the
president of Pennsylvania State University recently reinstated a gay professor fired because
of his homosexuality. His firing was protested by the Pennsylvania chapter of the American
Association of University Professors. However, in Hawaii, Maui Community College is
presently being sued by Arnold A. Sciullo because his contract as a lecturer was not re-
newed. According to Mr. Sciullo's allegations, Provost Moikeha, a member of the Church of
Latter Day Saints, refused to allow Sciullo to be rehired because of the provost's own reli-
gious beliefs condemning homosexuality. The Advocate, May 17, 1978, at 10.
The American Association of University Professors voted in June of 1976 to oppose
discrimination by colleges and universities on the basis of sexual preference. Lesbian Con-
nection, Dec. 1976, at 14.
834. The details of Aumiller's statements to the newspapers and the various responses
by President Trabant are numerous. The court's opinion with the appended newspaper arti-
cles is 46 pages long. In describing the case, the factual details have been omitted.
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the university administrators involved when his contract was renewed
for the first time. When his contract came up for renewal after the
appearance of the newspaper articles, however, the president of the
university refused to sign it.835
The court said that the nonrenewal of Aumiller's contract was
clearly a direct consequence of his newspaper statements; therefore the
proper issue was whether the university had violated his first amend-
ment rights. The court relied on Pickering v. Board of Education 36 to
develop the criteria for judging Aumiller's statements: The teacher's
right to free speech must be balanced with the state's rights as an em-
ployer, but such balancing is to occur only when the statements can be
shown, or are presumed, to impede the teacher's classroom perform-
ance, to have substantially disrupted regular school operations, or to
have violated some type of confidentiality.8 37 The court said that none
of these factors applied in Aumiller's case, and thus concluded that by
failing to renew Aumiller's contract, the University violated his first
amendment rights.
8 38
A third "public forum" case, Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan,839
involved the 1976-77 Anchorage Bluebook, a paperback guide to serv-
ices and organizations in the metropolitan area published by the City
of Anchorage. The mayor of Anchorage had ordered that an entry list-
ing and describing the Alaska Gay Coalition8 40 be deleted from the
guide. The court made a factual finding that the Gay Coalition's name
was omitted solely because of the personal beliefs of its members.
84'
The Gay Coalition argued that the Blue Book was in essence a
public forum, and therefore, the government could not deny access to
that forum because of the content of its message. The court agreed,
holding that the city could not deny access to the pages of the Blue
835. 434 F. Supp. at 1285-86. The court said that whether the university could fire
Aumiller because he was a homosexual was not in issue. Id. at 1292 n.56.
836. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
837. 434 F. Supp. at 1292.
838. "The Court fully recognizes that homosexuality is an extremely emotional and con-
troversial topic and that Aumiller's opinions on the subject quite likely represent a minority
view. But this unpopularity can not justify the limtation of Aumiller's First Amendment
rights by the University of Delaware." Id. at 1301.
Aumiller was awarded back pay for one year and compensatory damages from the
university as well as damages for mental distress, humiliation, and embarrassment. Most
interestingly he was awarded $5000 punitive damages against the president of the university,
who was found by the court to have acted maliciously and wantonly. Id. at 1307-12.
839. 578 P.2d 951 (Alas. 1978).
840. The Coalition submitted a description of its purpose and activities which included
its ability to furnish speakers to educate on the subject of homosexuality. Id. at 953.
841. Id. at 955.
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Book on the basis of the content of an organization's beliefs.8 42
Whether involving universities or other public forums, cases in
this section are unlike any others described in this Article. Nowhere
else is there such a consistent respect for the constitutional rights of the
homosexual individual. 843 If people are indeed educated through the
means of expression of ideas, gay rights advocates have a real chance to
speak out because their speech and association seem securely protected
at least from government intervention. The "Catch-22" of this situa-
tion, however, is that the same free speech which is constitutionally
protected may cause the speaker to lose his or her job in the private
sector or to be accused of "flaunting," thus endangering even public
sector jobs.
844
XV. Immigration and Naturalization
The homosexuality of an alien can crucially affect his or her ad-
mission to the United States, ability to remain in the country and to
become a naturalized citizen of the United States.
An alien who is a homosexual can be denied entry into the United
States under two sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act.8 45
Section 212(a)(4) provides that aliens "afflicted with psychopathic per-
sonality, or sexual deviation" shall be excluded from admission into the
United States.846 Section 212(a)(9) provides that "aliens who have
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude . . . , or aliens
who admit having committed such a crime, or aliens who admit com-
mitting acts which constitute the essential elements of such a crime"
shall also be excluded from admission.
847
The two exclusionary criteria can be applied to aliens at a variety
842. The city argued that the Gay Coalition had not been actually harmed by the dele-
tion of its material from the Blue Book. The court did not agree. "[T]he suppression of
speech in itself. . . is the evil to be avoided . . . . Any further showing of adverse conse-
quences . . . is unnecessary." fd. at 960.
843. There are other similar cases currently in the courts. A gay student organization
sued the College of the Redwoods in Eureka, California asserting that the college's refusal to
recognize their organization officially violated its first amendment rights. Hi Gear, June
1977, at 4. At last report the college had changed its policy. Lesbian Connection, Dec. 1977,
at 10. According to a leading gay newspaper, in 1975 gay students filed an action against
Texas A & M in federal district court, which was subsequently dismissed. Plaintiffs are
currently challenging the dismissal in the Fifth Circuit, citing to the Bonner, Matthews and
Missouri decisions for support. See The Advocate, June 28, 1978, at 17.
844. See generally sections on Employment and Related Occupational Discrimination at
text accompanying notes 31-449 supra.
845. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1502 (1976).
846. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976).
847. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976).
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of times.848 When an alien applies for an entry visa, he or she can be
denied the right to enter.849 Such a denial has a ring of finality: refusal
of an entry visa to an alien is not reviewable by a United States
court.8 50 Second, once granted, a visa can be reevaluated at a border or
port of entry under the same admission criteria.85' Third, under the
"last entry" doctrine, an alien who leaves the United States for any
period of time or for any reason (a vacation, a business trip, or a visit to
a dying mother) may be reevaluated upon return to the United States
as if he or she were entering for the first time.8 52 Thus, an alien clearly
admissible at the time of his or her original entry may be excluded on
the basis of conduct, such as homosexual acts, that occurred while he or
she was residing in the United States.
853
Fourth, under section 241(a)(1) of the Act, an alien can be de-
ported at any time if it can be shown that he or she was excludable at
the time of entry. 854 Under this section, aliens who have lived in the
United States for years are potentially subject to deportation for acts
they may have committed long before their first entry into the United
States.
Finally, an alien who desires to change his or her status from non-
immigrant to permanent resident may again be evaluated as if he or
she were seeking original entry.855 The alien's conduct since the origi-
nal entry becomes relevant to the change of status.
The application of these exclusionary criteria can be a continuing
process that constantly hangs over the alien's head. This is particularly
true of the homosexual alien who is directly affected by the triple effect
of the above described criteria: if an alien admits he has been con-
848. For a detailed description of immigration and naturalization problems and proce-
dures, see C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (1978).
849. The application for an immigrant visa asks whether the applicant suffers from psy-
chopathic personality or sexual deviation, and the medical examination form requires the
examining physician to examine for and report any indications of psychopathic personality
or sexual deviation. See Dept. of State Form FS-150: Application for Immigrant Visa &
Alien Registration; Dept. of State Form FS-398: Medical Exam of Visa Applicants.
850. Montgomery v. French, 299 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Kellogg, 30
F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
851. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 1 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 3-148
(1978).
852. Id. at 2-23.
853. See Barber v. Rietmann, 248 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1957).
854. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
855. An alien can enter the United States as a nonimmigrant with the intention of only a
temporary visit. Students, businessmen, and various consular officials, for example, have
nonimmigrant visas. An alien can also enter as an immigrant seeking permanent residence
and eventually citizenship. Amarante v. Rosenberg, 326 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1964).
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victed of a crime involving moral turpitude, he may be excluded under
section 212(a)(9); even if he escapes the snare of that section, he may be
denied entry as being "mentally defective" under section 212(a)(4); if
he denies either, he may be excluded for committing perjury.
The question of whether the homosexual is a psychopathic person-
ality has been considered on a number of occasions.85 6 Under the 1917
Immigration and Nationality Act, aliens were excluded who were "per-
sons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority" or who were found to
be and certified by the examining surgeon as being "mentally defec-
tive.18 57 In United States v. Flores-Rodrguez,858 an alien was deported
for perjury when he failed to state on his visa application that he had
been convicted of soliciting, a crime involving moral turpitude. 859 In
the course of determining that Flores-Rodriguez's perjury was mate-
rial, the court indicated that if the alien had not covered up his solicit-
ing conviction, he would probably have been excluded as a person of
constitutional psychopathic inferiority or as a mental defective. The
court defined "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" as characteriz-
ing "individuals who show a life-long and constitutional tendency not
to conform to group customs, and who habitually misbehave so
flagrantly that they are continually in trouble with the authorities."
860
The court also stated that "the term 'mentally defective,' as used in the
statute, is a concept embracing more than intellectual capacity or lack
thereof . . . We think this language was designed to exclude homo-
sexuals with exhibitionistic tendencies and other groups with lewd
proclivities similarly repugnant to the mores of our society."
'86'
The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act removed the phrase
"persons of constitutional psychopathic personality" and substituted
the phrase "afflicted with psychopathic personality." 862 Under the new
856. Some cases never reach the courts but are decided by the Board of Immigration
Appeals. See, e.g., In re Steel, 12 I.N. Dec. 302 (B.I.A. 1967); In re LaRochelle, 11 I.N. Dec.
436 (B.I.A. 1965); In re J, 2 I.N. Dec. 533 (B.I.A. 1946); In re Z, 2 I.N. Dec. 316 (B.I.A.
1945).
857. Ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875 (repealed 1952). See Richards, supra note 25, at 727 n. 117.
858. 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956).
859. The offense was a violation of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722(8) (McKinney 1967) which
prohibits loitering in a "public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing a crime
against nature."
860. 237 F.2d at 411.
861. Id. Concurring with the majority opinion, Judge Frank was highly critical of the
statutory interpretation of his colleagues, and went so far as to draw attention to the pur-
ported homosexuality of Plato. Id. at 414 n.6.
862. Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, tit. II, ch. 2, § 212(a)(4), (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)
(1976)).
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language, the Fifth Circuit held in Quiroz v. Neely 863 that the lesbian in
question was a psychopathic personality and hence excludable. The
court disregarded the testimony of two doctors that homosexuals are
not necessarily psychopathic personalities as that term is understood
and used in the medical profession. Rather, the judge looked to legisla-
tive history of the Act and concluded, "[w]hatever the phrase 'psycho-
pathic personality' may mean to the psychiatrist, to the Congress it was
intended to include homosexuals and sex perverts." 864 A year later,
however, the Ninth Circuit in Fleuti v. Rosenberg8 65 voided a deporta-
tion order against alien Fleuti on the ground that the term "psychopatic
personality" failed to give definite warning that homosexuality or sex
perversion are included in the term, and thereby violated due process.
The Ninth Circuit maintained this position in 1966 in Lavoie v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service.866 In that same year the Sec-
ond Circuit in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service867
again reached an opposite conclusion and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The Court8 68 affirmed the Second Circuit's holding that by
its use of the term "psychopathic personality" in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, Congress intended to exclude homosexuals from ad-
mission. 869 The Court concluded that even if an applicant could get no
fair warning from this phrase the statute was not void, because at the
time when the standards of admission were applied one was either "af-
flicted with a psychopathic personality" or one was not. Adequate
warning was irrelevant because there was no conduct to avoid.
863. 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961).
864. Id. at 907.
865. 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). Fleuti
was a victim of the "last entry" doctrine. Fleuti, a Swiss, was admitted as a permanent
resident in 1952. In 1956 he spent a few hours in Ensenada, Mexico. In 1959 the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service filed deportation charges against Fleuti claiming that in
1956, his last reentry, he was excludable because he was a homosexual person.
On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to deal with the constitutionality of the phrase
"psychopathic personality," focusing, instead, on whether a brief excursion was included
within the purview of the Act. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
866. 360 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 572 (1967). The
Supreme Court vacated the order of the court of appeals and remanded in light of its opin-
ion in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967). See text ac-
companying notes 867-72 infra. On remand, the Ninth Circuit found Lavoie to have been a
"psychopathic personality" at time of entry and affirmed the deportation order. Lavoie v.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970).
867. 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966), af'd, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
868. Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
869. Id. at 119. See also Note, Limitations on Congressional Power to Deport Resident
Allens Excludable as Psychopaths at Time ofEntry, 68 YALE L.J. 931 (1959).
Registering a strong dissent,870 Justice Douglas called psycho-
pathic personality "much too treacherously vague a term to allow the
high penalty of deportation to turn on it.''871 He pointed out facts that
few have chosen to deal with regarding the policy of total exclusion of
homosexuals:
It is common knowledge that in this century homosexuals have
risen high in our own public service-both in Congress and in the
Executive Branch-and have served with distinction. It is therefore
not credible that Congress wanted to deport everyone and anyone
who was a sexual deviate, no matter how blameless his social con-
duct had been nor how creative his work nor how valuable his con-
tribution to society.
872
Douglas quoted with favor Judge Moore's dissent below: "'To label a
group so large 'excludable aliens' would be tantamount to saying that
Sappho, Leonardo da Vinci, Michaelangelo, Andre Gide and perhaps
even Shakespeare, were they to come to life again, would be deemed
unfit to visit our shores.' "1873 During the debate between the Second
and Ninth Circuits and before the decision by the Supreme Court in
Boutilier, Congress in 1965 amended section 212(a)(4) of the Act by
adding the words "sexual deviation. 8 74 The additional words were in-
tended to make clear any doubts about Congressional intentions. 875 In
light of the Boutilier decision the addition was unnecessary, but it did
provide double protection that no homosexual would enter the United
States.
876
The second exclusionary criterion that often affects homosexual
aliens is the exclusion of persons who have committed crimes of moral
turpitude.8 77 The statute does not merely apply to those who have been
convicted, but also to those who admit the crime or admit the acts that
870. 387 U.S. at 125. Justice Fortas concurred with this dissent. Justice Brennan also
dissented, id., relying on Judge Moore's dissent below, 363 F.2d 488, 496 (1966).
871. 387 U.S. at 127.
872. Id. at 129.
873. Id. at 130 (quoting 363 F.2d at 497-98 (Moore, J., dissenting)).
874. Act of Oct. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 919 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4) (1978)).
875. See H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1965); S. REP. No. 748, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1965).
876. The amendment also affected aliens who applied for a change of status. In Campos
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 402 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1968), a young man who
had lived in the United States for 11 years sought a change of status from non-immigrant
student to permanent resident. Although he had been deemed admissible at the time of his
entry, Campos was re-evaluated when he applied for change of status and was ordered to be
deported for allegedly being a "Class A-Sexual Deviate." The Ninth Circuit upheld the
deportation order.
877. See note 847 & accompanying text supra.
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constitute the crime. Because there is no judicial review when a visa is
denied, the question of whether admission of homosexual acts that are
not crimes in one's home country would affect the admissibility of an
alien remains unanswered.
878
Courts have easily found various crimes involving homosexuality
to be crimes involving "moral turpitude." In Ganduxe y Marino v.
Mur/f, 879 the court found that the offense of disorderly conduct by loi-
tering for purpose of inducing men to commit acts against nature, for
which the penalty was a twenty-five dollar fine or ten days in jail, was
clearly "a crime involving moral turpitude." The case hinged on the
fact that the defendant had failed to report this arrest. Such a misrep-
resentation was material, said the court, because if the Immigration and
Naturalization Service had known of it, he could have been excluded
as "a psychopathic personality." This resulted in a no-win situation for
Sr. Ganduxe y Marino for if he told the truth, he was excludable under
one section and if he lied, he could be deported for perjury. In
Babouris v. Esperdy,8 0 a deportation for a conviction under the same
disorderly conduct statute used in Ganduxe was upheld. The court re-
fused to accept petitioner's argument that under New York law the par-
ticular action was considered an "offense" not a crime, ruling that an
alien's status did not depend on the classifications of misconduct
adopted by states.""'
Given the fact that in twenty-nine of the fifty states homosexual
acts are still illegal, 8 2 and that often homosexuals are singled out for
harassment by law enforcement officials, it is more likely that homosex-
ually active aliens will run afoul of the law than heterosexually active
878. The Soviet Union and the United States are the only major countries in Europe
and North America still punishing homosexuals criminally. W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREE-
DOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 293 (1973).
879. 183 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afdmem., 378 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 824 (1960).
880. 269 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 913 (1960). Barbouris was or-
dered deported after living in the United States 39 years.
881. Id. at 623. In another case involving the New York disorderly conduct statute, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a violation of
that statute was a "crime involving moral turpitude." Wyngaard v. Kennedy, 295 F.2d 184
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961). The court summarily avoided the issue of
whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague, ruling that the issue was settled by the
Supreme Court in Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). In Jordan, the Court held that
the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" did not lack sufficiently definite standards.
For other cases involving crimes of "moral turpitude," see Marinelli v. Ryan, 285 F.2d
474 (2d Cir. 1961); Hudson v. Esperdy, 200 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam).
882. See Appendix A infra.
aliens. The homosexual alien who is caught runs the risk of deporta-
tion and the inability to change his immigrant status.
For the homosexual alien who seeks naturalization the standards
differ from those of admission.883 To become a citizen, the petitioner
must prove that during the statutory waiting period he or she was a
"person of good moral character. '884 Good moral character is not de-
fined in the statute, and homosexuals are not specifically mentioned as
persons who do not have good moral character.
885
In In re Schmidt, 886 the court ruled that a lesbian did not possess
the requisite "good moral character" to be naturalized despite the fol-
lowing findings: all of the alien's homosexual behavior had been in the
privacy of her home with adult partners; she had been regularly and
successfully employed for fourteen years; she had never been convicted
of a crime; and her reputation, except for her sexual preference, was
beyond reproach. In support of its conclusion that the woman's admit-
ted practices of sexual deviation were not "consistent with good moral
character as the 'ordinary man or woman' sees it,"887 the court quoted a
New Jersey divorce opinion: "Few behavioral deviations are more of-
fensive to American mores than is homosexuality.
'888
Three more recent cases have taken a broader view of "good moral
character." In re Labad, 88 9 decided in 1971 by a United States Dis-
trict Court in New York, found a homosexual man to be "a person of
good moral character" and entitled to naturalization. The court made
clear its own position by saying, "If the criterion were our own personal
moral principles, we would deny the petition, subscribing as we person-
ally do to the general 'revulsion' or 'moral conviction or instinctive
feeling' against homosexuality." 890 Laying aside its revulsion, how-
ever, the court focused on whether the challenged conduct was private
or public in nature: "[P]rivate conduct which is not harmful to others,
even though it may violate the personal moral code of most of us, does
not violate public morality which is the only proper concern of
883. In this section it is to be presumed that the alien was not excludable at the time of
admission; that is, the alien was not a homosexual person at the time of admission, although
he or she may be a homosexual person at the time of the petition for naturalization.
884. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1976).
885. The statute does name drunkards, adulterers, murderers, prostitutes and gamblers.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1976).
886. 56 Misc. 2d 456, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct., Dutchess County 1968).
887. Id. at 460, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
888. H. v. H., 59 N.J. Super. 227, 237, 157 A.2d 721, 727 (1959).
889. 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
890. Id. at 927.
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§ 1427."891
In 1973, in Kovacs v. United States,8 92 the Second Circuit upheld
the denial of a petition for naturalization of a homosexual immigrant.
However, the lack of good moral character found in this case resulted
not from the petitioner's homosexuality but from his false testimony.
The court said, "This is not a case like Labady. . . where the applicant
testified truthfully about prior homosexual acts, yet still was granted
naturalization because of the private character of his sexual life. Had
Kovacs testified truthfully about his past, the petition might well have
been granted.
'893
The trend begun with Labady was continued in In re Brodie,
8 94
wherein the court granted naturalization despite the applicant's homo-
sexuality. The court focused on the private nature of the alien's sexual
life, his lack of contact with minors, and his otherwise good behavior.
The court also noted that homosexual acts were no longer criminal be-
tween consenting adults under state law and that a local city council
had passed an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in employment
against homosexuals. The court concluded: "Noting these indications,
I am convinced that the community regards homosexual behavior be-
tween consenting adults with tolerance, if not indifference. Brodie is a
person of good moral character and his petition should be granted." 895
Brodie, Kovacs, and Labady apparently moved the Immigration
and Nationalization Service to reformulate its policy. In August, 1976,
the Service announced a new policy regarding the naturalization of
homosexuals: "The fact that a petitioner for naturalization is or has
been a practicing sexual deviate, during the relevant statutory period is
not, in itself, a sufficient basis for finding that he lacks the necessary
good moral character."8 96 The interpretation continues: "However,
89 1. Id. at 927-28. The court reviewed at length the changing position of the homosex-
ual in the United States with regard to criminal statutes and employment. The court then
drew this conclusion with respect to the petitioner: "He has led a quiet, peaceful, law-abid-
ing life as an immigrant in the United States. Although he has engaged on occasion in
purely private homosexual relations with consenting adults, he has not corrupted the morals
of others, such as minors, or engaged in any publicly offensive activities, such as solicitation
or public display. He is gainfully employed, highly regarded by his employer and associates,
and he has submitted to therapy that was unsuccessful. Under all of the circumstances,
setting aside our personal moral views, we cannot say that his conduct has violated public
morality.. . ." Id. at 930 (emphasis added).
892. 476 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1973).
893. Id. at 845.
894. 394 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Or. 1975).
895. Id.
896. Immigration and Naturalization Service Interpretations § 316. 1(f)(7) (1976) (em-
phasis added).
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where there has been a conviction of a homosexual act or the admission
or the commission of such an act in ajurisdiction in which it is a crimi-
nal offense. . . the Service view is that a showing of good moral char-
acter is precluded. '897 Thus, homosexuality per se does not presently
prevent naturalization. However, the commission of a homosexual act
or admission of such an act can be cause for the finding of lack of good
moral character. This policy results in an interesting anomaly because
in twenty-one states homosexual conduct is irrelevant while in the
other twenty-nine states it is grounds for denial of a naturalization
petition. 898
The position and policies of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service have come under increasing criticism from gay rights and civil
rights leaders. Under the Carter administration, Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service administrators have met with National Gay Task
Force8 99 members to discuss changes in policy. As a consequence of a
meeting held on April 4, 1978, between the National Gay Task Force,
the Surgeon General of the United States, and the top representatives
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States Pub-
lic Health Service will no longer define homosexual persons as either
"sex deviants" or "psychopathic personalities." 900 This change of pol-
icy should mean that homosexual aliens will no longer automatically
be denied entry into the United States because of their homosexual sta-
tus. If the applicant has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude,
however, that conviction would still constitute a bar to entry.
Criminal Issues
XVI. Criminalization of Homosexual Behavior
This Article does not attempt a descriptive survey of cases dealing
with criminal charges of sodomy or other sexual acts of homosexual
897. Id. (emphasis added).
898. See Appendix A infra.
899. The National Gay Task Force is an organization devoted to gay civil rights. See
note 70 supra.
900. This change reflects the position of the American Psychiatric Association. The
Public Health Service has announced that it will inform its officers at border crossings of the
new policy; similar information will be given to Immigration officials, and State Department
Visa officers. It's Time, May 1978, at 1-2.
After trying for 25 years, a Danish-born lesbian was granted United States citizenship
in March 1978. She said that she had spent the last 17 years haggling with immigration
officials over the connection between her sexual preference and "her suitability to become an
official American." The woman reported that she did not know why her petition was sud-
denly granted. Lesbian Connection, June 1978, at 8.
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persons;90' they are simply too numerous.902 Moreover, no aspect of
homosexual behavior has been more thoroughly examined by legal
scholars than the criminal area. The criminalization of homosexual be-
havior has been analyzed from a constitutional viewpoint, 90 3 a moral
viewpoint,9°4 a psychiatric viewpoint,90 5 a sociological viewpoint 90 6 and
last, but hardly least, from the viewpoint of a right to privacy.907 With
the proposal of the Model Penal Code,90 8 many articles were written
discussing a particular state's law in the area of homosexual criminal
conduct.90 9 These articles provide a wealth of information with regard
901. All the sexual acts penalized when committed between persons of the same sex also
can be performed by persons of the opposite sex. Laws forbidding certain sexual acts often
do not differentiate as to heterosexuals or homosexuals, married or unmarried persons. Kin-
sey estimated that if all the laws then currently on the books forbidding various sex acts were
enforced, 95% of all white American males would be subject to prosecution. A. KINSEY, W.
POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF THE HUMAN MALE 390-93 (1948).
902. See, e.g., 81 C.J.S. Sodomy §§ 1-16 (1977); 70 AM. JUR. 2d Sodomy §§ 1-26 (1973).
Many cases appear in West's Decennial Digests and General Digest under the topic Sodomy.
903. See Hindes, Morality Enforcement Through the Criminal Law and the Modern Doc-
trine of Substantive Due Process, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 344 (1977); Comment, Homosexuality
and the Law--4 Right to be Different, 38 ALB. L. REV. 84 (1973); Comment, The Constitu-
tionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (1976); Note, The Constitutionality of
Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974). See also W.
BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1973).
904. See Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: 4 Moral
Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977); Hefner, The Legal Enforcement of Morality, 40
U. COLO. L. REV. 199 (1968); Comment, Private ConsensualAdult Behavior: The Require-
ment of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581 (1967).
905. See Bowman & Engle, .4 Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Homosexuality, 29
TEMP. L.Q. 273 (1956).
906. See Ford, Homosexuals and the Law: Why the Status Quo', 5 CAL. W.L. REV. 232
(1969).
907. See Richards, supra note 25; Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GON. L. REV. 587 (1977);
Silver, The Future of Constitutional Privacy, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 211 (1977); Taber, Consent,
Not Morality, as the Proper Limitation on Sexual Privacy, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637
(1977). The preceding articles are not limited to or focused solely on homosexual conduct.
908. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Official Draft, 1962).
909. Fields, Privacy 'Rights" and the New Oregon Criminal Code, 51 ORE. L. REV. 494
(1972); Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the Proposed New Maryland Criminal Code.-
Should Private, Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded', 30 MD. L. REV. 91
(1970); Johnson, Crimes Against Nature in Tennessee: Out of the Dark and Into the Light?, 5
MEM. STATE U.L. REV. 319 (1975); Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32
BROOKLYN L. REV. 274 (1966) (New York); Potter, Sex Offenses, 28 ME. L. REV. 65 (1976)
(Maine); Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669
(1963) (general discussion); Stimmel, Criminality of Voluntary SexualActs in Colorado, 40 U.
COLO. L. REv. 268 (1968); Von Beitel, The Criminalization of Private HomosexualActs: A
Jurisprudential Case Study of a Decision by the Texas Bar Penal Code Revision Committee, 6
HUMAN RIGHTS 23 (1976); Comment, Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability of Legisla-
tive Proscription, 30 ALB. L. REV. 291 (1966) (New York); Comment, Revision of the Law of
the Sex Crimes in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 78 DICK. L. REV. 73 (1973); Comment,
Criminal Law - Consensual Homosexual Behavior - The Needfor Legislative Reform, 57
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to the history of such laws and their jurisprudential development.
Given the wealth of material in this area coupled with the focus of
this Article on the civil problems of homosexual persons, a detailed
description of the cases in this area seems unnecessary. However, since
the criminality of homosexual behavior affects the homosexual person's
ability to be employed, to be naturalized, to hold a professional license
and to obtain a security clearance, 910 to mention only a few instances,
the reader should know the current state of the law in this area. There-
fore, Appendix A911 details, by state, the various statutes either prohib-
iting or decriminalizing homosexual behavior.
Many state statutes, that have criminalized homosexual behavior,
have also been subject to numerous constitutional challenges. Appen-
dix B lists by state the most recent cases challenging constitutionality of
the respective statute.
One such case, however, warrants special consideration. In Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,912 two adult, sexually active,
homosexual men sought in a federal district court a declaratory judg-
ment that the Virginia statute which criminalized sodomy was uncon-
stitutional. The statute under attack proscribed: "Crimes Against
Ky. L.J. 591 (1969) (Kentucky); Comment, Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults- Why
Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206 (1971) (California); Comment, Oral Copulation. A Constitutional Cur-
tain Must be Drawn, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 523 (1974) (California); Note, Deviate Sexual
Behavior Under the New Illinois Criminal Code, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 220.
910. "Once convicted or once their condition becomes known to the relevant authorities,
male sex deviants (like the leprous or the insane) must expect some legal and social restric-
tions. If they work in certain fields, such as teaching, or governmental posts involving secur-
ity risk, they will lose their jobs. If they belong to a profession with strict disciplinary rules,
like solicitors and medical men, they may have their license to practice taken away. They
will not be accepted for admission to the armed forces or the merchant navy, they will be
found unsuitable for a wide range of employment such as police, prison service, youth work-
ers and so forth. They will never be considered for important posts in politics or public life.
They may even encounter difficulties if they want to enter as students at a university. They
will be rejected if they apply to emigrate to another country." D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY
91 (1967).
911. The reader should be warned that this area of the law is subject to rapid changes
and should be aware that this chart may soon be outdated.
912. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afdmem., 425 U.S. 901, rehearing denied, 425
U.S. 985 (1976). For commentary on this case, see Comment, Constitutional Protection of
Private Sexual Conduct Among Consenting Adults. Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, 62
IOWA L. REV. 568 (1976); Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney." A Set-Back for the
Right of Privacy, 65 Ky. L.J. 748 (1977); 15 DUQ. L. REV. 123 (1976).
Many of the important civil cases, previously discussed, explicitly refer to the court's
decision in Doe. See Cyr v. Walls, 439 F. Supp. 697, 700-01 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Saal v.
Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 198 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air
Force, Civ. No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976) reported in 2 SEX. L. REP. 53, rev'd, 47
U.S.L.W. 2361 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 1978).
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Nature-If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute
animal or carnally know any male or female person by anus or by or
with the mouth or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or
she shall be guilty of a felony."
913
The statute applies to heterosexuals as well as homosexuals and, at
least on its face, to married persons as well as unmarried persons. The
district court upheld that statute and apparently approved state crimi-
nal intervention in adult private consensual sex which did not fit the
traditional standard of penile-vaginal sexual intercourse between a
man and a woman. When the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's decision, the press decried the decision as a setback for gay
rights.914 A close examination of the opinion, however, shows that it
represents a much broader setback for all nonmarital sexual conduct.
The majority opinion concluded that there was no constitutional
bar to punishing homosexual behavior.915 The court relied almost ex-
clusively on Griswold v. Conneciicut91 6 which it restricted completely to
its facts, interpreting the rule of that case to apply only to marital pri-
vacy. In finding that extra-marital sex, especially homosexual conduct,
is not constitutionally protected, the court relied upon Justice Harlan's
dissent in Poe v. Ullman,917 which was cited with approval by Justice
Goldberg in Griswold.
Because the right of privacy enunciated in Griswold applied only
in the marital context, homosexual conduct, which "is obviously no por-
tion of marriage, home or family life,"918 was outside the pale of consti-
tutional protection. The court concluded that "[i]f a State determines
that punishment therefor, even when committed in the home, is appro-
priate in the promotion of morality and decency, it is not for the courts
to say that the State is not free to do so."'919
The court did not clearly indicate whether the state was constitu-
913. VA. CODE § 18.1-212 (1950).
914. TIME, Apr. 12, 1976, at 50.
915. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
916. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a forceful argument that Griswold should be applied to
protect homosexual conduct see Richards, supra note 25.
917. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
918. 403 F. Supp. at 1202 (emphasis added). One of the basic premises of this Article
illustrates. that the court's statement is patently erroneous. A close examination of this Arti-
cle will reveal factual evidence that homosexual persons marry in the traditional sense and
also in the nontraditional sense, consequently homosexual persons have spouses and/or
partners; they often are parents and have children; they all have families in the sense of
mothers, fathers and siblings; and they have homes and participate in family life in a variety
of ways.
919. Id.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tionally required to establish a legitimate interest in criminalizing such
conduct. However, the court observed that P such proof were neces-
sary, the state of Virginia had satisfied the requisite burden because the
statute was directed to the suppression of crime.920 The circularity of
that reasoning is clear: a state may declare conduct criminal in order to
suppress crime. Moreover, the court noted that the state did not have
to show that moral delinquency actually resulted from homosexuality,
but only that the proscribed conduct was likely to contribute to moral
delinquency. 92' In support of this conclusion, the court pointed to the
longevity of the Virginia statute, the fact that other states had similar
provisions and, lastly, to the Judaic and Christian origins of such
proscriptions.
922
In a forceful dissent, Judge Merhige pointed out that the court had
ignored the Supreme Court's decisions in Eisenstadt v. Baird,923 which
extended the Griswold protections to single unmarried persons, and in
Stanley v. Georgia,924 which protected private actions in the home. He
concluded that the right of privacy is not limited to marital relation-
ships but that all intimate personal decisions or private matters are con-
stitutionally protected, 925 observing that "[lthe right to select consenting
adult sexual partners must be considered within this category.
'926
Not only did Judge Merhige conclude that private adult consen-
sual homosexual conduct was constitutionally protected, but he felt
that Virginia had failed to show any compelling interest for its regula-
tion.927 He noted that the state had made no offer of evidence that
homosexual conduct caused society any significant harm and summa-
rily rejected, as "unworthy ofjudicial response," the suggestion that the
prohibition of homosexual conduct would encourage new heterosexual
marriages and prevent divorce.928 Judge Merhige observed that the
majority decision was based solely on the promotion of morality and
decency,92 9 which was beyond the state's power, and concluded that
"the issue centers not around morality or decency, but the constitu-
920. Id.
921. Id.
922. Id. at 1202-03.
923. 405 U.S. 430 (1972).
924. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
925. 403 F. Supp. at 1205.
926. Id. at 1204.
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tional right of privacy."
930
The district court's decision was appealed directly to the United
States Supreme Court and was summarily affirmed. 931 The judicial ob-
ligation of the Supreme Court to explain its decision is particularly
compelling in light of the district court's failure to consider the two
recent Supreme Court decisions in Stanley and Eisenstadt. The
Supreme Court's failure to address the constitutional issues raised by
Doe has been severely criticized by legal scholars and popularly inter-
preted as a continuing license for harassment and discrimination
against homosexual individuals.
Conclusion
The purpose of this Article is to bring together all the legal sources
necessary to give the reader a comprehensive picture of the legal status
of homosexual individuals in our country today and is intended to be
useful not only to the legal scholar but to the practitioner and layperson
as well.
Because this area of the law is so young and so fragmented it has
not been possible to find broad rules which cut across all the areas in-
volved. However, a thorough reading of the Article does reveal system-
atic and pervasive discrimination against homosexual individuals in
our courts and dispels the popular idea that, because homosexual indi-
viduals occupy every walk of life, there is no real discrimination
against them.932 On the contrary, homosexual individuals are penal-
ized in all aspects of their lives because of their sexual preference.
They lose their jobs, their children, and numerous other precious rights
as a result of many current judicial policies.
In the short time since this Article was completed, there have been
a few judicial and legislative victories for the proponents of homosex-
ual rights. Leonard Matlovich's case against the U.S. Air Force was
remanded to the district court by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court on the grounds that the Air Force had failed to rationally explain
why Sgt. Matlovich should not qualify as one of the "exceptional" ho-
930. Id.
931. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens noted probable juris-
diction. However, the vote of four justices is needed to obtain plenary consideration with
oral argument. Ohio v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 246-47 (1959).
932. See Leo, Homosexuality: Tolerance vs. Approval, TIME, Jan. 8, 1979, at 48, 51;
Robinson, Invisible Men: The Issue is Visibility, Not Discrimination, THE NEw REPUBLIC,
June 3, 1968, at 9.
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mosexual servicement who is retained. 933 John Singer was ordered re-
instated by the Federal Employee Appeals Authority of the United
States Civil Service Commission 934 and the Internal Revenue Service
finally issued a Revenue Ruling making gay organizations eligible for
tax-exempt status.935 The beginning months of 1978 saw numerous
gay-rights ordinances overthrown by popular referendum, 936 but in
November of 1978 the attempt to repeal the Seattle, Washington ordi-
nance protecting gay persons failed and in California, the infamous
Briggs Amendment, which would have discriminated against gay
teachers, failed to win popular approval. 937 There are some signs of
progress, but they are hard won and, as this Article reveals, such suc-
cesses only scratch the surface.
The resolution of the problem is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, at a minimum, judges, in particular, as well as attorneys,
need to examine their homophobic attitudes and the many popularly
held myths and stereotypes. Only after such a reevaluation of judicial
and societal attitudes can our legal system begin to achieve a fair and
equal application of the laws to all persons.
Oh who is that young sinner with the handcuffs on his wrists?
And what has he been after that they groan and shake their fists?
And wherefore is he wearing such a conscience-stricken air?
Oh they're taking him to prison for the colour of his hair.
'Tis a shame to human nature, such a head of hair as his;
In the good old time 'twas hanging for the colour that it is;
Though hanging isn't bad enough and flaying would be fair
For the nameless and abominable colour of his hair.
Oh a deal of pains he's taken and a pretty price he's paid
To hide his poll or dye it of a mentionable shade;
But they've pulled the beggar's hat off for the world to see and stare,
And they're haling him to justice for the colour of his hair.
Now 'tis oakum for his fingers and the treadmill for his feet,
And the quarry-gang on Portland in the cold and in the heat,
And between his spells of labour in the time he has to spare
He can curse the God that made him for the colour of his hair.
A.E. Housman938
933. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 45 U.S.L.W. 2361 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 1978).
See text accompanying notes 303-16 supra.
934. Appeal of John F. Singer, Dec. No. SE07138002 (Federal Employee Appeals Auth.,
Seattle Field Office July 21, 1978). See text accompanying notes 134-48 supra.
935. Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-33 I.R.B. 10. See text accompanying notes 658-90 supra.
936. See It's Time, June-July 1978, at 1.
937. See The Advocate, Dec. 13, 1978, at 9.
938. THE COLLECTED POEMS OF A.E. HOUSEMAN 233 (1965). This poem was written
near the time of the trial of Oscar Wilde.
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Appendix A
Part One-State Statutes Prohibiting Private,
Consensual, Adult Homosexual Sexual Actsa
State and Code
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (Michie
1978)
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411,
13-1412 (West Supp. 1977)c
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977)
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-3502 (West
1973)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West
1976)
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (1977)
IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Supp. 1978)
KAN. STAT. § 21-3505 (1974)
Ky. REV. STAT. § 510.100 (1975)
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:89,
14:89.1 (West Supp. 1978)
MD. ANN. CODE §§ 27-553, 27-554
(Michie Supp. 1977)
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 272, § 34 and
§ 35 (Michie 1968)
MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 750.158,
750.338, 750.338a (1968)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West
Supp. 1978)
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972)
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon
Supp. 1978)
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-5-505
(1975)
NEV. REv. STAT. § 201.190 (1977)
Type of Statute
modem definition b (married
couples excluded)














and perverted sex practices ' 'e
common law definition; "unnatural
and lascivious act"
common law definition; "gross
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 143-1 (West
1969)
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKin-
ney 1975)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886
(West 1951)
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124
(Purdon 1973)
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-10-1
(1969)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (1976)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1975)
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06
(Vernon 1974)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (Supp.
1977)
VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (Supp. 1978)
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West
Supp. 1978)
common law definition













Part Two-States Which Have Decriminalized Private,










Law and Effective Date
1978 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 166 (effective Jan. 1,
1980).
1975 Cal. Stat., ch. 71, § 7 (effective July 1, 1976).
1971 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 121, § 1 (approved June
2, 1971).
1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 828, § 214 (effective Oct. 1,
1971).
58 Del. Laws, ch. 497, § 1 (effective Apr. 1, 1973).
1972 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 9, § 1 (effective Jan. 1,
1973).
1961 IIL. Laws, p. 1983, § 11-2 (effective Jan. 1,
1962).
1976 Ind. Acts, P.L. 148, § 24 (effective July 1,
1977).
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1976 Iowa Acts, ch. 1245, § 520 (effective Jan. 1,
1978).
1975 Me. Acts, ch. 499, § 5 (effective Mar. 1, 1976).
1977 Neb. Laws, L.B. 38, § 328 (effective July 1,
1978).
1973 N.H. Laws, 532: 26, x (effective Nov. 1,
1973).
1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 109, § 8.
1977 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 122, § 1 (approved Mar.
19, 1977).
1972 Ohio Laws, 134 v H 511, § 2 (effective Jan. 1,
1974).
1971 Or. Laws, ch. 743, § 432 (167.040) (effective
Jan. 1, 1972).
1976 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 158, § 22-8 (effective Apr.
1, 1977).
1977 Vt. Acts, No. 51, § 3 (effective July 1, 1977).
1975 Wash. Laws, 1st. exec. sess., ch. 260 (effective
July 1, 1976).
1976 W. Va. Acts, ch. 43 (effective June 11, 1976).
1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws, cli. 70, § 3 (effective May
27, 1977).
a. Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have laws forbidding "deviant"
sexual behavior. Even though these laws include nearly every type of sexual act except
penile-vaginal intercourse, the crime is usually called "sodomy". Those statutes prohibiting
sexual relations only between people of the same sex have been indicated as proscribing
"homosexual acts only".
b. States using modem definitions of the prohibited acts specifically describe what is
prohibited rather than using general terms such as "sodomy" or the vague common-law
definition. See note 4 infra.
c. Effective October 1, 1978.
d. States using the common law definition of "sodomy" use language similar to "the
abominable and detestable crime against nature with mankind or beast."
e. Defined in the statute as oral sexual acts.
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Appendix B
Most Recent Court Decisions on the Constitutionlity of State Statutes
Prohibiting Private Consensual Adult Homosexual Sexual.4ctsa
Case Name
Horn v. State, 41 Ala.
App. 489, 273 So. 2d
249 (1973)
Williams v. State, 55
Ala. App. 436, 316 So.
2d 362 (1975)
State v. Bateman, 113
Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6,
cert. denied, 429 U.S.
864 (1976)
Carter v. State, 255 Ark.








Stewart v. United States,
364 A.2d 1205 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1976)
Bell v. State, 289 So. 2d
388 (Fla. 1973)
State v. Sandstrom, 344
So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1976)
Wanzer v. State, 232
Ga. 523, 207 S.E.2d 466
(1974)
State v. Carringer, 95
Idaho 929, 523 P.2d 532
(1974)
State v. Thompson, 221









not vague or overbroad;
did not violate right of
privacy or freedom of
expression
not vague or cruel and
unusual punishment;
did not violate equal
protection or establish
religion; no standing to
raise privacy issue
did not violate equal
protection or establish




not vague; statute not
overbroad
not vague
no standing to raise pri-
vacy or equal protection











State v. Lindsey, 310 So.
2d 89 (La. 1975)
State v. McCoy, 337 So.
2d 192 (La. 1976)
Hughes v. State, 14 Md.
App. 497, 287 A.2d 299




298, 318 N.E.2d 478
(1974)
Commonwealth v.
Gallant, 369 N.E.2d 707
(1977)
People v. Dexter, 6
Mich. App. 247, 148
N.W.2d 915 (1967)
People v. Howell, 395
Mich. 16, 238 N.W.2d
148 (1976)
People v. Penn, 70
Mich. App. 638, 247
N.W.2d 575 (1976)
People v. Clark, 68
Mich. App. 48, 241
N.W.2d 756 (1976)
People v. Jones, 75
Mich. App. 261, 254
N.W.2d 863 (1977)
State v. Witt, 308 Minn.
214, 245 N.W.2d 612
(1976)
State v. Mays, 329 So.
2d 65 (Miss. 1976)
State v. Crawford, 478
S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1972)
State v. Ballew, 166
Mont. 270, 532 P.2d 407
(1975)
did not violate right of
privacy
not vague; did not vio-
late equal protection; no
standing to raise privacy
issue
ch. 272, § 35 is not
vague but is inapplica-
ble to adult, consensual
private acts







as applied to acts in





























Hogan v. State, 84 Nev.
372, 441 P.2d 620 (1968)
Allan v. State, 91 Nev.
650, 541 P.2d 656 (1975)
State v. Lair, 62 N.J.
388, 301 A.2d 748
(1973)




State v. Enslin, 25 N.C.
App. 662, 214 S.E.2d
318 (1975)
State v. Jarrell, 24 N.C.
App. 610, 211 S.E.2d
837 (1975)
Canfield v. State, 506
P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim.
App.), appeal dismissed,
414 U.S. 991 (1973)
Carson v. State, 529
P.2d 499 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1974)
United States v. Brewer,
363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D.
Penn.), affd, 491 F.2d
751 (1973)
State v. Levitt, 371 A.2d
596 (1977)
no cases
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S.
48 (1975)
Young v. State, 531
S.W.2d 560 (1975)
Pruett v. State, 463




no standing to raise pri-
vacy issue




an appeal of a nonfinal
order
not vague
no standing to raise pri-
vacy issue
not vague or overbroad
not vague
constitutional as to pris-
oners; no standing to
argue rights of non-pris-
oners
not vague; no standing
to raise privacy issue
not vague
not vague; no decision
on overbreadth or pri-
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403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975), affdmem.,
425 U.S. 901, rehearing
denied, 425 U.S. 985
(1976)
Jones v. State, 55 Wis.
2d 742, 200 N.W.2d 587
(1972)
Gossett v. State, 73 Wis.
2d 135, 242 N.W.2d 899
(1976)
a. The most recent decisions on the constitutionality of state "sodomy" statutes have
been listed by state although some of the cases may not refer to the most recent version of a
particular state's law. In some states, the statutes have merely been reenacted and renum-
bered, but in other states substantial changes in wording have been made since these deci-
sions were handed down.
b. The statute does not violate due process because of vagueness.
c. The court was split 3-3 on this issue.
see text accompanying
notes 911-30 supra
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